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I. INTRODUCTION
The Medicare Utilization and Quality Control Peer Review Organization (PRO)
program is an administrative law curiosity. The PRO program is the federal
government's primary tool for assuring that services provided to Medicare benefi-
ciaries are medically necessary, are of a quality that meets professionally recognized
standards of health care, and are provided in an appropriate setting.I It both protects
the health and safety of Medicare beneficiaries and controls the cost of the Medicare
program.
The power of PROs over Medicare providers, practitioners, and beneficiaries is
sweeping. If a PRO determines that medical services do not meet utilization or quality
standards, it may retrospectively deny Medicare payment for those services. 2 A PRO
may also deny payment prospectively for some prescribed procedures, effectively
blocking a beneficiary from receiving those services unless the beneficiary can
independently afford them. 3 It may also recommend to the Office of the Inspector
General (OIG) of the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) that a
provider or practitioner 4 be fined or excluded from receiving payment under the
Medicare program. As a practical matter, exclusion from Medicare may make it
impossible for a physician to practice; thus the PRO's power over physicians is nearly
as great as that of state licensure boards.
More striking than the scope of the PRO's authority is the fact that in many
instances PRO decisions are either not reviewable or are reviewable only after they
have been implemented. A hospital or physician, for example, cannot in most cases
obtain independent review of the decision of a PRO to deny payment for a claim from
either an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) or a court-the PRO's decision is final. 5
PRO-initiated sanctions and penalties assessed against providers and practitioners are
usually not reviewable until months after they have been implemented.6
From an administrative law perspective, however, the most striking feature of
PROs is that, despite their substantial, often unreviewable power, they are private
entities that provide services for the federal government on a contractual basis. 7 The
1. Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1320c-3(a)(1) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
2. Id. § 1320c-3(a)(2).
3. HEALTH CARE FIN. ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HumAN SERvS., TIRD SCOPE OF WORK § X, at 26 (1987)
[hereinafter THIRD SCOPE OF WORK]. The Third Scope of Work is the request for proposals governing PRO contracts during
the current contract cycle; for further explanation, see infra text following note 56.
4. Under the Medicare law, a provider is an institutional health care entity, such as a hospital or nursing home,
42 U.S.C. § 1395x(u). A practitioner is a physician or other individual who provides health care.
5. See infra text accompanying notes 423-27.
6. 42 U.S.C. § 1320c-5(b)(2) (1982); 42 C.F.R. §§ 1004.100(b), .130(a)(3) (1987). A recent draft report of the
HHS OI notes that on average it takes 15 months from the date of a PRO recommendation to the OIG to completion
of the appeal. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HumAN SERvS., THE UTILIZATON AND QuAmrrY
CONTROL PEER REviEw ORGANtZATION (PRO) PROGRAM: SANCTION Acrrvmss (draft) 16 (Mar. 1988) [hereinafter OIG
SANCTION REPORT]. There is, however, a special exception for certain rural practitioners, who may receive a pre-exclusion
ALJ hearing. 42 U.S.C. § 1320c-5(b)(5) (1982).
7. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1320c-i to -2(b) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
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private nature of PROs is intentional and based on the philosophy of medical peer
review. From the beginning, PROs (like the Professional Standards Review Organi-
zations before them) were established so that private doctors participating in the
Medicare program could have their work reviewed by other private doctors, with a
minimum of interference from the federal government. The quasi-private nature of
PROs is also reflected in the scope of their activities. Though many PROs were
formed explicitly to perform Medicare review, they are not limited to this function;
indeed federal law encourages them also to perform review for private and other
public entities. 8 A recent study found that, in fact, 73% of PROs conduct review for
business entities and 68% for state Medicaid programs. 9 Several spent less than 50%
of their time on Medicare-related activities.
As private entities, PROs are not generally subject to the statutes governing
federal administrative law. The court in Public Citizen Health Research Group v.
HHS10 concluded that Professional Standards Review Organizations (PSROs), the
predecessors of PROs, were private independent contractors and not federal agencies
for purposes of the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). A more recent case held that
PROs are not federal agencies for purposes of the attorneys fees provisions of the
Equal Access to Justice Act.'1 Presumably PROs are also not federal agencies for
purposes of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).12
This is not to say that PROs are unfettered by administrative law. The federal
PRO statute, regulations, and Manual specify procedures to be followed by the PROs
for rulemaking, adjudication, and data disclosure. Indeed, as the importance of the
PRO program has grown, these requirements have tended to proliferate, providing
increasingly more protection for those affected by the PROs, but also leaving the law
affecting PROs in an increasingly confused state. Moreover, in carrying out their
federal review activities, PROs are, as will be discussed below, federal actors subject
to the due process requirements of the Constitution. 13 There is, therefore, a
substantial body of statutory, regulatory, and constitutional law that dictates how the
PROs should conduct themselves in relating to the beneficiaries, providers, and
practitioners they regulate.
8. Id. § 1320c-3(a)(1 1) (1982). See Hastings, Legal Issues Raised by Private Review Activities of Medical
Peer-Review Organizations, 8 J. HEAL'H POL. POL'Y & L. 293 (1983) (an excellent article considering the PRO private
review side, which is not considered in this Article).
9. OFFICE OF INsPECrOR GENERAL, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HumtA SERvs., THE UTnizAToi AND QuArr CONMROL
PEER REvisw ORGArIZsaaON (PRO) PRooRsQI: AN EXPLORAT7ON OF PRoGRAM Ep'Ecrrvemss (draft) 3 (June 1988)
[hereinafter OIG EFmcnvssa REPorT].
10. 668 F.2d 537 (1981). This holding is reaff'med by the more recently adopted PRO statute, which explicitly
states that PROs are not federal agencies under the FOIA. 42 U.S.C. § 1320c-9(a) (1982).
11. Oster v. Bowen, 682 F. Supp. 853, 856-57 (E.D. Va. 1988); 28 U.S.C. § 2412(b) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
12. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559 (1982); but see J. BLui, P. GE srTas & J. RABwOW, PSROs An Tn LAw 119-29
(1977) (arguing that PSROs should be considered federal agencies under the APA and FOIA).
13. See infra notes 98-99, 259-70. The question of whether PROs are federal actors has not come up in cases to
date. Most decided cases have challenged sanctions imposed by the OIG, which clearly is part of the federal government.
In these cases, the question of the constitutionality of PRO procedures arises only derivatively, as part of the process of
generating sanctions ultimately imposed by the OIG. In one case, however, Kuown v. Southeast Mo. PSRO, 811 F.2d
401 (8th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1994 (1988), the court decided that PSROs were federal actors absolutely
immune from civil rights claims under the Constitution and thus held implicitly that they were in fact subject to the
Constitution, as the question of immunity would not arise were they not.
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This Article examines both what the law with respect to PROs is and what the
law should be. Part II provides a general description of the PRO program. Parts III
through X consider the following eight areas in which administration of the PRO
program affects beneficiaries, providers, and practitioners: the adoption by HHS of
rules, policies, contracts, and instructions that govern the PROs; the formulation and
dissemination of criteria, norms, and standards by the PROs; the PRO process for
sanctioning providers and practitioners who provide care that is unnecessary or of
substandard quality; denial of payment for substandard care; the investigation by the
PROs of beneficiary complaints regarding practitioners and providers; the PRO
process for reviewing proposed hospital discharges of beneficiaries; the processes
through which PROs deny payment for improper utilization of medical care and
reconsider those denials; and the considerations governing PRO data dissemination
and confidentiality. As to each of these subjects, this Article examines the current
state of the law and practice and relevant policy considerations and recommends
improvements in current procedures.
This Article draws on a variety of information sources. It is based in part on a
review of the relevant statute, regulations, manual instructions, and scopes of work
governing the PRO program and the rapidly growing body of court cases and ALI
opinions considering PRO issues. It also draws on dozens of articles from the medical
and legal literature; testimony to congressional committees; position statements of
affected groups; and reports from the General Accounting Office, HI-S OIG, and
other evaluators of the PRO program. Finally, it draws on interviews with nearly
eighty informants, including seventeen representatives of national, state, and local
beneficiary organizations; eleven representatives of provider groups; twelve attorneys
who represent providers; twenty-three PRO representatives; and fourteen represen-
tatives of the federal government. These included in-depth interviews with represen-
tatives from twelve PROs (in most instances executive directors) reviewing the
current procedures of those PROs in each of the areas under consideration. 14 Finally,
this Article considers comments received on an earlier draft from interested persons
and organizations.
II. THE PRO PROGRAM
The initial Medicare law adopted in 1965 gave little attention to regulating the
medical necessity, appropriateness, and quality of services provided Medicare
beneficiaries. It required only hospital-based utilization review committees to assure
appropriate utilization of services,' 5 state licensure to assure that physicians were
minimally qualified,' 6 and accreditation by the Joint Commission on Accreditation of
Hospitals to guarantee the quality of hospitals. 17 By the early 1970s, however, it was
14. The PRO representatives interviewed were from the states of New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Virginia, Florida,
Illinois, Texas, North Dakota, Iowa, California, Washington, Minnesota, and Michigan. The Iowa PRO also has the
contract for Nebraska and the Washington PRO for Idaho and Alaska, so these programs were also discussed.
15. Social Security Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-97, § 1861(k), 79 Stat. 285, 318-19 (1966).
16. Id. § 1861(r), 79 Stat. 285, 321.
17. Id. § 1865, 79 Stat. 285, 326-27.
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becoming apparent that further controls were needed to limit excessive utilization of
Medicare services. 18 Out of this concern grew the PSRO program, which used
regional nonprofit physicians groups to review independently the use of medical
services by beneficiaries of federal medical assistance programs, including
Medicare.19 Though the primary emphasis of PSROs was on utilization review, they
also conducted Medical Care Evaluation Studies (later Quality Review Studies)
aimed at improving the quality of medical care. PSROs never succeeded in meeting
the expectations of their supporters or overcoming the criticisms of their increasingly
vocal detractors. In 1982 the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act (TEFRA)
abolished the PSRO program and created in its stead the PRO program. 20
The PRO program was intended to be a leaner and more effective program than
its predecessor. The 195 PSRO regions were trimmed to 54 statewide areas. The old
system of grant-funding was replaced by biennial (now triennial) contracts, to be
awarded by competitive bidding. Ineffective PROs were to be terminated. PROs
could no longer delegate utilization review functions to hospitals, as had the PSROs.
Though PROs were initially to be physician-sponsored organizations (as were the old
PSROs), the statute allows HHS to turn to other organizations, including insurance
companies or Medicare fiscal intermediaries, for PRO services if initial physician-
sponsored contractors prove ineffective. Unlike PSROs, PROs could be for-profit
entities. Finally, the PROs were given enhanced sanction and payment denial
authority to enforce their power. 21
In the year following the creation of the PRO program (before it was in fact
implemented), Congress adopted a prospective payment system (PPS) for Medicare
based on diagnosis-related groups (DRGs).22 This system ended the prior cost-related
reimbursement system, under which Medicare had reimbursed hospitals the costs
they incurred in caring for Medicare patients, and substituted for it a program that
paid hospitals primarily on a lump sum per hospitalization basis.
This change solved one problem addressed by the PROs, but created others. The
old system had rewarded hospitals for keeping patients in the hospital as long as
possible (which increased their costs and thus their reimbursement); thus a major
focus of PSRO utilization review had been controlling the length of inpatient hospital
stays. Because the new DRG system creates incentives for hospitals to minimize their
costs by discharging patients as soon as possible, the problem of excessive
length-of-stay has been solved. This problem has been replaced, however, by other
serious problems: the DRG system creates incentives for hospitals to discharge
patients prematurely, to underserve them while in the hospital, and to try to game the
18. See SENAT Co.m. ON FiN., S. RE'. No. 1230, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 254-69 (1972); SENATE COMM. ON FIN.,
MEDICARE & MEDiCAm, PROBLEiS, ISSUES AND ALTERNATIVES, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 105-09 (Feb. 9, 1970).
19. Social Security Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-603, § 249F, 86 Stat. 1329, 1429-45 (1972).
20. Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-248, § 143, 96 Stat. 324, 382 (1982).
21. See CisLowsKI, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERViCE REPORT FOR CONGRESS, TnE PEER REvmw OROANIZATION
PRORAM 4-5 (1987); LoHE, PEER REvIEw ORGANIZATIONS: QuAt.rrY ASSURANCE iN MEDICARE (The Rand Paper Series) 7,
14-15 (1985); Mellette, The Changing Focus of Peer Review Under Medicare, 20 U. RicH. L. Ra,. 315 (1986)
(describing the change,; from the PSRO to PRO program).
22. Social Security Amendments of 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-21, Title VI, 97 Stat. 65, 149-72 (1983).
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system, either by transferring patients between hospitals or units within hospitals or
by assigning improper DRGs. These practices can potentially lead to lower quality
care for patients; therefore, every major budget reconciliation act since 1983 has
included provisions redirecting the mission of PROs to address the potential quality
and access problems created by the DRG reimbursement system.
There are currently forty-four PROs serving the fifty-four PRO areas.Y
Sixty-eight percent were formerly PSROs.24 Eighty-four percent are "physician-
sponsored"-that is, they are either composed of at least 20% of the physicians
practicing in the review area or of 10% of the physicians in the area and are otherwise
representative of the state physician community.25 The remaining PROs are "phy-
sician access" organizations, usually insurance companies, having a sufficient
number of physicians available to carry on review functions. 26 HHS is supposed to
give preference in contracting to "physician-sponsored organizations," if any are
available.27 PROs must include on their boards at least one consumer
representative. 28 The PROs vary significantly in size, the largest having hundreds of
employees and budgets of millions of dollars. The proposed budget for the PRO
program for fiscal year 1989 is $257.4 million, an increase of 50% over fiscal year
1988.
PROs are delegated review responsibility under contracts with HHS. Until this
year, these contracts were bid on a two-year cycle, but now they last for three years. 29
HHS may terminate a PRO that has substantially failed to carry out its contract.30
HHS monitors PRO performance primarily through three methods: (1) periodic data
reporting from the PROs, (2) the PRO Monitoring Protocol and Tracking System
(PROMPTS-2) regional office review system, and (3) the SuperPRO, an independent
contractor, which verifies PRO reviews. 31 The PRO program is supervised by the
Health Standards and Quality Bureau (HSQB) of the Health Care Financing
Administration (HCFA) of HHS.
The primary tasks of the PROs are to process data concerning health care services
provided to Medicare beneficiaries 32 and to intervene when these data indicate that
services have been provided unnecessarily, inappropriately, or with inadequate qual-
ity. Because hospitals consume over two-thirds of Medicare expenditures, PROs have
focused their review traditionally on care provided to beneficiaries by doctors in
hospitals. Recently many of the PROs have begun to review care provided by health
23. OIG EFFEcTvENESS REPORT, supra note 9, at 3.
24. Id.
25. Id.; 42 C.F.R. § 462.102 (1987).
26. 42 C.F.R. § 462.103 (1987).
27. 42 U.S.C. § 1320c-2(b)(1) (1982).
28. Id. § 1320c-1(3) (Supp. IV 1986).
29. Id. § 1320c-2(c)(3) (1982).
30. Id. § 1320c-2(c)(6). Such a termination is not subject tojudicial review. In re Pa. Peer Review Org., 50 Bankr.
640 (1985); 42 U.S.C. § 1320c-2(f) (1982).
31. OIG EnFmci ENEss REmoRT, supra note 9, at 12-18; GAO, MDcARE: ImpRovING QuAtry oF CAnR ASSEaSMEr
AND AssusAcE 53-58 (May 1988).
32. PROs also review Medicaid cases for states that contract for such assistance, 42 U.S.C. § 1320c-7, and review
for private payers, id. § 1320c-3(a)(l 1).
[Vol. 50:1
1989] ADMINISTRATIVE LAW ISSUES AND THE PRO PROGRAM 7
maintenance organizations and competitive medical plans (HMOs/CMPs) with
Medicare risk-sharing contracts. 33 The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 198634
(OBRA '86) also requires PROs to stretch their review capacity to cover services
provided in other settings, including post-acute care provided by skilled nursing
facilities and home health agencies; ambulatory and hospital outpatient care; and
beginning in 1989 care provided by physicians in their offices.3 5 Most PROs,
however, still focus the vast majority of their resources on review of care provided
in hospitals, the primary concern of this Article.
The principal source of data for PRO review is the hospital record. PROs
regularly receive from fiscal intermediaries (the insurance companies and other
entities that handle Medicare reimbursement to providers) data on bills paid for
services rendered to Medicare beneficiaries. The PRO selects a sample of these cases
for review and requests medical records on these cases from the hospitals, which are
reviewed at the hospital or at the PRO office. 36 The sampling criteria that PROs use
for selecting cases for review, and the focus of their review in examining the records,
have varied over the three contract cycles during which PROs have been in operation.
During each contract cycle, the screening criteria and focus of PRO activity have
been established by a scope of work. 37
The sampling criteria mandated by the Third Scope of Work, currently being
implemented, require a PRO to review, for each PPS hospital (hospitals reimbursed
under the DRG prospective payment system) under its jurisdiction, a 3% random
sample of all discharges; 50% of cases involving transfers from one PPS hospital to
another; 10% of transfers to a psychiatric bed in a PPS hospital (and 100% of certain
problem transfers to psychiatric beds); 25% of transfers from a PPS hospital bed to
a nursing home bed in the same hospital; 25% of cases in which a patient discharged
from a PPS hospital is readmitted within thirty-one days; 20% of cases in the 25%
discharge and readmission sample just mentioned, in which the patient received care
from a nursing home, home health agency, or hospital outpatient area during the
period intervening between hospitalizations; 25%, 50%, or 100% of cases coded with
certain problem DRGs; 25% of day and cost outliers (cases in which hospitals
received extra payment beyond the DRG reimbursement because the case required an
extraordinarily long or expensive hospital stay); all cases with targeted principal
diagnoses, such as obesity or pacemaker fitting or adjustment; all cases in which a
hospital has requested that a case be adjusted from a lower to a higher DRG; all cases
in which a hospital has determined that an admission was not covered but the patient
required Medicare-covered care at some time during the stay; and all cases referred
33. See Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-272, § 9405, 1986 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD MuN. NEws (100 Stat.) 83, 201 [hereinafter COBRA '85], as amended by Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act
of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-509, § 9353(a), 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.mwt. NEws (100 Stat.) 1874, 2044 [hereinafter
OBRA '86].
34. OBRA '86, Pub. L. No. 99-509, 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.WNu. NEws (100 Stat.) 1874.
35. Id. § 9353(a), (0, 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.uN. NEws (100 Stat.) 1874, 2046, 2052.
36. A recent study found that 61% of PROs usually perform review on-site at the hospital; 20% always perform
it on-site. OIG EnafcnvE'ss REPORT, supra note 9, at 3.
37. For a further description of a scope of work, see infra text following note 56.
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to the PRO by the fiscal intermediary or by HCFA.38 PROs are also required to
review a random sample of 15% of discharges from non-PPS units of PPS hospitals
(for example, rehabilitation units) and from non-PPS-reimbursed hospitals and a 5%
random sample of cases from ambulatory surgical centers. 39 When reviews indicate
that a hospital is committing errors in more than 5% of its cases (or six cases if this
amount is greater), the PRO is to intensify review to 50% or 100%, depending upon
the problem, of the hospital's Medicare cases. 40
To this point, all the reviews listed are retrospective. The PROs must also
perform preadmission or preprocedure review of ten specific procedures and the use
of assistants for cataract surgery. 41 Finally, a separate HMO/CMP Scope of Work
provides a sampling procedure for identifying HMO/CMP cases to be reviewed. The
intensity of sampling of HMO/CMP cases is related to the confidence that the PRO
has in the HMO/CMP's own internal quality control capacity. In total, sample cases
under the second contract cycle totaled about 26% of all Medicare hospital
admissions .42
Once medical records fitting these sample criteria are identified and copied, they
are reviewed by professional reviewers (usually nurses), who apply criteria screens to
identify utilization or quality problems. This review must be completed within sixty
days from the date of receipt of the list of cases from the fiscal intermediary. 43 Each
inpatient hospital discharge is to be reviewed for quality using HCFA's generic
quality screens, for necessity and appropriateness using PRO discharge and admis-
sion criteria screens, and for DRG validation. 44 Care provided outside of the hospital
setting is reviewed only for quality and not for utilization problems.
Once a PRO identifies a problem through this review of medical records, the
case is routed to a physician reviewer. If the physician confirms the problem, the case
can go in one of two directions. First, if a quality problem is identified, the case is
routed to the PRO quality assurance system, which can interpose various interven-
tions (including sanctions ultimately) to correct the problem.45 If, on the other hand,
the problem is identified as a utilization problem, the case is considered for a payment
denial. 46 PROs also continually assemble profile data in an effort to identify aberrant
providers and physicians. Profiles are kept on patients, physicians, hospitals, DRGs,
diagnoses, and procedures to monitor PRO impact and identify problems for further
study. 47
PROs have a number of other functions unrelated to their data gathering and
analysis functions. They are responsible for reviewing cases when hospitals inform
38. THiRD SCOPE OF VORK, supra note 3, § VI, at 16-22.
39. Id. §§ VII-VIII, at 22-23.
40. Id. § Ix, at 24-26.
41. Id. § X, at 26-27.
42. HCFA Official Outlines PRO Program Objectives, HosprrALs, Aug. 5, 1987, at 122.
43. TttnD SCOPE OF WORK, supra note 3, § 11(B), at 2-3.
44. These screens, and problems associated with them, are described further in Part IV of this Article.
45. The PRO quality assurance/sanction process is described in Part V of this Article.
46. Payment denials and reconsiderations are considered in Part IX below.
47. TmhRD SCOPE OF WORK, supra note 3, § XV, at 29-32.
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patients that their care is not, or is no longer, covered by Medicare. 48 PROs are also
responsible for monitoring to assure that hospitals provide beneficiaries with a
statement of their rights to PRO discharge review at the time of admission.49 They are
required to investigate complaints by Medicare beneficiaries about the quality of
Medicare-covered services received from Medicare-certified hospitals, nursing
homes, home health agencies, or ambulatory surgical centers.50 Finally, PROs are
responsible for educating beneficiaries and providers as to their existence and
functions.5 1
Im. PUBLICATION OF PRO PROGRAM POLICIES AND PROCEDURES
One major administrative law issue that has arisen under the PRO program
concerns the extent to which directives and guidelines governing the program must
be promulgated as rules under the APA. At the time the program was initiated in
1982, some regulations survived from the PSRO program that preceded it. Additional
regulations have been promulgated that address issues such as PRO eligibility, area
designations, imposition of sanctions, confidentiality and disclosure, reconsidera-
tions and appeals, and review activities.5 2
These regulations, however, represent only a small portion of the instructions
HHS has issued to govern the PRO program. First, HHS has issued a PRO Manual,
supplemented periodically by manual transmittals and interim manual instructions.
Chapters in the Manual address such issues as PRO review procedures; PRO denials,
reconsiderations, and appeals; waiver of liability determinations; sanctions; data and
reports; and PRO administration. Some portions of the Manual track closely the
statute and regulations. 53 Even these sections, however, cover details not addressed
by the regulations. 54 Other parts of the Manual cover issues not addressed by the
48. 42 U.S.C. § 1320c-3(e) (Supp. IV 1986). This procedure is discussed at Part VIII below.
49. TumD SCOPE OF WORK, supra note 3, § XVI, at 33-34.
50. 42 U.S.C. § 1320c-3(a)(14) (Supp. IV 1986); TtRD SCOPE OF WORK, supra note 3, § XVII(A), at 36-38.
51. 42 U.S.C. § I320c-3(a)(4)(B) (Supp. IV 1986); TmiRD SCOPE OF WORK, supra note 3, § XVI(C), at 34-35. For
further background on the PRO program, refer to CtsLOwatu, supra note 21; LoHR, supra note 21; Mellette, supra note
21.
52. The initial set of regulations was promulgated at 401 Fed. Reg. 7,201 (Feb. 27, 1984) and 50 Fed. Reg. 15,311
(Apr. 17, 1985) and codified at 42 C.F.R. pts. 400, 405, 420, 422, 431, 433, 456, 460, 462, 466, 473, 474, 476, and
489 (1987). On September 30, 1986, rules governing imposition of sanctions were redesignated to 42 C.F.R. pt. 1004
(1987). On October 7, 1987, HHS published rules governing PRO HMOICMP review. 52 Fed. Reg. 37,545 (Oct. 7,
1987). These rules were published as final without a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) under the APA good-cause
exception to effectuate in a "timely manner" provisions of OBRA '86, adopted in October of 1986, which were to be
in effect by April of 1987. 52 Fed. Reg. 37,456 (Oct. 7, 1987). Corrections to this notice were published in December
of 1987, 52 Fed. Reg. 47,003 (Dec. 11, 1987). Finally, on March 16, 1988, HHS proposed further regulations to
implement provisions of COBRA '85, Pub. L. No. 99-272, 1986 U.S. CODE CONo. & ADMiN. NEws (100 Stat.) 83, and
OBRA '86, Pub. L. No. 99-509, 1986 U.S. CODE CoNo. & ADMIN. NEws (100 Stat.) 1874, and to make technical changes
necessitated by experience with the PRO program. 53 Fed. Reg. 8,654 (Mar. 16, 1988). Additional provisions requiring
PRO review of proposed changes in DRG assignments were also published at 52 Fed. Reg. 33,033, 33,059-60 (Sept.
1, 1987).
53. See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HumAN SEsvs., PEER RavtEw ORGANIZATON MANUAL §§ 4080-4086,
Reconsiderations and Appeals (1988) [hereinafter PRO MANUAL].
54. 53 Fed. Reg. 8,666 (Mar. 16, 1988). For example, PRO Manual § 4084 requires that a reconsideration
reviewer be a physician who practices in a similar setting to that of the physician being reviewed whenever possible and
that the physician be board-certified or board-eligible in the specialty of the reviewed physician. 42 C.F.R. § 473.28
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regulations but clearly internal to the PROs, such as the data and reporting
requirements appearing in detail in Manual Chapter 8. Finally, some Manual
provisions that have effects external to the PROs differ materially from the PRO
regulations.5 5 PRO activities are also affected by provisions in other HCFA manuals,
such as the Medicare Hospital Manual.56
The other central documents governing the PRO program are the PRO scopes of
work and PRO contracts. HHS has recently issued the Third Scope of Work for the
third contract cycle, and last year it issued a separate Scope of Work for review of
HMOs and CMPs. HHS is currently entering into contracts reflecting the Third Scope
of Work. The Scope of Work specifies in great detail PRO review responsibilities and
data requirements and incorporates by reference the PRO statute, regulations, and
PRO Manual. PRO contracts specify in even greater detail the review responsibilities
and specific objectives of individual PROs. Finally, PROs are also governed by a
variety of less formal instructions, such as regional medical review letters.
The practice of relying on manual transmittals, program instructions, and con-
tracts in lieu of regulations promulgated through notice and comment rulemaking is
not unique to the PRO program. Throughout its administration of the Medicare and
Medicaid programs, HHS has often used such materials in preference to rules adopted
through the APA notice and comment process.5 7 It is not difficult to understand HHS's
preference for issuing instructions informally. Public notice and comment rulemaking
has always been burdensome. The requirements of 5 U.S.C. section 553 that the public
be given an opportunity to comment on proposed rules, that the agency consider the
comments, and that publication of final rules precede their effective date by at least
thirty days necessarily slow down the process of implementing policy. Recent re-
strictions on notice and comment rulemaking, including Executive Orders No. 12,291
and No. 12,498, requiring Office of Management and Budget (OMB) review of some
rules, and 5 U.S.C. section 603, requiring regulatory flexibility analyses, have made
APA rulemaking increasingly burdensome and time-consuming.5 8 It can easily take
a year or more to promulgate a rule under these procedures.5 9 Regulations imple-
menting sections 9401 and 9403 of COBRA '8560 have been under consideration
for over two years and have only very recently been published as a notice of
currently only requires that the reconsideration physician be a specialist in the type of services under review, though
proposed rule 473.28 (proposed on March 16, 1988) is identical to the PRO Manual provision.
55. PRO Manual § 6025, for example, implements the 1987 HCFAJAMA/AARP compromise on sanction
procedures, discussed in Part V below and provides procedural protections to providers and practitioners beyond those
specified in 42 C.F.R. pt. 1004.
56. See HEALTH CARE Fir. AnmiN., U.S. DE'T OF HEALTH & HustAN SEsvs., MEWCAM Hose. MARAL § 312 (July
1988) (dealing with notices to beneficiaries of PRO review of care) [hereinafter MEnicARE Host. MANuAL].
57. See St. Mary's Hosp. of Troy v. Blue Cress Blue Shield, 788 F.2d 888 (2d Cir. 1986); Cubanski v. Heckler,
781 F.2d 1421 (9th Cir. 1986); Powderly v. Schweiker, 704 F.2d 1092 (9th Cir. 1983); Rio Hondo Memorial Hosp. v.
United States, 689 F.2d 1025 (Ct. Cl. 1982); Samuels v. Heckler, 668 F. Supp. 656, 664 (W.D. Tenn. 1986); New York
State Dep't of Social Serv. v. Bowen, 648 F. Supp. 850 (D.D.C. 1986); Bond Hosp. Inc. v. Heckler, 587 F. Supp. 1268,
1272 (D.D.C. 1984), aff'd, 762 F.2d 137 (D.C. Cir. 1985); Kinney, The Medicare Appeals System for Coverage and
Payment Disputes: Achieving Fairness in a Time of Constraint, I ADruN. L.J. 54 (1987).
58. Although Exec. Order No. 12,291,46 Fed. Reg. 13,193, only requires OMB review of"major rules," in fact
OMB reviews all rules proposed by HCFA.
59. DeMuth & Ginsberg, White House Review of Agency Rulemaking, 99 HARv. L. REv. 1075, 1159 (1986).
60. COBRA '85, Pub. L. No. 99-272, 1986 U.S. CODE CONo. & Aram. NEws (100 Stat.) 83, 196-200.
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proposed rulemaking (NPRM).61 Given the rapid changes in the Medicare and
Medicaid programs generally and in the PRO program in particular, it is not
surprising that HHS has sought means other than notice and comment rulemaking for
program management.
While HHS's eschewal of notice and comment rulemaking may be understand-
able, it is not necessarily right. There are sound policy reasons grounding the APA's
requirement of notice and comment rulemaking. First, it "reintroduces public
participation and fairness to affected parties after governmental authority has been
delegated to unrepresentative agencies.' '62 It also assures a prepublication dialogue,
which permits persons affected by a rule to educate the agency as to their concerns.
This in turn allows the agency to achieve a more rational regulatory scheme or a more
intelligible explanation of the scheme it originally proposed. 63 It forces the agency to
think carefully about its policies, so as to justify them before a skeptical public. 64 It
"assures that the agency will have before it the facts and information relevant to a
particular administrative problem, as well as suggestions for alternative solutions.' '65
Finally, public participation in rulemaking contributes to public acceptance of the
legitimacy of the regulatory result. 66 The Administrative Conference of the United
States (ACUS) has consistently urged HHS to provide greater opportunity for public
comment on its policies for making coverage and payment determinations. 67
More specifically, the attempts of HHS to govern the PRO program without
using the APA rulemaking process have subjected the PROs to a continual and
confusing stream of instructions, which have severely hampered their ability to carry
out their mandate. 68 They have also angered the providers and practitioners governed
by the program.
In October 1984 an association of those providers, the American Hospital As-
sociation (AHA), filed a petition with HHS for rulemaking, 69 which requested HHS
to promulgate comprehensive regulations for the PRO program. When HHS failed to
do so, the AHA brought suit claiming that HHS had violated the APA. The District
Court for the District of Columbia held that HHS had indeed violated the APA by
promulgating the PRO Scope of Work, contracts, and several manual transmittals
without notice and comment rulemaking. 70 HHS appealed this determination to the
61. Medicare and Medicaid Programs; Denial of Payment for Substandard Quality Care and Review of Beneficiary
Complaints, 54 Fed. Reg. 1956 (1989) (to be codified at various parts of 42 C.F.R.) (proposed Jan. 18, 1989) (proposed
rle) [hereinafter PRoposED SUBSTANDARD CARE REGuLATioNs]. See also infra Part V1.
62. Batterton v. Marshall, 648 F.2d 694, 703 (D.C. Cir. 1980); see also National Ass'n of Home Health Agencies
v. Schweiker, 690 F.2d 932, 949 (D.C. Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1205 (1983).
63. American Bus Ass'n v. United States, 627 F.2d 525, 533 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
64. New Jersey v. Department of Health & Human Servs., 670 F.2d 1262 (3rd Cir. 1981).
65. Guardian Fed. Sav. & Loan v. Federal Say. & Loan Ins. Corp., 589 F.2d 658, 662 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
66. Chamber of Commerce of the United States v. OSHA, 636 F.2d 464 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
67. 1 C.F.R. §§ 305.86-5, .87-8 (1987).
68. Baldwin & Fackelmann, Blizzard of Paperwork, New Rules are Burying PROs and Hospitals, MOD.
HEALTHCARE, Jan. 3, 1986, at 46, 47-48.
69. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(e) (1982).
70. American Hosp. Ass'n v. Bowen, 640 F. Supp. 453 (D.D.C. 1986). The court also held two manual
transmittals to be valid interpretive rules, not subject to notice and comment rulemaking. This holding was not appealed.
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District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals, which reversed the district court.7' The
appellate court's majority opinion, written by Judge Wald, found the contract, Scope
of Work, and manual transmittals to have been covered by exceptions to the APA.
Judge Mikva dissented in part, arguing that the challenged contract objectives should
have been promulgated through APA rulemaking procedures. 72 Ultimately, Congress
seems to have had the last word, as provisions of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation
Act of 1987 (OBRA '87) 7 3 call for publication of PRO contract provisions, though not
necessarily using APA procedures. Before turning to this legislation, the rulemaking
requirements of the APA in general, and the interpretation of them in American
Hospital Association v. Bowen in particular, will be considered in greater detail.
The notice and comment and publication requirements of 5 U.S.C. section 553
are subject to a number of exceptions, several of which arguably apply to the PRO
program. Most obviously, section 553 does not apply to "a matter relating to...
public property, loans, grants, benefits or contracts."-74 As PROs assist in running a
benefit program (Medicare) under contract with HHS, instructions governing the
administration of the PRO program would seem to fall within this exception. This
exception has been widely criticized as an atavistic survival of simpler days when
government benefit programs were uncommon rather than pervasive and when the
law still drew a clear line between rights and privileges. 75 The Secretary of HHS has
yielded to these criticisms and voluntarily waived the protection of this exception. 76
HHS is legally bound by this waiver. 77
In its brief in American Hospital, HHS argued that, even though it has generally
waived the APA contract exception, the PRO statute expressly exempts PRO
contracts from any APA constraints. 78 42 U.S.C. section 1320c-2(e) provides that the
Secretary's authority in making PRO contracts is not to be trammeled by "any
provision of law relating to the making, performance, amendment, or modification of
contracts of the United States." ' 79 This provision was adopted by Congress to
promote flexibility and avoid restriction of "innovation in new approaches to
review." ' 80 The D.C. Circuit, however, rejected this argument, noting that the
provision exempted PRO contracting from "the vast corpus of law establishing rules
regarding the procurement of contracts from the government" 81 and not from the
71. American Hosp. Ass'n v. Bowen, 834 F.2d 1037 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
72. Id. at 1058-62 (Mikva, J., dissenting).
73. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-203, 1987 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADuN. NEws
(101 Stat.) 1330 [hereinafter OBRA '87].
74. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1982).
75. See Bonfield, Public Participation in Federal Rulemaking Relating to Public Property, Loans, Grants,
Benefits, or Contracts, 118 U. PA. L. REv. 540 (1970); 1 C.F.R. § 305.69-8 (1987).
76. 36 Fed. Reg. 2,532 (Feb. 5, 1971).
77. Herron v. Heckler, 576 F. Supp. 218, 229 (N.D. Calif. 1983).
78. Brief for Appellant at 35-39, American Hosp. Ass'n v. Bowen, 834 F.2d 1037 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (No.
86-5579).
79. 42 U.S.C. § 1320c-2(e) (1982).
80. S. REP. No. 494, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 41, 43, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 817-19.
81. American Hosp., 834 F.2d at 1054.
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APA. The court noted that nothing in the provision's legislative history indicated that
Congress intended to retract HHS's own waiver of the APA contract exemption. 82
Because HHS was precluded by its waiver from relying on the grants, benefits,
and contracts exception in American Hospital, it instead relied primarily on
exceptions found in 5 U.S.C. section 553(b)(3)(A) for "interpretive rules, general
statements of policy, or rules of agency organization, procedure, or practice.'"83 The
law governing these exceptions to the APA is terribly obscure, described by various
cases as "tenuous," "blurred," "baffling," and "enshrouded in considerable
smog.'"84
In the district court, HHS argued unsuccessfully that the manual instructions
were interpretive rules. Interpretive rules are provisions that "merely clarify or
explain existing law or regulations."-85 They track and fine-tune statutory or
regulatory requirements or remind regulated individuals or entities of existing
duties, 86 elucidating what an administrative officer thinks a statute or rule means. 87
They have no independent force of law.88
Some provisions of the PRO Manual, scopes of work, and contracts merely
restate and clarify statutory obligations. Examples include provisions dealing with
data confidentiality or disclosure. But most provisions of the PRO Manual and
contracts address issues not directly covered by statutes and regulations, such as
review sampling and data reporting requirements, and thus cannot properly be
classified as interpretive rules. The district court in American Hospital so held, 89 and
the court of appeals affirmed. 90
The court of appeals, however, relied on other exceptions found in 5 U.S.C.
section 553 to uphold the PRO Manual instructions, contract, and Scope of Work.
First, it held that several manual instructions focusing PRO review on particular
objectives were validly exempt from notice and comment rulemaking because they
were procedural rules, exempt under 5 U.S.C. section 553(b)(A).91 The procedural
rule exception exists to allow agencies flexibility in arranging their internal
operations-'"it covers agency actions that do not themselves alter the rights or
interests of parties, although it may alter the manner in which parties present
themselves or their viewpoints to the agency. ' 92 As procedural rules do not directly
82. Id.
83. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(3)(A) (1982).
84. See, e.g., Community Nutrition Inst. v. Young, 818 F.2d 943, 946 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (and cases cited therein).
85. Alcaraz v. Block, 746 F.2d 593, 613 (9th Cir. 1984) (quoting Powderly v. Schweiker, 704 F.2d 1092, 1098
(9th Cir. 1983)).
86. Cabais v. Egger, 690 F.2d 234, 238 (D.C. Cir. 1982). See Assimow, Nonlegislative Rulemaking and
Regulatory Reform, 1985 DtrK L.J. 381, 393-97.
87. American Postal Workers Union v. United States Postal Serv., 707 F.2d 548 (D.C. Cir. 1983), cert. denied,
465 U.S. 1100 (1984); In Home Health Care v. Bowen, 639 F. Supp. 1124 (D.D.C. 1986).
88. Herron v. Heckler, 576 F. Supp. 218, 231 (N.D. Cal. 1983).
89. American Hosp. Ass'n v. Bowen, 640 F. Supp. 453, 462-63 (D.D.C. 1986).
90. American Hosp. Ass'n v. Bowen, 834 F.2d 1037, 1050 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
91. Id. at 1049-51.
92. Batterton v. Marshall, 648 F.2d 694, 707 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (footnote omitted); see also Neighborhood TV Co.
v. FCC, 742 F.2d 629 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Mayton, A Concept of a Rule and the "Substantial Impact" Test in Rulemaking,
33 &=IORY L.J. 889, 900 (1984).
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govern public conduct, it is argued, their formation does not require the public
participation mandated by the APA. 93 In American Hospital, Judge Wald articulated
the key test for identifying a procedural rule as "whether the agency action also
encodes a substantive value judgment or puts a stamp of approval or disapproval on
a given type of behavior. 94 A rule governing procedure that does not enforce such
a substantive value judgment is exempt from APA rulemaking requirements,
regardless of its actual impact on the rights of those affected by agency action. This
interpretation expands the procedural rule exemption and is at variance with earlier
authorities, which placed emphasis on whether the rule in fact had a substantial
impact on substantive rights. 95
Applying this definition of procedural rule, Judge Wald upheld as exempt from
APA rulemaking requirements manual provisions establishing sampling procedures
for targeting PRO review. This holding is consistent with other cases holding that
strategies for enforcement or timing of review are procedural in nature. 96 It is,
however, based on two questionable premises.
First, Judge Wald's opinion is clearly based on the proposition that PROs are,
in effect, agents or extensions of HHS. If the PROs are in reality a part of HHS, the
disputed manual transmittals establishing procedures to be used by the PROs in effect
dictate the internal procedures of a federal agency. 97 Following this line of reasoning,
Judge Wald posited that any impact of the challenged HHS directives on PROs was
not relevant to the question of whether such directives had a sufficiently substantial
effect to render them substantive rather than procedural rules.
PROs are, of course, federal entities for some purposes. 98 But they are also
independent, private corporations, contracting to provide a service to the
government. 99 If PROs are part of the federal government solely because they
provide a service under contract, so are Medicare carriers and intermediaries and, for
that matter, hospitals and physicians who provide services as agents of the
government to the ultimate beneficiaries of the Medicare program. In fact, when
HHS has engaged in notice and comment rulemaking, it has considered the impact of
its rules on PROs as if they were "small entities" under the Regulatory Flexibility
Act, thus recognizing their independent existence. °0
It could be argued, of course, that the federal government should be able to deal
with its contractors without being bothered by notice and comment rulemaking, and
93. United States Dep't of Labor v. Kast Metals Co., 744 F.2d 1145 (5th Cir. 1984).
94. American Hosp., 834 F.2d at 1047.
95. See, e.g., Pickus v. United States Bd. of Parole, 507 F.2d 1107, 1112-13 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
96. See International Union, UAW v. Brock, 783 F.2d 237, 251 n. 18 (D.C. Cir. 1986); Kast Metals, 744 F.2d at
1145; Neighborhood TV, 742 F.2d at 629; Donovan v. Wollaston Alloys Inc., 695 F.2d 1, 9 (1st Cir. 1983); Davis Walker
Corp. v. Blumenthal, 460 F. Supp. 283 (D.D.C. 1978).
97. American Hosp., 834 F.2d at 1048-49.
98. See Kwoun v. Southeast Mo. PSRO, 811 F.2d 401, 407 (8th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1994 (1988)
(holding PSRO officials to be federal officers for application of immunity doctrine in damage action); Smith v. North La.
Medical Review Ass'n, 735 F.2d 168, 173 (5th Cir. 1984) (holding PSRO to be federal rather than state entity for
application of state action requirement).
99. See supra notes 7-9 and accompanying text.
100. See 53 Fed. Reg. 8,662 (Mar. 16, 1988).
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as noted earlier, the APA explicitly exempts from notice and comment rulemaking
matters pertaining to government contracts. Yet, HHS has waived the protection of
this exemption generally, and this waiver includes within its scope, presumably,
HHS's governance of PROs as well as of hospitals. Turning again to the policies
underlying the APA notice and comment requirement, PROs indisputably have an
interest in participating in the process used for determining their responsibilities and
have valuable information to contribute to that process. Thus, Judge Wald's
conclusion that the substantive impact of HHS rules on PROs is irrelevant to a
consideration of whether such rules are procedural or not is simplistic and probably
wrong. The AHA may not have had standing to challenge the effect of HHS's
informal policy on the PROs, but this issue is a real one.
Second, Judge Wald's opinion is also based on the notion that manual
transmittals directing enforcement strategy have only a minimal impact on hospitals
and other providers. Providers, of course, have no legitimate interest in freedom from
effective oversight, but they may well have an interest in avoiding enforcement
strategies that create excessive burdens' 0' or that unfairly single out particular classes
of providers.10 2 Other courts have noted that enforcement strategies may have
substantive effects. 10 3
HHS did not take the position that its enforcement strategy was secret; indeed,
HHS has described this strategy in the PRO Manual. Having chosen to make its
enforcement strategy public, HCFA would not have suffered a great additional
burden in seeking information from the public as to the wisdom of that strategy.
The court of appeals upheld the validity of the PRO Scope of Work and contracts
under another exception to section 553, the "general statement of policy" exception.
This exception to the APA is probably the most mysterious. Cases attempting to
explicate it describe "general statements of policy" as akin to press releases,
announcing to the public an agency's intention as to what plans and priorities it will
seek to establish in the future.l14 Policy statements do not create binding norms that
constrain the agency's discretion. 0 5 They are tentative and do not foreclose agency
alternatives or conclusively affect rights. 10 6 Some cases exclude from this category
statements having a substantial impact on substantive rights,10 7 while others reject
this distinction.108 Most cases have considered the binding nature of a pronouncement
101. Cf. Burlington Memorial Hosp. v. Bowen, 644 F. Supp. 1020 (W.D. Wis. 1986) (considering HCFA's alleged
responsibility to reimburse providers for costs of photocopying necessitated by PRO review).
102. See infra text accompanying notes 169-70.
103. Community Nutrition Inst. v. Young, 818 F.2d 943 (D.C. Cir. 1986); Estate of Smith v. Bowen, 656 F. Supp.
1093 (D. Colo. 1987).
104. Mada-Luna v. Fitzpatrick, 813 F.2d 1006, 1013 (9th Cir. 1987); Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Federal Power
Comm'n, 506 F.2d 33, 38 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
105. Mada.Luna, 813 F.2d at 1014.
106. Batterton v. Marshall, 648 F.2d 694, 702 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
107. W.C. v. Bowen, 807 F.2d 1502 (8th Cir. 1987); Pickus v. United States Bd. of Parole, 507 F.2d 1107, 1112
(D.C. Cir. 1974).
108. Jean v. Nelson, 711 F.2d 1455 (1 1th Cir. 1982), aff'd, 472 U.S. 846 (1985). See also Note, An Analysis of
the General Statement of Policy Exception to Notice and Comment Procedures, 73 GEo. L.J. 1007 (1985) (arguing for
both a binding norm and substantial effect test).
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to be decisive in determining whether it is a "general statement of policy" or not. 10 9
Policy statements that narrow the field of vision of a decisionmaker, minimizing the
influence of some factors and encouraging decisive reliance on other factors that
might not have been decisive had rulemaking procedures been followed, must be
promulgated as rules.' 10
Judge Wald's position that PRO scopes of work are general statements of policy
is certainly plausible. They are, after all, primarily statements by HHS of what it
hopes to achieve through its contracts. The court's holding that PRO contracts are
mere general statements of policy, however, is more questionable. In particular, the
court's argument that objectives found in the contracts are not binding upon the PROs
and thus will have no substantial effect on the PRO application of standards in
necessity and quality review seems highly suspect. One of the primary arguments
relied on by Congress for replacing the PSRO program with the PRO program was
that the PROs would be more effective in controlling utilization and quality precisely
because they would be held to their contractual objectives under threat of
nonrenewal."l In fact, some PRO contracts were not renewed after the first contract
cycle because the PROs failed to meet contract objectives," 2 and HCFA's evaluation
of PROs for renewal of contracts in the second cycle relies heavily on the PROs'
contractually assumed review activities. 13 Indeed, when HHS has engaged in
rulemaking, it has acknowledged the significant effects that review of PROs pursuant
to their contracts will have on providers, practitioners, and beneficiaries. 14 It is
disingenuous for HHS to say, therefore, that PRO contracts have no binding effect on
the PROs and thus no impact on beneficiaries or providers.
Judge Mikva, in dissent, pointed persuasively to the analogy between the PRO
contract objectives and efforts of the Social Security Administration to target its
review on ALJs who granted a disproportionate number of disability awards. This
effort was held earlier by the Ninth Circuit to be subject to APA rulemaking
requirements because it effectively discouraged disability awards. " 5 Similarly, PRO
contract objectives undoubtedly have an impact on PRO payment denials, which in
turn affect provider and physician behavior and, ultimately, the services received by
Medicare beneficiaries.
All of this is not to say that Judge Wald's opinion reaches the wrong conclusion.
If its legal foundations are questionable, its result is certainly politic. In creating the
PRO program, Congress intended to establish a system that could respond rapidly,
flexibly, and creatively to developments in the delivery of health services. To impose
109. See Community Nutrition Inst. v. Young, 818 F.2d 943, 946-48 (D.C. Cir. 1987); Telecommunications
Research & Action Center v. FCC, 800 F.2d 1181, 1186 (D.C. Cir. 1986); Brock v. Cathedral Bluffs Shale Oil Co., 796
F.2d 533 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (use of permissive or mandatory language may be decisive); American Bus Ass'n v. United
States, 627 F.2d 525, 529 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
110. Pickus, 507 F.2d at 1113.
111. See S. REP. No. 494, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 41, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & As uu. NEws 781, 817;
42 U.S.C. § 1320c-2(c)(7) (1982).
112. Growing Contract Denials Dispirit the Nation's PROs, HosprrAts, May 20, 1986, at 28.
113. OIG ErrEcnveNEss REPORT, supra note 9, at 21.
114. 50 Fed. Reg. 15,322-25 (Apr. 17, 1985).
115. W.C. v. Bowen, 807 F.2d 1502 (8th Cir. 1987).
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on this program the cumbersome requirements of APA notice and comment
rulemaking, with its encrustation of 0MB oversight, would seriously impede the
implementation of this intent, as evidenced by the delay attendant to promulgation of
the substandard care denial and second opinion rules mandated by COBRA '85,
which have just reached the NPRM stage.11 6 It would be particularly unfortunate if
both the PRO scopes of work and contracts were forced to go through separate,
largely redundant rulemaking proceedings that involve four separate Federal Register
publications. Nevertheless, as has been pointed out, the American Hospital case
imposes a very expansive reading on the APA exceptions and gives inadequate scope
to the policies supporting notice and comment rulemaking.
As was stated at the outset, Congress has had the last word on this question, at
least for now. Several sections of OBRA '87 attend to earlier recommendations of
ACUS that HHS take a more public posture in formulating its policies governing the
Medicare program. 1 7 Section 4035(b), for example, provides:
(2) No rule, requirement, or other statement of policy (other than a national coverage
determination) that establishes or changes a substantive legal standard governing the scope
of benefits, the payment for services, or the eligibility of individuals, entities, or
organizations to furnish or receive services or benefits under this title shall take effect unless
it is promulgated by the Secretary by regulation .... 18
The amended statute further requires the Secretary to permit at least sixty days for
public comment on rules so promulgated.1 9 Under language adopted by OBRA '86,
this provision does not apply when statutes require implementation of a rule with a
shorter comment period or within a period of less than 150 days or when the APA
good cause exception applies.' 20 In effect, these provisions explicitly forbid the
Secretary from revoking HHS's waiver of the APA contracts and benefits exception
and bind HHS to APA rulemaking when its instructions to the PROs have substantive
impact. These provisions do not, however, reverse American Hospital, which
specifically found that the challenged provisions did not have substantive impacts.
Other provisions of OBRA '87, however, do affect the American Hospital result.
First, section 4035(c)(1) requires HHS to publish every three months "a list of
all manual instructions, interpretative rules, statements of policy, and guidelines of
general applicability" that are promulgated to carry out the Medicare program but are
not promulgated as rules and have not been published in an earlier list.' 2 ' This
provision assures that the public will at least be made aware of HHS instructions
affecting the PRO program. More specifically relevant to PROs, section 4091
116. COBRA '85, Pub. L. No. 99-272, §§ 9401, 9403, 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMiN. NEWS (100 Stat.) 83,
196-200. See supra note 61 and infra Part VI.
117. See I C.F.R. §§ 305.86-6, .87-8 (1987).
118. OBRA '87, Pub. L. No. 100-203, 1987 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADmiN. NEws (101 Stat.) 1330, 1330-78 (to be
codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1395hh(a)(2)).
119. 42 U.S.C. § 1395hh(b)(1) (Supp. IV 1986).
120. Id. § 1395hh(b)(2).
121. OBRA '87, Pub. L. No. 100-203, 1987 U.S. CODE CoNG. & ADMIN. NEws (101 Stat.) 1330, 1330-78 (to be
codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1395hh(c)(1)).
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provides that "[tihe Secretary shall publish in the Federal Register any new policy or
procedure adopted by the Secretary that affects substantially the performance of
contract obligations under 42 U.S.C. § 1320c-2 [authorizing contracts with PROs]
not less than 30 days before the date on which such policy or procedure is to take
effect."' 122 It further requires that "[t]he Secretary shall publish in the Federal
Register the general criteria and standards used for evaluating the efficient and
effective performance of [PRO] contract obligations . . . and shall provide
opportunity for public comment with respect to such criteria and standards."123
These provisions make considerable progress toward solving the problem
addressed by American Hospital. First, they support the court's conclusion that many
HHS policies and procedures affecting PROs, and specifically the criteria and
standards for evaluating PRO performance, are not subject to the full panoply of
procedures that accompany APA rulemaking. The statute does not designate these
criteria and standards as "rules" subject to the prepublication requirements of
Executive Order No. 12,291 or No. 12,498 or 5 U.S.C. sections 601 through 612.
Rather, it simply calls for publication of the criteria and standards in the Federal
Register and for an opportunity for comment. This should significantly enhance the
ability of HHS to respond flexibly to the complexity and volatility of the issues raised
by the PRO program.
Second, these sections nonetheless affirm Congress' commitment to the princi-
ples that undergird notice and comment rulemaking. HHS should interpret these
provisions liberally to honor this commitment. In particular, HHS should construe the
amendments to require publication for comments of proposed scopes of work. The
scope of work is the most basic document used to evaluate contract proposals and is
thus ultimately used to judge contract performance. Even though scopes of work are
arguably, as the D.C. Circuit held, statements of policy rather than rules, they have
a substantial effect on the PRO program and should be promulgated pursuant to notice
and comment procedures.
Drafts of proposed scopes of work have in the past apparently been leaked to
interested parties before publication. Indeed, a notice of the availability of the Second
Scope of Work was published in the Federal Register, and HHS received comments
on it. 124 HHS would suffer no significant additional burden in sharing them with the
public generally for comments. With the PRO contract cycle expanded to three years,
HHS should find that it has ample time to publish proposed scopes of work for
comment.
In accordance with the requirements of OBRA '87, HCFA published a summary
of the Third Scope of Work as a notice in the Federal Register on September 12,
1988.125 This summary was only published, however, after contracts were already
being negotiated to implement the Third Scope of Work. Moreover, HCFA did not
122. Id. at 1330-134 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1320c-2). This paragraph, like the provisions relating to
regulations mentioned above, does not apply when inconsistent with a statutory deadline.
123. Id.
124. 50 Fed. Reg. 46,702 (Nov. 12, 1985) (comments due by Nov. 27, 1985).
125. 53 Fed. Reg. 35,234 (Sept. 12, 1988).
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solicit comments on it. While publication of the summary is a positive step, HCFA
should do more to involve interested parties in the process of devising scopes of
work.
Third, these statutes clarify the status of PROs in their relationship to HHS. The
statutes reject Judge Wald's position that PROs are mere tools of the federal
government, no more entitled to an opportunity to participate in policymaking than
a low level government employee. They recognize rather the quasi-independent
nature of PROs and their right to notice and an opportunity to comment on the criteria
under which their performance will be evaluated and to some notice before changes
are made in their contract obligations. 26
Fourth, these provisions focus on the appropriate level for public participation in
policymaking. HHS is required to publish policies and procedures "substantially"
affecting performance of contract obligations and "general" criteria and standards.
The public should be made aware of and allowed to participate in the formulation of
broad policy; the minutiae, however, should be left to HHS. In particular, this
language should be understood not to require publication of individual contracts. The
intention of Congress in establishing the PRO program, evidenced in 42 U.S.C.
section 1320c-2, was to run the program through bid contracts. It is difficult to
conceive of how competitively bid contracts can be subjected to notice and comment
rulemaking. Moreover, if a scope of work has been run through the notice and
comment process, there is little need for individual contracts, which reflect the scope
of work, to be run through a similar process. Despite arguments made earlier that the
PRO contracts resemble legislative rules, the result arrived at by a combination of the
American Hospital decision and the OBRA '87 requirements-that the scopes of
work be published for notice and comment rulemaking, but contracts need not
be-seems the most workable result.
Finally, the provisions requiring notice and comment proceedings are rendered
inapplicable when they conflict with statutory deadlines. Thus, they withhold from
HHS any excuse for further foot-dragging in complying with statutory mandates.
IV. IssuEs CONCERNING PRO CRITERIA, NoRMs, AD STANDARDS
The previous Part considered the rules under which HHS governs the PRO
program. Each PRO, however, also has its own "rules," by which it governs the
providers, physicians, and beneficiaries under its jurisdiction. Among the most
important of these are the criteria, norms, and standards reviewers use to identify
utilization or quality problems.
The concepts of criteria and norms have evolved over time. The initial vision of
the PSRO program was that PSROs would develop objective norms against which the
performance of providers and physicians could be reviewed. To quote from the
legislative history:
126. See OIG En'Ecnvss REORT, supra note 9, at iii, v (concurring with the need for this change).
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The review process would be made more sophisticated through the use of professionally
developed regional norms of diagnosis and care as guidelines for review activities, as
opposed to the present usage of arbitrarily determined checkpoints. The present review
process, without such norms, becomes a long series of episodic case-by-case analyses on a
subjective basis which fail to take into account in a systematic fashion the experience gained
through past reviews or to sufficiently emphasize general findings about the pattern of care
provided. 27
Such regional norms, under the original PSRO legislation, were to be informed by
national norms developed by a National Professional Standards Review Council. The
goal was to develop objective standards of care accepted nationally. 128
Though the dream of objective national standards for evaluating the quality and
effectiveness of medical care continues to inspire scholars, 129 and remains high on the
research agenda of HHS,130 PROs have reconciled themselves to the real world where
such ideal standards do not generally exist.
To function in such a world, PROs use two kinds of norms for evaluating care.
First, they use written screening criteria, applied by nonphysician professional record
reviewers (usually nurses), to identify potential quality and utilization problems. All
PROs must use utilization, quality, and discharge screens. 131 PROs must use HHS
generic quality screens for evaluating quality problems. 132 These screens look for
problems such as death during or following surgery, nosocomial infection, trauma
suffered in the hospital, or discharge of a patient with an inappropriately elevated
temperature, high blood pressure, or depressed pulse. 133 PROs are also to apply their
own criteria screens to identify premature discharges, unnecessary admissions,
inappropriate performance of invasive procedures, and, for PPS hospitals, improper
assignment of DRGs. 134 Most PROs, including all but one of the PROs with which
I spoke, use an adapted version of the ISD-AI 35 criteria developed by InterQual for
making medical necessity and appropriateness determinations. 136 This system con-
siders the intensity of services delivered to patients, the severity of the patient's
condition, the patient's stability at discharge, and the use of special care units and
clinical support services to determine the necessity and appropriateness of care.137
127. SENATE COMM. ON FIN., S. REP. No. 1230, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 257 (Sept. 26, 1972).
128. See Chenen, PROs and Poor Quality Medical Care-They Can't Sanction It Until They Define It, 2 Mw.
STAFF CouNs. 25 (Spring 1988).
129. See, e.g., Dubois & Brook, Assessing Clinical Decision Making: Is the Ideal System Feasible?, 25 INQuiRY 59
(Spring 1988); Eddy & Billings, The Quality of Medical Evidence: Implications for Quality of Care, 7 HEALTI AFs. 19,
29-30 (Spring 1988); Wennberg, Improving the Medical Decision-Making Process, 7 HEMA.nT An. 99 (Spring 1988).
130. GAO, supra note 31, at 144-56.
131. TIRD ScoPE OF WORK, supra note 3, § XIII, at 27-29.
132. Id., Attach. 1.
133. Id. (Generic Quality Screens, Hospital Inpatient).
134. Id. § IV, at 3-5.
135. Intensity, severity, diagnosis-appropriateness.
136. See AMA, PEER Raviaw ORANIZATION (PRO ExEcimvs) SURvEy Table 8 (1987) [hereinafter AMA PRO
ExEcumwv SuRvEY]; GAO, supra note 31, at 46-51. For an example of PRO screening criteria, see Black, Impact of PROs
on Hospitals and Pharmacy Practice, 44 Am. J. Hosp. PHARMAcY 77, 79 (Jan. 1987).
137. PEOSPECrIVE PAYMENT ASSESSMENT COMM'N, A STunY OF THE PREADMISSION Rviaw PRocEss 1-2 (Dec. 1987).
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Second, once problems are identified by nurse reviewers, physician reviewers
apply their own judgment, using implicit unarticulated standards, to evaluate the
quality or necessity of the care rendered. 138 It is ultimately on the basis of these
judgments that PROs deny payment to or sanction providers. Because of the potential
subjectivity of this system, PROs rely heavily on repetitive review to assure accuracy
and fairness. An AMA survey, for example, determined that, depending on the PRO,
between three and thirty-five physicians will review a case before an initial sanction
letter is sent. The mean number of reviewers was ten; the median was seven. 139 Thus,
although PROs do not apply written criteria in making their final decisions, they do
seek a consensus medical judgment that transcends the subjective judgment of
individual reviewers.
The concepts of criteria, norms, and standards are defined in the PRO statute and
regulations. 42 U.S.C. section 1320c-3(a)(6) mandates that PROs:
shall... apply professionally developed norms of care, diagnosis, and treatment based upon
typical patterns of practice within the geographic area served by the organization as principal
points of evaluation and review, taking into consideration national norms where appropriate.
Such norms with respect to treatment for particular illnesses or health conditions shall
include-(i) the types and extent of health care services, which, taking into account
differing, but acceptable, modes of treatment and methods of organizing and delivering care,
are considered within the range of appropriate diagnosis and treatment of such illness or
health condition, consistent with professionally recognized and accepted patterns of care;
and (ii) the type of health care facility which is considered, consistent with such standards,
to be the type in which health care services which are medically appropriate for such illness
or condition can most economically be provided.' 40
While the PRO statute speaks only of norms, implicit in it is the distinction made
by the current PRO regulations among criteria, norms, and standards. Norms are
defined as "numerical or statistical measures of average observed performance in the
delivery of health care services." 141 Criteria are "predetermined elements of health
care, developed by health professionals relying on professional expertise, prior
experience, and the professional literature, with which aspects of quality, medical
necessity, and appropriateness of a health care service may be compared." 142
Standards are defined as "[p]rofessionally developed expressions of the range of
acceptable variation from a norm or criterion." 143 In short, norms represent the real,
criteria the ideal, and standards the acceptable deviations from either the real or the
ideal. 144
This neat distinction among norms, standards, and criteria becomes blurred in
section 466.100, which delineates the use of norms, criteria, and standards. First,
138. The term "standards" is used in a generic rather than a technical sense, as defined below (see infra text
accompanying notes 141-44).
139. See AMA PRO ExEcurnVE SuRvEY, supra note 136, Table 11.
140. 42 U.S.C. § 1320c-3(a)(6) (1982).
141. 42 C.F.R. § 466.1 (1987).
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. See A. Gosmsw, PSRO's: THE LAw AND THE HEA.T CoNSursm 34-35 (1975) (further exploring this
distinction).
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section 466.100(c) requires PROs to "[e]stablish written criteria based upon typical
patterns of practice in the PRO area, or use national criteria where appropriate." 1 45
Typical practice patterns, of course, should be reflected in norms, not criteria, given
the definitions of the regulations. Section 466.100(a) requires use of "national, or
where appropriate, regional norms in conducting review to achieve PRO contract
objectives."1 46 Section 466.100(b) requires the use of criteria to review patient care
in health facilities to determine the necessity of admission, of continuing stay for day
outliers, 47 or of surgical and other invasive diagnostic and therapeutic procedures,
and to determine the appropriateness of providing care in particular types of facilities.
Finally, section 466.100(d) permits the use of variant criteria and standards to
evaluate care in particular locations and facilities if the patterns of practice in them
are substantially different from practice in the rest of the PRO area and there is a
reasonable basis for the variation.
Amendments to the PRO regulations proposed on March 16, 1988, will modify
the rules in three important respects. First, they make it clear that norms are used by
nonphysician health care professionals, who screen medical records and refer cases
that fail the screens to physicians for a final determination. Second, they specify that
criteria are to be used for reviewing for the quality as well as the necessity and
appropriateness of norms. Finally, they eliminate the notion of standards (that is,
acceptable deviations from norms and criteria), noting that PROs in fact have not
adopted standards.1 48
Several important issues have arisen concerning the application of PRO norms
and criteria. First, a continuing dispute exists as to whether the norms and criteria
applied by PROs are sufficiently definite to give adequate notice to those who are
sanctioned or denied payment by the PROs. Second, differences of opinion exist as
to what extent local or regional practice variations should be accommodated by PRO
norms. Third, there is controversy as to what extent PRO utilization norms should
accommodate social, as opposed to medical, needs for care. Finally, debate continues
as to what processes should be used to assure the participation of relevant parties in
the formation of PRO norms and to make final norms available to such parties.
A. Are PRO Norms and Criteria Sufficiently Definite?
Administrative law has long struggled with the question of whether standards
must be prospectively articulated with precision before they can be enforced. There
is much to be said for administrative agencies governing through precise and
objective written rules. Objective written standards provide guidance to the regulated
agencies in planning conduct and thus assure greater voluntary compliance with
145. 42 C.F.R. § 466.100(c) (1987).
146. It further specifically requires the use of national norms to determine the number of procedures selected for
preadmission review, a requirement that would be omitted by the proposed regulations, as it does not reflect current PRO
practice. See proposed rule § 466.100, 53 Fed. Reg. 8,660, 8,666 (Mar. 16, 1988).
147. Outliers are patients who require hospitalization for periods of time significantly longer than those
contemplated by PPS and for whom hospitals receive extra reimbursement.
148. 53 Fed. Reg. 8,654, 8,660, 8,666 (Mar. 16, 1988).
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requirements. They also focus and facilitate judicial and political review and
generally cabin administrative discretion.149 ACUS has long supported prospective
articulation of agency policies. 150 Courts have on occasion struck down agency
actions wholly unfettered by written standards. 15'
Formulating precise and objective rules, however, may place inordinate de-
mands on agency resources and may result in rules that are too complicated or that
are over- or under-inclusive.152 The Supreme Court has on several occasions
permitted agencies to make policy on a case-by-case basis rather than through
prospective rulemaking.153 And courts have been notably reluctant to strike down
standards propounded by agencies as unconstitutionally vague, at least when neither
first amendment rights nor criminal prosecutions were involved.' 54 This is particu-
larly true where industry or professional practice assists in understanding an
imprecise rule. 155
The federal statute and regulations defining conduct sanctionable under the PRO
program are remarkably imprecise. 42 U.S.C. section 1320c-5, for example,
provides that practitioners or providers have an obligation to assure that services "(1)
will be provided economically and only when, and to the extent, medically necessary;
and (2) will be of a quality which meets professionally recognized standards of health
care." 5 6 Practitioners or providers may be sanctioned if they fail "in a substantial
number of cases substantially to comply" or in one or more instances "grossly and
flagrantly" violate these obligations. '7 The PRO regulations further define "gross
and flagrant violation" to mean "[a] violation of an obligation [that] has occurred in
one or more instances which presents an imminent danger to the health, safety or
well-being of a Medicare beneficiary or places the beneficiary unnecessarily in
high-risk situations.' 58 "Substantial violation in a substantial number of cases" is
defined as "a pattern of care [that] has been provided that is inappropriate,
unnecessary, or does not meet recognized professional standards of care, or is not
supported by the necessary documentation of care as required by the PRO."159 These
federal standards are fleshed out through objective screening criteria and subjective
reviewer judgments at the PRO level.
149. Diver, Agency Articulation of Policy, 1983 AD.%tN. CONF. OF THE UNITED STATES 390-91; Berg, Reexamining
Policy Procedures: The Choice Between Rulemaking and Adjudication, 38 ADnNu. L. Ray. 149, 163 (1986).
150. See 1 C.F.R. § 305.71-3 and other ACUS recommendations cited by Diver, supra note 149, at 389-90.
151. Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199 (1974); D & W Food Center v. Block, 786 F.2d 751, 757 (6th Cir. 1986); White
v. Roughton, 530 F.2d 750 (7th Cir. 1976); Holmes v. New York City Housing Auth., 398 F.2d 262 (2d Cir. 1968).
152. Diver, supra note 149, at 397-98, 505-06, 508-09.
153. NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267 (1974); NLRB v. Wyman Gordon Co., 394 U.S. 759 (1969). See
also Scalia, Back to Basics: Making Law Without Making Rules, 5 REGULATION 25 (July/Aug. 1981).
154. United States v. Sun Sport Imports Ltd., 725 F.2d 184 (2d Cir. 1984); Vorbeck v. Schnicker, 660 F.2d 1260
(8th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 921 (1982). See Village of Hoffman Estates v. The Flipside, Hoffman Estates,
Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 498 (1982).
155. PBR Inc. v. Secretary of Labor, 643 F.2d 890 (1st Cir. 1981); Brass Plating Co. v. Town of Windsor, 639 F.
Supp. 873 (D. Conn. 1986).
156. 42 U.S.C. § 1320c-5(a)(1)-(2) (1982). The section further requires that providers and practitioners be able to
supply evidence of the necessity and quality of services provided.
157. Id. § 1320c-5(b)(1)(A), (B).
158. Id.
159. 42 C.F.R. § 1004.1 (1987).
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The federal PRO statute and regulations have been upheld repeatedly against
vagueness challenges. 16o The Fourth Circuit in Varandani v. Bowen noted: "The
definition of adequate medical care cannot be boiled down to a precise mathematical
formula; it must be grounded in what, from time to time, other health professionals
consider to be acceptable standards of health care." ' 161 The First Circuit Court of
Appeals in Doyle v. Bowen further noted that "[t]o the medical profession, which
will administer this [federal] standard, it has a reasonably clear meaning."1 62
Nonetheless, physicians sanctioned under the Medicare program, and many of
the provider attorneys with whom I spoke, have complained about the lack of
precision in PRO criteria for evaluating the necessity and quality of medical care. 163
While ALJs hearing PRO sanction cases have not rejected PRO sanctions solely
because of the imprecision of PRO standards, they have called for more objective,
clear, and appropriate standards.' 64 On the other hand, some provider associations
that I interviewed expressed continuing concern about reducing the practice of
medicine to a "cookbook," which ignores the art necessarily involved in medical
practice.165 Devising a definitive and precise formula for evaluating medical practice
may be an impossible dream in any event-a recent article that proposed use of
Bayesian analysis for devising criteria maps for analyzing patient diagnosis noted that
a complete system would include over ten billion pathways of analysis for common
medical problems. 166 Some room must be left for informed judgment.
HHS and the PROs continue to attempt to devise more objective criteria for
evaluating the effectiveness and quality of medical care. The generic screening
criteria uniformly used by the PROs represent one such attempt. Reviews of these
criteria are generally positive.167 HHS has also proposed that more explicit criteria be
developed for particular conditions before the denial of payment for substandard care
program, mandated by COBRA '85, is implemented. 168 At the PRO level, the
160. Doyle v. Bowen, 848 F.2d 296, 301 (1st Cir. 1988); Varandani v. Bowen, 824 F.2d 307, 311-12 (4th Cir.
1987); Association of Am. Physicians & Surgeons v. Weinberger, 395 F. Supp. 125, 138 (N.D. Ill. 1975).
161. Varandani, 824 F.2d at 312.
162. Doyle, 848 F.2d at 301; see also In re Lifshutz, No. 000-44-7020, 11-13 (Mar. 25, 1988) (AJ opinion holding
that PROs need not apply written criteria, norms, and standards in sanctioning physician).
163. The interviews conducted by the author were generally carried out under an understanding that the identity of
interviewees would be kept confidential, so interviewees are not identified here. For published statements to the same
effect, see generally Chenen, supra note 128; Hearings on the Peer Review Organization Program Before the Subcomm.
on Health and the Env't of the House Energy & Commerce Comm., 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 7-9 (1987) (statement of
AHA).
164. In re Greene, No. HIX-000-00-0219, 8-20 (Dec. 29, 1987); In re Apakupakul, No. HIX-000-34-7009, 32-33
(June 1, 1987) (charges too vague).
165. See Interpreting PSRO "Norms of Care"-Cookbook Medicine or Textbook Medicine?, AM. MED. NEws, May
20, 1974, at 21; PROs, Medical Societies Must Play a Role, THE INTtRNST, Apr. 1985, at 9.
166. Dubois & Brook, supra note 129, at 63.
167. See OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SEtvs., THE UmtizAtoN AND QUAtrY
CoNrTROL PEER REvIEw ORGAsnzA-nON (PRO) PIROGRAM, QUALITY REvmw Acrnvrrmss 12 (1988) [hereinafter OIG QUALITY
REPORT]; Slide Presentation on Quality Assurance, Ernst & Whinney, Slide K-18 (1987 survey results).
168. HEALTH CARE FIN. ADMIN., U.S. DEF'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERvs., REGULATIONS ON DENIAL OF PAYMENT FOR
SUBSTANDARD QUALIrY CARE (draft) A12-13 (Feb. 29, 1988) [hereinafter HCFA REGULATONS]; PROPOSED SUBSTANDARD
CARE REGOULATONS, supra note 61, at 1958-59, 1963 (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 462, § 466.100(c) (establishment
of criteria and standards)).
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Pennsylvania PRO has been experimenting with computerizing its screening criteria,
which presumably would require greater precision.
HHS and the PROs should continue to press forward toward formulating more
objective and precise necessity and quality criteria when it is possible to do so with
the support of scientific evidence and the consensus of the medical community. Until
such criteria become feasible, however, the program will continue to have to live with
relatively imprecise criteria that are applied to individual cases through the judgment
of physician reviewers.
B. Local or National Norms
One of the most politically controversial issues affecting the PROs has been
whether norms and criteria used for evaluating medical care should be national in
scope or whether local practice variations should be accommodated. From 1985 to
1987, 63% of physicians recommended by PROs for sanctions and 65% of the
physicians sanctioned by the OIG were from rural areas, despite the fact that only
11% of physicians in the United States practice in rural areas. 169 While there is no
consensus as to why this has been true, it has clearly raised the ire of rural
practitioners and their patients, who believe that rural physicians are sanctioned
disproportionately because PROs depend on reviewers from urban areas who do not
understand the practice of medicine in rural areas. 170
It has long been known that there are substantial variations in medical practice
between different communities,' 7' a fact recognized, at least intuitively, in the old
malpractice locality rule. On the other hand, there is a certain plausibility to the
argument (which has largely won the day in malpractice litigation) that local
standards often reflect poor quality care and that a national standard, adjusted for
local variations in access to medical resources, is more appropriate. A broken hip or
heart attack in rural Texas is, after all, physiologically identical to one in Boston. 172
From the beginning, the PRO statute recognized that there may be local or
regional variations in acceptable norms of treatment and that the PROs should take
these into account. The PRO regulations permit the use of variant norms to
accommodate local variations in practice. 173 PRO Interim Manual Transmittal
IM-87-1174 requires PROs, whenever possible, to use physician reviewers who
practice in settings similar to that of the physician under review and specifically to use
169. OIG SArcnoi REPoRT, supra note 6, App. XI, Table D. See id. at 20 (speculating as to the reasons for this).
170. See Hearings on Peer Review Organizations, Health and the Env't Subcomm. of the House Energy and
Commerce Comm., 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 30 (1987) (statement of Rep. Boulter); Reinhold, Quality-Care Reviews
Hurting Rural Doctors, N.Y. Times, Mar. 24, 1987, at Al, col. 3.
171. Wennberg, Dealing with Medical Practice Variations: A Proposal for Action, 3 HEAmT AMi. 6 (Summer
1984).
172. See Hall v. Hilbun, 466 So. 2d 856 (Miss. 1985); Letter from John C. Rother, for the Am. Ass'n of Retired
Persons, to William Roper, Administrator, HCFA, at 5 (May 16, 1988) (commenting on March 16, 1988, proposed PRO
regulations) ("AARP firmly believes that the standard of care must not change from location to location, although
allowance may be made for resource availability.").
173. 42 C.F.R. § 466.100(d) (1987).
174. PRO MAmNAL, supra note 53, § 3015 (Apr. 1987).
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rural physicians to review the work of rural physicians.175 At least one court has
determined that a physician who argued that a PRO must use rural standards in
sanctioning a rural physician raised a sufficiently substantial question to secure a
preliminary injunction. 176 This interpretation of the PRO legislation was followed by
the ALI in that case on remand. 177 Finally, OBRA '87 further accommodates local
practice variations by requiring PRO consideration of the "special problems
associated with delivering care in remote rural areas"1 78 and by mandating on-site
review of at least 20% of the rural hospitals in a PRO's area. 179
In practice, PROs are increasingly sensitive to the concerns of rural practition-
ers. None of the PROs I interviewed had special criteria sets for regional areas, but
all tried to use rural reviewers for rural providers and physicians. The OIG sanction
activity investigation found that 63% of those interviewed believed there was no bias
against rural physicians and providers in PRO quality review activities.180
While substantial political and, perhaps, medical arguments can be made both
for and against the use of local or national standards, little can be said about the issue
from an administrative law perspective. One point, however, should be made (and
here this Article briefly gets ahead of itself). OBRA '87 provides that before HHS
can exclude a provider or practitioner located in a rural health manpower shortage
area or in a county with a population of less than 70,000 from the Medicare program,
the provider or practitioner must be afforded a hearing, at which HHS must prove by
a preponderance of the evidence that the provider or practitioner will pose a serious
risk to beneficiaries if allowed to continue in the program. 181 As of late October 1988
three exclusions appealed under this procedure had been stayed (two by consent of the
OIG), and two others remained pending.182 None of the contested cases has been
decided within forty-five days. Thus, prehearing exclusions of rural practitioners
from the program have effectively halted.
The appropriate procedure for sanctioning physicians or providers is an
important issue and will be discussed below. Whatever procedure is appropriate,
however, fundamental constitutional notions of equal protection and administrative
law principles of fairness demand that the same procedure be applied both to rural and
urban practitioners. There are arguments, of course, for applying more favorable
procedures in rural areas: there is the charge of PRO bias against rural practitioners
and the concern that beneficiaries in rural areas may have no alternatives if the sole
175. Proposed rule § 466.98 also adopts this policy. 53 Fed. Reg. 8,665 (Mar. 16, 1988). A recent GAO report
found that only about half of PRO reviews of cases handled by rural physicians were in fact reviewed by rural practitioners
at the initial review stage. GAO, MEDICARE PROs: ExTREME VARAnoNs IN ORGANIZATIONAL STRucruRE AND Acnvrris 21
(1988) [hereinafter GAO MEDIcAE PROs].
176. Greene v. Bowen, 639 F. Supp. 554 (E.D. Cal. 1986).
177. In re Greene, No. HIX-000-00-0219, at 15, 20 (Dec. 29, 1987).
178. OBRA '87, Pub. L. No. 100-203, § 4094(a), 1987 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADmiN. NEws (101 Stat.) 1330,
1330-136.
179. Id. § 4094(b), 1987 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMiN. NEws (101 Stat.) 1330, 1330-137.
180. OIG SArcnoN REPORT, supra note 6, at 19.
181. 42 U.S.C. § 1320c-5(b)(5) (1982).
182. Telephone interview with William Libereci, Office of Inspector General, U.S. Dep't of Health & Human
Servs. (Oct. 31. 1988).
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provider or practitioner in the area is excluded from the Medicare program. But the
charge of bias has been generally rejected, and potential bias problems can be
addressed through less drastic means, such as requiring the use of rural physicians to
review care delivered in rural areas. The OIG already considers "the availability of
alternative sources of services in the community" 183 in determining whether or not to
exclude a provider or practitioner. Neither problem is serious enough to justify
supplying rural practitioners and providers with radically different procedural
protections than those offered others. 184 Congress, therefore, should repeal this
provision.
C. Consideration of Social Criteria
One of the major tasks of the PRO program is "appropriateness" review-
determining whether care provided on an inpatient basis could have been provided
more appropriately through less expensive outpatient treatment. 8 5 A procedure
generally appropriate for outpatient care considering only medical factors may in a
particular case be inappropriate because of the social characteristics of the patient or
situation. One interviewee, for example, recounted the experience of a patient who
traveled from her home in rural North Dakota several hundred miles to Minneapolis
to be hospitalized for a medical procedure, only to be told on arrival that she would
have to leave the hospital immediately after the procedure was done because the PRO
would only permit it to be done on an outpatient basis. 186 Section 4094(a) of OBRA
'87 provides that PROs:
shall take into account the special problems associated with delivering care in remote rural
areas, the availability of service alternatives to inpatient hospitalization and other appropri-
ate factors (such as the distance from a patient's residence to the site of care, family support,
availability of proximate alternative sites of care, and the patient's ability to carry out
necessary or prescribed self-care regimens) that could adversely affect the safety or
effectiveness of treatment provided on an outpatient basis.187
While there are substantial arguments for the consideration of social factors in
determining the appropriateness of outpatient care (or, for that matter, in determining
the appropriateness of hospital discharges), implementation of this provision will
183. 42 C.F.R. § 1004.80(e) (1987).
184. The Hall Amendment's origin in the frustration with and anger toward the Inspector General felt by some
physicians is well illustrated by remarks of its drafter, Rep. Hall, responding to the first use of the procedure to stay an
exclusion:
This is one of the first judicial victories and should indicate to the inspector general, Richard Kusserow, that
he can't sit over there in his ivory castle and make all types of blustery and bragging and misleading speeches;
that while he can talk down to men and women who come before him and have heretofore been at his
mercy--that there are many Members of Congress who are neither interested in nor impressed by his pomposity.
Even physicians have a right to due process-and in the short 120 days you have left-Mr. Kusserow-I
suggest you try to get acquainted with this fact, and never again try to deny any American due process!
134 Coxo. REc. E2803-04 (daily ed. Aug. 11, 1988) (extension of remarks by Rep. Hall).
185. 42 U.S.C. § 1320c-3(a)(1)(C) (1982).
186. See also Hearings on Medicare Peer Review Orgs., Subcomm. on Health and the Env't, House Energy and
Commerce Comm., 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 12-15 (1987) (statement of Vita Ostrander, AARP) [hereinafter AARP
Statement].
187. OBRA '87, Pub. L. No. 100-203, 1987 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. tu. NEws (101 Stat.) 1330, 1330-136.
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obviously result in more inpatient care and, thus, higher expenditures for the
Medicare program. Whether such added expenditures are justified is a policy
question, not a question of administrative law. HCFA implementation of this
provision, however, does raise an important administrative law issue.
In implementing OBRA '87, HCFA initially took the position that the first
comma in the section quoted above should be read as a colon, that is, that the
provision only applied to remote rural areas. This is not only contrary to the
amendment's clear language, but is also contradicted by the legislative history of the
provision, which clearly states that beneficiary location in a remote rural area is only
one of the social factors to be taken into account. 188 HHS is apparently reconsidering
its position on its interpretation of section 4094(a) and should expeditiously
implement it as written.1 89
D. Formulation and Publication of Criteria and Standards
As has already been briefly noted, the D.C. Circuit held in Public Citizen Health
Research Group v. DHEW that PSROs were not agencies within the meaning of the
FOIA.190 Because the FOIA adopts the APA definition of "agency," that decision
also stands for the proposition that PROs are not agencies under the APA and thus not
subject to the rulemaking requirements of 5 U.S.C. section 553. Although the
reasoning of the court in Public Citizen is somewhat confused (the court held both
that the PSRO did not have independent decisionmaking authority and that it was not
subject to supervision by HHS), 191 its holding seems consistent with congressional
intent that PROs are to be independent bodies of practicing physicians and not
government agencies. 192 The holding is also consistent with other cases that have
considered the status of PSROs and PROs.193 PROs are also probably not subject to
the Model State APA, which describes an agency as "a board, commission,
department, officer, or other administrative unit of this state." 194
Even though PROs are themselves not bound by the rulemaking requirements of
the APA, the reasoning behind those requirements1 95 argues in favor of PROs seeking
participation of affected parties in formulating criteria, standards, and norms and
assuring that their criteria, standards, and norms are made available to those affected
by them. This is recognized by the documents governing the PRO program. The
Third Scope of Work requires that:
188. H.R. CoNE. REP. To AccoMPANY THE OMlmus BuDnEr REcoNciLIA ON Acr oF 1987, 100th Cong., Ist Sess.
661,663.
189. Several beneficiary representatives with whom I spoke also argued for greater consideration of social criteria
in determining appropriateness of discharge. This is, however, a policy and not an administrative law issue, and it is thus
beyond the scope of this Article.
190. 668 F.2d 537 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
191. Id. at 543-44.
192. See id. at 542-43.
193. See Oster v. Bowen, 682 F. Supp. 853 (E.D. Va. 1988); Kwoun v. Southeast Mo. PSRO, 663 F. Supp. 520
(D.C. Mo. 1985); Taylor v. Flint Osteopathic Hosp., 561 F. Supp. 1152 (E.D. Mich. 1983).
194. Model State Admin. Procedure Act § 1-102(1) (1981).
195. See supra Part In for discussion.
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In the development/refinement of criteria, the PRO shall consult with physicians/practition-
ers actively engaged in practice in the state. PRO developed criteria are to be submitted to
HCFA for review, and sent to the providers and physician organizations (i.e., State medical
societies) in the State. In addition, the contractor must furnish the criteria to anyone upon
request. 196
The PRO regulations also require that a PRO must disclose "[t]he norms, criteria,
and standards it uses for initial screening of cases, and for other review activities." 197
All of the PROs with which I spoke attempt to involve their state medical
community in drafting or modifying their criteria sets. Most PROs seek comments
from state medical associations and specialty societies; some circulate drafts to
hospital medical staffs or have provider advisory committees. Seventy-three percent
of state medical societies reported in an AMA survey that state specialty societies had
assisted PROs in developing or modifying criteria, and 39% reported that specialty
sections of the state medical society had also provided assistance. 198 The possibility
of PROs involving their own state medical community in drafting and reviewing PRO
criteria is one of the strongest arguments against the creation of uniform national
criteria sets by HCFA.
All of the PROs that I interviewed are also making efforts to publicize their
criteria. All send their criteria sets to every hospital in the state. Some have identified
PRO liaisons in the hospitals to whom they direct the criteria, others send them to the
director of the medical staff, the administrator, or the utilization review/quality
assurance supervisor. Most also send them to the state medical society. None sends
its criteria to all physicians in the state, though some send out a regular bulletin or
newsletter to advise doctors of criteria changes or send specialty criteria to affected
specialists. Nevertheless, several state provider representatives with whom I spoke
said that providers are not sufficiently educated by the PROs as to PRO criteria.199
National provider and beneficiary groups have also called for clearer and more public
articulation of criteria.20°
The task of formulating PRO criteria is ideally suited for a simplified version of
negotiated rulemaking. 201 The parties affected by criteria are relatively few, and their
spokespersons are readily identifiable; technical rather than ideological issues are
usually (though not always) involved; the adoption of some criteria is usually
necessary and inevitable; and opportunities for compromise and consensus are usually
196. T ot ScoPE OF voRK, supra note 3, § XIn, at 27-28.
197. 42 C.F.R. § 476.120(a)(t) (1987). PROs must also make available to the public copies of their contracts (which
describe their procedures) and copies of documents describing their administrative procedures. Id. § 476.120(a)(2)-(3).
198. AMA PRO ,xExcrtmva SUovEY, supra note 136, at 2.
199. A recent study by the GAO provides more information on how PROs disseminate their criteria. See generally
GAO M IEocAR PROs, supra note 175.
200. See Hearings on Medicare PROs Before Subcomm. on Health and the Env't, House Comm. of Energy and
Commerce, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 7-11 (1987) (statement of AHA); Information for Consumers About Quality of
Medical Care, Subcomm. on Natural Resources, Research, and Env t, House Comm. on Science, Space and Tech., 100th
Cong., 2nd Sess. 10 (1988) (statement of AARP); AARP Statement, supra note 186, at 4.
201. See Harter, Negotiating Regulations: A Cure for Malaise, 71 GEO. L.J. 1 (1982); Perritt, Negotiated
Rulemaking Before Federal Agencies: Evaluation of Recommendations by the Administrative Conference of the United
States, 74 GEO. L.J. 1625 (1986); 1 C.F.R. §§ 305.82-4, .85-5 (1987).
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present. 2°2 Greater involvement of providers and practitioners in the standard-setting
process could bring greater understanding of the standards and compliance with them,
acceptance of the legitimacy of PRO review, and, mostimportantly, better standards.
Greater involvement of beneficiary organizations would assure that the patient's
perspective on care was taken into account, especially when social issues are
involved. Dissemination of norms to beneficiaries could also play a valuable
educative role. 20 3 PROs establishing or modifying criteria should, therefore, convene
groups of provider and beneficiary organizations and attempt to reach agreement as
to appropriate criteria through a negotiating process. Such an approach to criteria
setting is in the best tradition of peer review.
Two provisions of OBRA '87 have the potential to make an important
contribution to the task of educating the medical community about PRO criteria and
norms. Section 4094(c)(1)(B)(i) requires PROs to offer to make available a physician
to meet with the medical and administrative staff of each hospital to explain the
organization's review of the hospital's services (at individual hospitals or on a
regional basis). 2°4 Section 4094(c)(1)(B)(ii) requires PROs to publish at least
annually and distribute to practitioners and providers a report describing the types of
cases in which the PRO has frequently determined that care has been provided
inappropriately, unnecessarily, or not in conformity with professional standards of
care. 20 5 These provisions are implemented by the Third Scope of Work, which also
requires PROs to engage in further efforts at provider education, including making
staff available for educational presentations, and publications describing PRO
procedures. 206 Educational efforts that involve direct discussions with affected
providers and practitioners and focus on particular problem areas have great promise
for effectively communicating PRO criteria.
V. THE PRO QUALITY ASSURANCE AND SANCTION PROGRAM
A. Introduction
By far the most controversial function of the PRO program has been its
sanctioning authority. 42 U.S.C. section 1320-5(a) imposes on practitioners and
providers participating in the Medicare program an obligation to assure that services
they render are provided economically, are provided only when medically necessary,
and are of a quality that meets professional standards of care. It further obligates them
to provide evidence to establish that they have met these requirements. It also gives
PROs the power and responsibility to sanction providers who fail to fulfill these
obligations. If "after reasonable notice and opportunity for discussion" a PRO
determines that practitioners or providers have "(A) failed in a substantial number of
cases substantially to comply" with these obligations or "(B) grossly and flagrantly
202. See Perdtt, supra note 201, at 1642-47; 1 C.F.R. § 305.85-5 (1987).
203. See A. GosFELD, PSRO's: THE LAW AND THE HEALTH CONsiER 32-33 (1975).
204. OBRA '87, Pub. L. No. 100-203, 1987 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws (101 Stat.) 1330, 1330-136.
205. Id. at 1330-137.
206. THIRD ScopE OF WoRK, supra note 3, § xvnI(C), at 40-41.
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violated any such obligation in one or more instances," the PRO shall submit a report
and sanction recommendation to the HHS OIG.2 0 7 If the OIG agrees with the PRO
recommendation and determines that the practitioner or provider "has demonstrated
an unwillingness or a lack of ability substantially to comply with such obligations,"
it may exclude the provider or practitioner from "eligibility to provide Medicare
services on a reimbursable basis." ' 208 When the provider or practitioner has been
sanctioned for providing medically improper or unnecessary care, the OIG may,
instead of exclusion, impose a monetary penalty not in excess of the cost of the
medically improper or unnecessary services. 209 A sanctioned provider or practitioner
may obtain a post-exclusion hearing before an ALJ and, ultimately, judicial review.
As was discussed earlier, under OBRA '87 rural providers cannot be excluded from
the program without a pre-exclusion hearing before an ALJ to determine whether the
provider or practitioner poses a serious risk to Medicare beneficiaries. 210
B. Criticisms of the PRO Sanction Process
The PROs' exercise of their sanctioning authority has made them the target of
much criticism. As of December 31, 1987, 38 of the 54 PROs had referred 151 cases
to the OIG; the OIG had excluded 60 physicians and 1 facility and assessed a penalty
against 24 physicians and 2 facilities. 2 11 This represents about 19 sanctions per
100,000 physicians serving Medicare beneficiaries. Through September 1987
twenty-three states and the District of Columbia, containing one-fifth of the nation's
doctors and Medicare beneficiaries, had not successfully recommended a single
sanction.212 Though it is impossible, of course, to determine the optimal level of
sanctioning, it is difficult to believe that 99.98% of doctors treating Medicare
beneficiaries (and 100% in twenty-three states) are doing a satisfactory job, especially
given common estimates that incompetency among doctors runs at levels of 5% to
10%.213 Some consumer groups have been sharply critical of the timidity of the PROs
in sanctioning doctors, 214 and the OIG has occasionally joined this criticism. 21 5
Attorneys representing providers with whom I spoke, on the other hand, are
sharply critical of what they see as oppressive aggressiveness on the part of the
207. 42 U.S.C. § 1320c-5(b) (1982).
208. Id. § 1320c-5(b)(1). This provision further states that if HHS fails to take action within 120 days, the
practitioner or provider will be excluded until HHS decides otherwise. This clause was put in the statute to address the
problem of HHS delay in acting on sanctions recommended by the PSROs. The OIG has consistently taken action on PRO
recommendations within 120 days, consigning this provision to desuetude.
209. Id. § 1320c-5(b)(3).
210. Id. § 1320c-5(b)(5). HHS has implemented these statutory provisions through regulations appearing at 42
C.F.R. pt. 1004 and PRO MANuAL, supra note 53, Transmittal No. 15 of May 1987.
211. See OIG SANCnoN REP oRT, supra note 6, at 11.
212. Subcomm. on Health, Comm. on Ways and Means, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 2, 3 (1987) (testimony of Sidney
Wolfe, Director Pub. Citizen Health Research Group) [hereinafter Testimony of S. Wolfe].
213. See Derbyshire, Medical Discipline in Disarray: The Incompetent Physician, 18 Hose. PRAc. 30, 31 (Nov.
1983).
214. Testimony of S. Wolfe, supra note 212; Kotelchuck, Watchdog on a Short Chain, HEALmi/PAC BuLL., Spring
1987, at 19, 21.
215. See Webber, A PRO Report Card, THE IEM'rprasT, July 1986, at 7, 9.
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PROs.2 16 They properly note the devastating effect that exclusion from the Medicare
program has on physicians. While an excluded physician may in theory continue to
practice (and even to treat Medicare beneficiaries if he or she is willing to do so
without compensation), Medicare nationally pays for 21% of physicians services217
and provides a much higher proportion of the income for some specialists. Secondary
effects of Medicare exclusion can, moreover, be even more devastating. Attorneys
with whom I talked stated that after exclusion their clients ceased to receive referrals
from other doctors, were terminated from hospital medical staffs, and were
investigated by state licensure agencies. While they waited up to eighteen months for
ALJ hearings and judicial review, excluded doctors were forced to maintain the high
overhead of their practices and pay high legal fees without income, an ordeal that
drove at least one into bankruptcy.
The proceedings that resulted in these consequences were passionately criticized
by provider representatives. Though PRO procedures were substantially amended
under a May 1987 compromise between the OIG, HCFA, the AMA, and the
American Association of Retired Persons (AARP) to assure greater procedural
protections for sanctioned providers and practitioners at the PRO level,2 18 provider
attorneys still complain of the inability to cross-examine the reviewers (often
anonymous) who initiated the proceedings, the informality of the proceedings, and
the lack of notice and standards. Their harshest criticism, however, is focused on the
perceived bias of PRO sanction proceedings. Physician representatives widely
believe that PROs are directly rewarded for sanctioning providers and threatened with
contract termination for not doing so, and thus are heavily biased against providers
once sanctions are recommended. They also believe that the OIG is prejudiced
against providers and does not provide an effective review of PRO recommen-
dations. 219
The vast majority of those involved in the sanction process, including the PROs
and many beneficiary and provider representatives, are somewhere between these
poles and most show a marked ambivalence about PRO sanctions. On the one hand,
87% of respondents interviewed in a recent study felt that the PROs' sanction
authority strengthened their ability to perform their mission.220 Without the threat of
sanctions, the PROs' educational and corrective efforts would be less likely to get the
attention of the medical community. On the other hand, the PROs feel uncomfortable
with the hostility the sanction process has generated and are frustrated by the time and
resources that go into the sanction process. Two-thirds of PRO CEOs interviewed by
the OIG felt that the sanction process continues to be problematic. 22 1 PROs are
216. See also Schorr, Peer Review: Still Tilting at Windmills, 27 PHYs. Mosrr. 124 (Oct. 1987); Remarks by
Hanson, Cal. Med. Ass'n 1987 House of Delegates (Mar. 10, 1987).
217. Div. of Nat'l Cost Estimates, Office of the Actuary, Health Care Fin. Admin., National Health Expenditures,
1986-2000, 8 HEALTH CARn FiN. REv., Summer 1987, at 1, 13.
218. See U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs. News Release, Changes in PRO Sanction Process, May 13, 1987
(implemented by Manual Transmittal 15).
219. See Carlova, Have Peer Reviewers Put a Price on Your Head?, MED. ECON., Sept. 5, 1988, at 62.
220. OIG SANcrnoN REvor, supra note 6, at 12.
221. Id. at 15.
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particularly frustrated with the inconsistent instructions they get from HCFA and the
OIG as to when to sanction, the proportion of PRO sanction recommendations
rejected by the OIG (over half in 1987),222 and their rate of reversal in ALJ
proceedings.
One thing is clear: the rate of sanctioning activity has dropped dramatically in
the recent past, after climbing steadily since the inception of the PRO program.
During 1985 seven cases were recommended to the OIG by the PROs for sanctions
and all were accepted. During 1986, the high water year for sanction activity,
seventy-seven were recommended, and fifty-five were accepted. During 1987 the
level of recommendations dropped slightly to seventy, but the number of OIG
acceptances dropped dramatically to twenty-five. 223 As of July, only ten cases had
been referred to the OIG for sanctions in 1988. With individual PROs, the drop-off
has been even more dramatic. In the first two years of the program, the California
PRO was among the most active in recommending sanctions, but within the last year
it has not referred any cases to the OIG for sanctions.
The reasons for this decline in activity are disputed. The most optimistic view
is that the initial flurry of sanction activity has cleared up all problems, and further
sanctions are not necessary. A more realistic view is that the PROs, having gotten the
attention of physicians, can now rely more on less drastic interventions. Additional
procedures imposed by the May 1987 compromise may have impeded the sanction
activity of some PROs, but many of the PROs had already implemented these
protections prior to the compromise. The most likely explanation for the slowdown
is that a variety of administrative impediments are discouraging the PROs from
sanctioning the physicians. First, the OIG has rejected a large proportion of sanction
referrals, which has discouraged PROs from referring cases. Second, PROs have
noted the high rate of ALJ reversals of sanction cases and have become reluctant to
commit the heavy expenditure of resources necessary to get a case to the ALJ level
if reversal seems inevitable.
In order to understand the decline in PRO sanction activity, it is important to
consider the reasons why PRO sanction cases are being rejected. Of the fifty-six cases
rejected by the OIG in 1987, twenty were rejected because the PRO had failed to
establish the inability or unwillingness of the physician or provider to meet statutory
obligations.2 24 PROs have generally concluded that they will not be able to establish
inability or unwillingness without documenting a pattern of violations over a period
of time, and they are thus keeping physicians under correction plans for several weeks
or months before referring for sanctions. Many PROs have also concluded that the
OIG will not accept referrals when only a single instance of gross and flagrant
conduct is involved (despite clear statutory language to the contrary) or of cases
222. Id. at 17.
223. Id.
224. Id. at 18.
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involving fines. 225 PROs have also experienced difficulty collecting payments from
HHS for sanction activities, which are supposed to be separately reimbursed. 226
In sum, despite significant changes in the sanction process over the last two
years, the process still seems not to be working very smoothly.
C. The PRO Quality Assurance and Sanction Process Described
All PROs, as required by the Scope of Work and PRO contracts, have a
two-stage process through which cases must go before sanctions are imposed.
Sanction cases normally begin in the quality assurance process, which identifies and
attempts to correct quality problems. 227 Serious or repeated problems identified
through the quality assurance process are sent on to the sanction process. The Third
Scope of Work establishes broad guidelines for the quality assurance process; the PRO
regulations 228 set out more specific guidelines for the sanction process. Both
processes vary considerably, however, from PRO to PRO.
In all PROs, the first step down the long road to a PRO sanction is taken (in most
instances) when a nurse reviewer kicks out a case for failing one of the generic quality
screens or another quality, utilization, or discharge screen. 229 In most PROs, the case
is then reviewed by a physician reviewer, who will in all likelihood not belong to the
specialty of the doctor under review. If the review is conducted on-site at a hospital,
the doctor is even less likely to be specialty-matched. 230
If the initial physician advisor determines that there is a quality problem, one of
several things may happen. In four of the twelve PROs I interviewed, the PRO sends
a letter to the attending physician or provider and asks for an explanation of the
problem. In six of these PROs, the case is referred to one or more specialists matched
with the specialty of the physician under question, who further reviews the case. If
the specialist agrees that there is a problem, the attending physician or provider is
contacted for further information; otherwise the matter is dropped. Finally, in the two
other PROs with which I spoke, the case is sent to a medical director or quality review
committee simultaneously with or before a request to the attending physician or
provider for more information. In several of the PROs, minor problems are noted at
this level for future consideration if patterns develop, but they are not immediately
acted on.
Once a response is received from the attending physician or provider, the
response is reviewed, in most of the PROs, by a matched specialist, usually someone
225. Id. at 16. These issues are the subject of a recent GAO investigation. See generally GAO MsoicAsre PROs,
supra note 175.
226. OIG SANCnON REPORT, supra note 6, at 16. Payment for sanction activity after an initial sanction letter is sent
is supposed to be in addition to the amount included in the PRO contract for quality assurance generally. See 2 Medicare
& Medicaid Guide (CCH) 12,875 (1986).
227. Potential sanction cases can also be identified in the utilization review process, but they seldom are.
228. 42 C.F.R. pt. 1004 (1987).
229. Cases could also be identified by beneficiary complaints or by referrals from fiscal intermediaries, HCFA
regional offices, or state medical boards.
230. In the median PRO surveyed by the GAO recently, only 30% of the cases were specialty-matched for the
doctor's review. GAO MErnckRs PROs, supra note 175, at 21.
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other than the initial reviewer. In one-fourth of the PROs I interviewed, however, the
record and the physician's or provider's response go directly to a quality assurance
committee. In half of the PROs I interviewed, the matched specialist reviewer refers
problem cases on to a quality assurance committee, often at a regional level. In two
of the remaining PROs, the matched specialist sends out a second letter noting that
the problem has not been cleared up and requesting more information. This letter may
be sent to hospitals at which the attending physician has staff privileges as well as to
the doctor. Again, during this further review, cases may be classified using a grid,
with serious cases being pursued aggressively and less serious cases being noted for
future profile review.
In three-fourths of the PROs I interviewed, serious or repeated problems
eventually end up in a quality assurance committee. In about one-third of the PROs,
this committee meets with the physician. These committees vary in size from three
to twelve members, often meet at a regional level, and are usually composed of an
assortment of specialists. In two of the PROs I interviewed, there are two layers of
committee review before a case can be referred for sanctions. The quality assurance
committee normally imposes a corrective action plan on the doctor and then monitors
compliance over a period of time.23 1 Some PROs monitor corrective action plans for
a set period of time (thirty, sixty, or ninety days). Other PROs (recognizing that a
doctor can simply avoid problem cases until a time-limited corrective action plan
expires) monitor corrective action plans for a set number of specific kinds of cases. 232
If a problem persists through all of these layers of review, it enters the sanction
process, which is often handled by a different committee. As is clear by now, the
number of steps in the review process between the initial identification of a problem
and a final decision to pursue sanctions varies considerably from PRO to PRO
(though many of the PROs can expedite their normal processes in egregious cases).
An AMA study found that the number of physician reviewers who review a case
before a sanction letter is sent varied from three to thirty-five, with a mean of ten and
a median of seven.233 My impression is that the PROs with the most expedited
procedures have traditionally been the most active in sanctioning physicians. 234
The Third Scope of Work imposes a quality review process that may streamline
this process in some PROs and complicate it in others. Under this process, the PRO
has sixty days from the date of receipt of fiscal intermediary sampling data to obtain
records, run them through criteria screens, and have problems assessed by a physician
advisor.2 35 Identified problems must then be reviewed within thirty days by a
231. See OIG SANnON REPORT, supra note 6, at 8 (describing this process further). The OIG QUALrrY REPORT,
supra note 167, at 18, noted that corrective action was relatively uncommon, but my impression in speaking with the
PROs was that it was increasingly common. The AMA PRO ExEcutvE SURvEY, supra note 136, Table 14, found that the
PROs the AMA interviewed had imposed from 0 to 98 corrective action plans, with a mean of 15.6. A recent GAO study
includes more information on corrective action plans. See generally GAO MEoxCARE PROs, supra note 175.
232. For example, if a corrective action plan applies for 50 cases, the doctor will be monitored for 50 cases, whether
it takes him 1 month or 24 to handle this volume.
233. AMA PRO ExEcutvE SURVEY, supra note 136, Table 11.
234. The OIG SANCno REPORT, supra note 6, at 14, agrees with this assessment. The OIG QUALtrrY REPORT, supra
note 167, at 18, notes that, conversely, the PROs with the most complicated procedures sanction the least.
235. TuRD SCOPE OF WORK, supra note 3, § V(B), at 6.
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specialist or quality assurance committee. 236 When problems are not resolved, the
provider must be given an opportunity to discuss the case, which consumes another
thirty days. 2 37 Finally, the PRO has 15 additional days to confirm or not confirm the
quality problem and to send final notice to the attending physician or provider, for a
total of 135 days. 23 8 Within this 135-day maximum, PROs may adjust the time frame,
as long as the attending physician or provider is given 30 days to discuss the
problem. 239
The initial reviewer in the Third Scope of Work quality assurance process must
classify problems into one of three categories depending on the severity of the
problem. The most trivial, severity level I, problems are noted but not acted upon
unless a pattern emerges. 240 Severity level II and III problems are to be profiled on
a quarterly basis. 241 Appropriate interventions are to be pursued by the PRO,
depending on the weighted score assigned to confirmed problems. 242 These might
include notification, education, intensified review, coordination with licensing and
accreditation bodies, and, ultimately, sanctions. 243 Though cases appropriate for
sanctions will normally be identified through the quality assurance process, the
sanction process is independent, and sanctions may be initiated in appropriate cases
even though not required by the quality assurance process. 244
Once a problem is finally confirmed and a case enters the sanction process, it is
governed by 42 C.F.R. part 1004.245 If the case involves a substantial number of
substantial violations, the PRO begins by sending a sanction notice to the provider or
physician and requesting additional information or a meeting to discuss the problem
within twenty days of the receipt of the notice. 246 For a gross and flagrant violation,
or the case of a substantial number of substantial violations not cleared up through the
discussions following this initial notice, a second notice is sent out requesting
additional information or an opportunity to meet within thirty days.247 Both notices
must clearly explain the problem identified, the obligation violated, the facts relied
on, the potential consequences of a sanction, and the importance of the sanction
meeting. 248 At the thirty-day notice meeting, the physician or provider may have an
attorney present who may make opening and closing remarks, ask clarifying





240. Id. § V(D), at 7.
241. Id. § V(F), at 8.
242. Id. §§ V(F)-(G), at 8-13.
243. Id. § V(G), at 10-12. The most common intervention is a notification letter, used 6 times per 1000 physicians
per quarter in 1987-88. PROs consider sanctions to be the most effective intervention for dealing with quality problems.
GAO MFDic~aR PROs, supra note 175, at 25-27.
244. TIRD ScoPE OF WoRK, supra note 3, § V(G)(4), at 13.
245. A description of this process is included in the OIG SANCTION REPORT, supra note 6.
246. 42 C.F.R. § 1004.40 (1987).
247. Id.
248. Id. §§ 1004.40, .50; U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs. News Release, Changes in PRO Sanction Process,
May 13, 1987.
249. PRO MANUAL, supra note 53, § 6025(B).
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against or in direct competition with the accused physician or provider, or who were
responsible for the findings presented to the sanction committee, may not vote on the
sanction recommendation.250
If the PRO decides to recommend that the OIG sanction a physician or provider,
it sends its determination to the OIG. The physician or provider may send additional
information within thirty days to the OIG.251 The PRO report to the OIG must
thoroughly explain the basis for the recommended sanction. It must also recommend
an appropriate period of exclusion or amount of monetary fine,2 5 2 considering the
type and severity of the offense involved, the deterrent value of a sanction, the
previous record of the sanctioned individual or entity, the availability of alternative
services in the community, and other relevant factors.25 3 The OIG must then decide,
considering these factors, whether or not to impose a sanction and also whether the
provider is unwilling or unable substantially to comply with these obligations.25 4 The
sanction is effective fifteen days from the date the physician or provider receives the
notice from the OIG.2 55 The OIG also provides notification of the sanction to the
public (through a notice in a local newspaper), state Medicaid fraud control units and
state licensing bodies, hospitals and other facilities at which the physician has
privileges, medical societies, and medical carriers, intermediaries, and HMOs.2 6
The sanctioned provider or physician may appeal to an ALJ and ultimately obtain
judicial review,25 7 but this may be done only after the sanction has been
implemented.258
D. Major Issues in the PRO Sanction Process
1. Does the Constitution Require a Pre-exclusion Hearing?
To this point, this Article has described the procedures afforded providers and
physicians in the sanction process by the PRO statute, regulations, and PRO Manual.
In a number of cases, sanctioned physicians have argued that these procedures are
insufficient to meet the demands of the due process clause of the fifth amendment. In
particular, they have argued that the Constitution guarantees them the right to an ALJ
hearing before they are terminated from the Medicare program.2 59
An analysis of the rights that should be afforded physicians and providers must
begin with a consideration of whether their participation in the Medicare program is
protected by the fifth amendment. As interpreted by the Supreme Court, the fifth and
250. Id. § 6025(C)(2).
251. 42 C.F.R. § 1004.60 (1987).
252. Id. § 1004.70.
253. Id. §§ 1004.70, .80.
254. Id. § 1004.90.
255. Id. § 1004.100.
256. Id.
257. Id. § 1004.130.
258. Except for rural physicians; see supra text accompanying notes 181-84.
259. Doyle v. Bowen, 848 F.2d 296 (Ist Cir. 1988); Cassim v. Bowen, 824 F.2d 791 (9th Cir. 1987); Varandani
v. Bowen, 824 F.2d 307 (4th Cir. 1987); Lavapies v. Bowen, 687 F. Supp. 1193 (S.D. Ohio 1988); Ferrer v. Bowen,
No. C86-3523 (N.D. Ohio filed July 6, 1987); Papendick v. Bowen, 658 F. Supp. 1425 (W.D. Wis. 1987).
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fourteenth amendments do not protect all expectations; they protect only life, liberty,
and property interests. 260 While it certainly may be argued that a Medicare
beneficiary has a property interest in continued receipt of Medicare benefits, it is
harder to argue that a provider or physician has a property right in a continued
contractual relationship with the government to provide services to Medicare
beneficiaries. Some courts have noted, therefore, that providers, who are not the
intended beneficiaries of the program, have no rights beyond those provided in their
contracts. 26' Other courts have recognized, on the other hand, the dependence of
providers and physicians on Medicare and their expectation that they will not be
terminated from Medicare without cause. On this basis, they have found a property
right in continued program participation. 262 Still other courts have held that the
reputational damage and injury to practice caused to a provider terminated from the
Medicare program implicates a liberty interest. 263 Most of the cases considering PRO
sanctions have been willing to assume the existence of a property or liberty interest
and move on to the next question: What process is due?2 64
The question of whether sanctioned doctors are entitled to a pre-exclusion
hearing must be answered under the Mathews v. Eldridge calculus by balancing the
doctor's interest in greater procedural protection, the government's interest in
expedited procedures, and the risk that the lack of a pretermination hearing will pro-
duce an erroneous deprivation. 265 Applying this calculus, the courts have uniformly
rejected physicians' claims for a pre-exclusion hearing. 266 First, the courts have
tended to minimize the interest of the sanctioned physician, noting that the doctor will
continue to be able to serve his non-Medicare patients, that he may even continue to
care for Medicare patients without compensation and claim compensation later when
vindicated, and that a successful conclusion of a post-termination hearing will restore
his reputation. 267 Second, they have stressed the compelling importance of expedited
260. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569, 576 (1972).
261. See Koerpel v. Heckler, 797 F.2d 858, 863-64 (10th Cir. 1986) (exclusion of doctor from Medicare
reimbursement for 10 years); Geriatrics, Inc. v. Harris, 640 F.2d 262, 264-65 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 832
(1981) (termination of Medicaid funding for nursing home); Green v. Cashman, 605 F.2d 945 (6th Cir. 1979) (termination
of Medicaid payments for nursing home).
262. See Ritter v. Cohen, 797 F.2d 119 (3rd Cir. 1986) (termination of physician's participation in Medicaid
program); Hathaway v. Mathews, 546 F.2d 227, 230 (7th Cir. 1976) (termination of Medicaid payments to nursing
home); Case v. Weinberger, 523 F.2d 602, 606 (2d Cir. 1975) (removal of Medicare patients from nursing home);
Lavapies, 687 F. Supp. 1193 (physician sanctioned by PRO); Papendick, 658 F. Supp. at 1432 (physician sanctioned by
PRO).
263. Koerpel, 797 F.2d at 865-66; Lavapies, 687 F. Supp. at 1201; Ferrer v. Bowen, No. C86-3523, slip op. at
8 (N.D. Ohio filed July 6, 1987). It is ironic that under the reasoning of Koerpel a physician or provider terminated for
no reason at all would not have a right to due process, since he has no property right in participation in the Medicare
program. A physician terminated, however, for gross and flagrant violations of professional standards of care is entitled
to full due process protection, because his reputation has been impugned.
264. Doyle v. Bowen, 848 F.2d 296, 302 (Ist Cir. 1988); Cassim v. Bowen, 824 F.2d 791, 796-97 (9th Cir. 1987);
Varandani v. Bowen, 824 F.2d 307, 310 (4th Cir. 1987).
265. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
266. Thorbus v. Bowen, 848 F.2d 901 (8th Cir. 1988); Doyle, 848 F.2d at 302; Cassim, 824 F.2d at 797-98;
Varandani, 824 F.2d at 310-11; Koerpel, 797 F.2d at 868-69; Ritter, 797 F.2d at 123-24; Lavapies, 687 F. Supp. at
1203; Papendick, 658 F. Supp. at 1431; County of San Diego v. Bowen, 631 F. Supp. 947, 953 (S.D. Cal. 1986); Kwoun
v. Schweiker, 528 F. Supp. 1004, 1007 (E.D. Mo. 1981).
267. Cassim, 824 F.2d at 797; Ritter, 797 F.2d at 123; Ferrer, slip op. at 10; Pupendick, 658 F. Supp. at 1431.
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proceedings for protecting Medicare beneficiaries from seriously deficient
physicians. 268 Finally, the courts have noted that the multiple levels of review
afforded physicians before the OIG issues a sanction lower the risk of error to an
acceptable level. 269 Summing these considerations, the courts have uniformly held
that even the procedures provided to physicians before the May 1987 compromise
afforded sufficient notice and an opportunity to respond to charges to accord with the
requirements of due process. 270
One can certainly argue with the weight given to the relevant considerations in
these cases. In particular, they tend to trivialize the devastating impact of exclusion
on physicians. Nevertheless, the unanimity of their results clearly establishes the
constitutionality of exclusions based on PRO recommendations prior to an adversarial
hearing before an AL. This does not mean, of course, that a pre-exclusion hearing
might not make sense. This issue will be considered later. First, however, the
procedures that should be followed in the PRO and ALJ process will be further
considered.
2. Notice
Though the Constitution does not require a pre-exclusion hearing, it does require
that a provider or physician receive notice of the grounds on which the sanction is
based.271 The PRO regulations and manual set out fairly extensive and specific
requirements for notices to be sent to the provider before the thirty-day review in a
gross and flagrant case, before the twenty-day and thirty-day reviews in the case of
a substantial number of substantial violations, and, finally, before OIG review in both
situations. 272 The doctor is to be informed of the obligation violated, the basis for the
PRO determination, the sanction the PRO will recommend, and the procedural rights
the doctor is entitled to in the review process.
Despite these specific requirements, providers have encountered problems with
notice in the PRO sanctions process. First, there are difficulties that seem to stem
from the unfamiliarity of the doctors running the PROs with legal process. In one
PRO sanction decision, for example, the ALJ faulted the PRO for providing the
sanctioned doctor only with vague "issues of concern" rather than the clear and
specific charges required by the regulations. 273 In other cases, PROs have raised new
issues not covered by the original notice at a sanction meeting. 274 The May 1987
compromise requires PROs to use model letters that will more clearly give notice to
268. Doyle, 848 F.2d at 302; Cassim, 824 F.2d at 799; Papendick, 658 F. Supp. at 1431-32.
269. Cassim, 824 F.2d at 797-98; Papendick, 658 F. Supp. at 1431.
270. Doyle, 848 F.2d at 302; Varandani, 824 F.2d at 313; Koerpel, 797 F.2d at 867-68 (citing Cleveland Bd. of
Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532 (1985)).
271. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 542 (1985).
272. 42 C.F.R. §§ 1004.40-.70; PRO MAuMAL, supra note 53, § 6025.
273. In re Apakupakul, No. HIX-000-34-7009, at 32-33 (June 1, 1987).
274. Approximately 40% of the sanction recommendations rejected by the OIG in 1987 involved instances of the
PROs failing to follow regulatory procedures, including presumably failing to give proper notices. 0IG SANCnoN REPORT,
supra note 6, at 18.
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
providers threatened with sanctions. Manual Transmittal 15 includes such forms and
will, it is hoped, alleviate this notice problem.
The second notice issue is more narrow in focus. As stated earlier, the statute
permits a provider or physician to be sanctioned only if it "has demonstrated an
unwillingness or a lack of ability substantially to comply" with program
obligations. 275 The regulations place the obligation to determine this fact on the OIG,
after it considers the recommendation of the PRO. 276 At no point, however, do the
regulations require that the provider or physician be given notice as to the basis for
this determination or an opportunity to respond to it. In Lavapies v. Bowen,277 the
OIG was enjoined from imposing an exclusion until the question of willingness and
ability was raised and discussed. If this requirement continues to be part of the law,
the regulations should be amended to assure that the PRO gives the provider or
practitioner notice of the basis of its unable or unwilling recommendation and an
opportunity to respond.
3. Confidentiality and Disclosure Issues
The PRO confidentiality and disclosure statute and regulations have several
provisions pertinent to the hearing process. First, 42 U.S.C. section 1320c-9 imposes
strict limitations on the disclosure of patient information. These limitations have been
relied on to impede the access of expert witnesses called by sanctioned physicians and
providers to information necessary for analyzing the patient care at issue in the
sanction proceeding. Manual Transmittal 15, section 6025(C)(1), clarifies that such
information should promptly be made available to expert witnesses and may solve
this problem.
A larger issue is raised by 42 C.F.R. section 476.139(a), which prohibits
disclosure of PRO deliberations except to the OIG and HCFA. While this regulation,
by itself, might seem to leave providers and practitioners in the dark as to why a PRO
has sanctioned them, section 476.139(b) requires PROs involved in administrative
hearings to give reasons for their decisions, including the detailed facts, findings, and
conclusions that support their determinations. These rules are consistent with general
administrative law requiring that decisionmakers issue findings of fact and conclu-
sions of law, but prohibiting inquiry into the deliberative process to assure frank and
free discussion. 278 They should not cause providers undue hardship.
Even more significant to providers or physicians in the PRO sanction proceed-
ings is the question of whether they can discover the identity of the reviewers who
initiated or participated in the review process. Section 476.101(b) protects the
identity of PRO reviewers as confidential. This provision is supported by the PROs,
which believe that their always lean supply of qualified physician reviewers might dry
275. 42 U.S.C. § 1320c-5(b) (1982).
276. 42 C.F.R. §§ 1004.90(d)(7), .70(c)(4) (1987). PRO MANUAL, supra note 53, § 6025, states that the physician
or provider may address the issue of ability and willingness at the PRO sanction meeting, but does not require the PRO
to notify the provider or practitioner of the evidence on which this determination will be made.
277. 687 F. Supp. 1193, 1201-02 (S.D. Ohio 1988).
278. United States v. Morgan, 313 U.S. 409, 422 (1941).
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up if reviewers became subject to the threat of litigation and to other forms of
retaliation that might occur were their identity to become known. These fears are not
irrational, as 42 U.S.C. section 1320c-6 only offers physician reviewers qualified
legal immunity for their review activities. 279 Moreover, specialist reviewers may
legitimately fear that they will lose referrals if it becomes known that they are
responsible for sanctioning other physicians.
Sanctioned physicians and their representatives, on the other hand, complain
that this provision deprives them of the opportunity to confront their accusers, a basic
right in Anglo-American jurisprudence. Many of them believe that once a reviewing
physician decides that an attending physician's practice has been deficient, subse-
quent reviewers tend to accept the initial reviewer's analysis uncritically. They are
concerned that if the initial reviewer cannot be questioned, it will be difficult to
convince the sanction committee that the initial reviewer's reasoning was flawed.
Moreover, the regulation conceals from sanctioned physicians not only the initial
reviewer's identity, but also his credentials. Denied access to these credentials,
providers or physicians cannot determine whether the initial reviewer was competent
to review the particular case.
These interests can largely be accommodated. Providers and physicians in the
sanction process should be apprised of the identity and credentials of reviewers who
present evidence against them before sanction review committees and before ALJs.
The identity of the much more numerous physician advisors and specialist reviewers
who identify cases involving inappropriate care for referral to the sanction process
should not be revealed, however, as long as their opinions are not relied on
exclusively by those making the final PRO sanction decision. The credentials of these
reviewers-for example, whether or not they are board-certified and in what
specialty, the nature of their practice, or how long they have been in practice-should
be revealed to the sanctioned physician or provider, if this can be done without
revealing the reviewer's identity.
A final disclosure issue involves the method by which beneficiaries are made
aware of PRO exclusions. Currently, the OIG is required to publish in a newspaper
of general circulation a notice identifying sanctioned providers. 280 The May 1987
agreement committed HCFA and the OIG to promulgate a regulation allowing
physicians to have the option of notifying their own Medicare patients of their
exclusion. This option has not yet been implemented. While allowing physicians to
notify their own patients directly may be more protective of their dignity, and may
even make it more certain that beneficiaries will be notified of the sanction, it is
difficult to understand how this provision will be enforced. The temptation would
surely be great for a sanctioned physician to provide his or her patients with
something less than the full truth about the exclusion or even not to send the notice
279. They must exercise "due care" to receive immunity (but see Kwoun v. Southeast Mo. PSRO, 811 F.2d 401
(8th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1994 (1988) (finding PSRO employees absolutely immune from suit)).
280. 42 C.F.R. § 1004.100(d) (1987).
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at all. It is important in implementing this provision for HHS to assure that Medicare
beneficiaries do in fact receive a prompt and accurate notice of exclusion. 281
4. Burden of Proof and Weight of Evidence Issues
The PRO statute, regulations, and Manual do not clearly identify who bears the
burden of proof in establishing the appropriateness of a sanction at the PRO or ALJ
level. The APA provides that "[e]xcept as otherwise provided by statute, the
proponent of a rule or order has the burden of proof.' 282 This would seem to put the
burden on the PRO or the OIG seeking a sanction to prove up its case before an ALJ.
On the other hand, the sanction statute places the obligation on providers and
physicians to assure that services provided Medicare beneficiaries are "supported by
evidence of medical necessity and quality in such form and fashion and at such time
as may reasonably be required" by a reviewing PRO. 283 This would seem to support
the position of the OIG that the provider or physician when challenged has the burden
of establishing that services meet the Act's requirements. 284
Several ALJ opinions have considered the burden of proof issue at the AUl level.
They note that the proceeding is de novo and that there is, therefore, no presumption
that there has been a violation for which the sanction proposed by the ALJ is
appropriate. 285 As the OIG initiates the sanction proceedings, these decisions place
upon it the burden of offering evidence to establish the statutory requirements for
exclusion from the program. 286 Once the OIG has presented this evidence, however,
the ALJ opinions split. Two ALJ opinions place on the respondent the ultimate
burden of proof that the sanction was factually unsupported and legally unjustified.287
A third seems to say that the burden remains on the OIG to prove its case. 288 A fourth
opines that the burden is "shared.' '289
Because physician and provider participation in Medicare has become so
widespread and so essential to the practice of medicine, it is appropriate that the
proponent of the sanction of exclusion at both the PRO and ALJ level bear the burden
of establishing that the exclusion requirements of 42 U.S.C. section 1320c-5 have
been met. This is consistent with practice in OIG civil penalty cases290 and with
281. ABA COMMISSION ON LEGAL PROBLEMS FOR THE ELDERLy & THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED
STATES, MEDICARE PROCEDURES SYMPOSIUM: REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 30 (1987) [hereinafter ABA/ACUS Rco.a-
MENDATIONS] (suggests individualized mailings as a more effective means of notifying beneficiaries than newspaper
notice).
282. 5 U.S.C. § 556(d) (1982).
283. 42 U.S.C. § 1320c-5(a)(3) (1982).
284. See Fairfax Hosp. Ass'n Inc. v. Califano, 585 F.2d 602, 611 (4th Cir. 1978) (Medicare provider has burden
of establishing validity of disallowed claim in administrative proceedings).
285. In re Lifshutz, No. 000-44-7020, at 8-10 (Mar. 25, 1988); In re Polka, No. HIP-000-00-0229, at 6 (June 17,
1987).
286. Lifshutz, No. 000-44-7020, at 10.
287. Polka, No. HIP-000-00-0229, at 6; In re Apakupakul, No. HIX-000-34-7009, at 7 (June 1, 1987).
288. Lifshutz, No. 000-44-7020, at 10.
289. In re Santos, No. 000-54-7029, at 3 (Feb. 25, 1988).
290. See 42 C.F.R. § 1003.114 (1987).
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administrative law generally when a party is charged with an illegal or improper
act. 291
The question of the standard of proof is less controversial. Although some
provider attorneys have argued that the serious consequences of sanctions call for a
clear andconvincing evidence standard, 292 ALJs have uniformly required only proof
by a preponderance of the evidence. 293 This is consistent with the general standard of
proof in administrative law294 and is appropriate in these cases, given the balance of
weighty considerations favoring both the protection of providers and of beneficiaries.
5. The "Unwilling or Unable" Requirement
As noted earlier, 42 U.S.C. section 1320c-5 prohibits HHS from sanctioning
providers or practitioners unless they have "demonstrated an unwillingness or a lack
of ability substantially to comply" with program obligations. The failure of the OIG
to establish this element to the satisfaction of an Aid has been the cause of several
OIG losses in sanction cases. 295 Failure of PROs to establish unwillingness or
inability has also been one of the most frequent reasons for rejection of PRO sanction
recommendations by the OIG. 296 The OIG has noted the confusion involving the
determination of unwillingness and inability and has recommended that Congress
delete the requirement. 297 This would make the PRO legislation consistent with
section 1128(b) of the Social Security Act, which allows the OIG to exclude poor
quality providers without showing unwillingness or inability. 298 It would also restore
the law existing under the PSRO program, which permitted proof of the underlying
violations of standards to establish unwillingness or inability to comply. 299
It is difficult to prove that providers or physicians are unwilling or unable to
comply with program obligations. Most doctors faced with sanctions will enthusias-
tically express their willingness to comply, and many ALJs believe that if a doctor is
licensed he should be able to comply. In one case, for example, the AL concluded
291. 73A C.J.S. Public Administrative Law and Procedure § 128 (1983).
292. See Adams & Krebs-Markrick, Defending Physicians Before the Peer Review Organization: Practical
Strategies and Tactics in Sanction Proceedings, in NATIONAL HEALTH LAwYERs Assocmvmo,, U-utIZA1oN, MANAGEMENT,
PROs AND QUALrrY AssuRANCE: THE LEGAL PrnFALLs 21 (1987).
293. In re Lifshutz, No. 000-44-7020, at 10 (Mar. 25, 1988); In re Polka, No. HIP-000-00-0229, at 6 (June 17,
1987); In re Apakupakul, No. HIX-000-34-7009, at 23 (June 1, 1987).
294. See Steadman v. SEC, 450 U.S. 91 (1981); Breeden v. Weinberger, 493 F.2d 1002, 1005 (4th Cir. 1974);
Whaley v. Gardner, 374 F.2d 9, 10 (8th Cir. 1967).
295. Lifshutz, No. 000-44-7020, at 18-20; In re Hill, No. HIX-000-64-7015, at 5-6 (Nov. 16, 1987); In re
Rodabaugh, No. PS 000-74-7002, at 4-5 (June 9, 1987).
296. OIG SANCnoN REPORT, supra note 6, at 18.
297. Id. at 16, 21.
298. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1320a-7(b)(6)(B) (West 1983 & Supp. 1988). Section 1128 allows the OIG to exclude providers
or physicians from Medicare who have been convicted of various crimes, lost their licenses or been excluded from other
governmental programs, committed fraud, or refused to cooperate with various program requirements. It also permits
exclusion of individuals or entities who provide items or services "substantially in excess of the needs of... patients,
or of a quality which fails to meet professionally recognized standards." This provision is used relatively infrequently,
principally to sanction physicians for errors committed in practice settings not supervised by the PROs, such as in their
private offices.
299. Social Security Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-603, § 1160(b)(1), 86 Stat. 1548, 1683 (codified at 42
U.S.C. § 1320c-5(b)(1)), amended by Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-248, 96 Stat.
324, 388.
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that in several instances the services provided by the sanctioned doctor had grossly
and flagrantly violated professional standards. Noting, however, that the doctor said
he was now willing to comply, and seemed to be bright and well-educated, the ALJ
threw out the sanction recommendation. 3° ° In another case, the ALJ found that the
PRO must attempt a corrective action plan before it can establish unwillingness or
inability. 30 On the other hand, ALJs have excluded doctors when they felt that the
doctor lacked a basic understanding of medical symptoms and procedures. 30 2
At the PRO level, the requirement has generally resulted in PROs imposing
lengthy corrective action plans before considering a sanction. Most of the PROs with
which I spoke believe that in most cases unwillingness and inability can only be
demonstrated by the failure of a corrective action plan. There is much to be said for
this approach, as correction through education is the primary focus of the PRO
program. It is unfortunate, however, if this approach results in incompetent
physicians being kept in practice until they injure a sufficiently large quota of
patients.
On balance, the "unwilling or unable" requirement should be repealed. If it is
retained, however, HCFA should issue regulations making it clear that unwillingness
and inability can be proved by establishing uncooperativeness, lack of basic
knowledge or skills, impairment, or extreme incompetence over a period of time in
the past, as well as through showing failure to comply with a corrective action plan.
It is especially important that monetary penalties be imposed for deterrence
purposes on physicians and providers guilty of gross or repeated violations regardless
of their willingness or ability to be good in the future. One plausible interpretation of
42 U.S.C. section 1320c-5 is that the "unwilling or unable" to comply requirement
of subsection (b)(1) does not apply to the monetary penalty provision, subsection
(b)(3), and one ALJ has read the statute to say this.303 Under this reading of the Act,
further legislation is not necessary to reach this result.
6. Money Penalties
Section 1320c-5(b)(3) allows HHS, in lieu of exclusion, to require a practitioner
or provider who has provided improper or unnecessary services to pay a monetary
penalty of an amount not in excess of the actual or estimated cost of those services.
This provision provides in theory a useful, less drastic, alternative to exclusion.
Alternative sanctions to program exclusion that can be applied flexibly to address
particular problems have proven very useful in other regulatory schemes, such as
nursing home licensure, 3°4 and should be available to the PROs.
300. In re Hill, No. HIX-000-64-7015, at 5-6 (Nov. 16, 1987); see also In re Rodabaugh, No. PS 000-74-7002,
at 4 (June 9, 1987) (willingness of doctor to engage in continuing education and to monitor patients enough to show
willingness and ability).
301. In re Lifshutz, No. 000-44-7020, at 19 (Mar. 25, 1988).
302. See In re Betty, No. HIX-O00-64-7003, at 2 (Sept. 30, 1987); In re Rivero, No. HIS-000-64-7010, at 24-25
(Sept. 29, 1987).
303. In re Santos, No. 000-54-7029, at 22 (Feb. 25, 1988).
304. See INsaMrrE OF MEDICINE, IMPROviNG Tm QUALrry OF CARE N Ntmsttm Ho.tES 162-68 (1986). See also 1
C.F.R. § 305.79-3 (1987) (ACUS recommendations regarding civil penalties).
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Unfortunately, the ALJs enforcing the penalty provision have read it very
narrowly to limit monetary penalties to the amount of isolated charges strictly
applicable to a particular medical procedure determined to be unnecessary or of poor
quality. 30 5 The result in one case was a penalty of $65.44. 306 Obviously penalties of
this size do not justify the cost of a sanction process, and the OIG has effectively
ceased using the monetary penalty authority or accepting PRO recommendations for
penalties .307
The PRO legislation ought to be amended to allow the OIG to impose monetary
penalties of up to $10,000.308 This would allow the OIG to impose a sanction that
providers and physicians would take seriously but would be short of exclusion from
the program. As stated above, this sanction should be for past violations of physician
and provider obligations and be aimed at deterring future violations. It should not,
therefore, be subject to the "unwilling or unable" to comply requirement.
7. Bias
One of the most fundamental rights afforded by due process to a person subject
to an administrative adjudication is the right to a hearing before an impartial
tribunal. 309 One of the most persistent complaints made against the PROs by
physicians and providers is that their hearing procedures are inherently biased against
providers and practitioners accused of sanctionable conduct. This charge takes three
forms.
First, review by one's peers can also mean review by one's competitors. There
has been a general concern that reviewers who participate in the quality assurance and
sanction process may be competitors of the sanctioned physician, eager to get him or
her out of the way to expand their own practice. Conversely, there is the concern that
PRO reviewers may be friends and associates of those whose care they review, biased
against the public whom they should be protecting. These concerns are addressed to
a minimal extent by the PRO regulations, which prohibit persons from reviewing
cases if they have participated in treating the beneficiary, are a member of the
beneficiary's family, or have a management or ownership interest in the facility at
which services were furnished to the beneficiary. 310 The PRO Manual further
requires PROs to assure that members of any hearing panel making a final sanction
decision are not affected by personal bias or direct economic competition with the
accused provider or practitioner.
In practice, most PROs go beyond these requirements to avoid this sort of bias.
All of the PROs with which I spoke refuse to allow physicians to review cases from
hospitals or HMOs at which they have staff privileges to guard against both prejudice
305. See Santos, No. 000-54-7029, at 19-20; In re Polka, No. HIP-000-00-0229, at 20 (June 17, 1987).
306. OIG QuALrrv REPORT, supra note 167, at 9.
307. See OmcE oF INSPECTOR GENERAL, PRO TECHNICAL JNFORMA-nON MEMORANDum No. 2, at 3 (July 24, 1987)
(fines only cost effective when an improper pattern of care involving substantial reimbursement is involved).
308. See ABA/ACUS RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 281, at 30; OIG SANcTIoN REPORT, supra note 6, at iii.
309. Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 46 (1975).
310. 42 C.F.R. § 466.98(d) (1987).
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and favoritism. One even had a computer system to assure that this would not happen.
Several went further, refusing to allow reviewers to review cases from their own
community or from communities from which they received referrals. This policy was
particularly prevalent in rural areas. Other PROs do not allow doctors on statewide
sanction committees to vote on cases from their region and allow the provider or
practitioner subject to sanction proceedings to object to committee members who are
suspected of bias. These protections seem adequate to the job and have been accepted
by the one case that has directly addressed this bias question. 311
A second concern is that the PROs inappropriately combine the prosecutorial
and adjudicatory function-that is, reviewers who recommend sanctions are permit-
ted to participate in the decisionmaking process. It is generally inappropriate for an
administrative officer to participate in both the prosecution and decision of a case,312
though the Supreme Court has rejected calls for strict separation of investigative and
adjudicatory functions. 31 3 The one PRO case in which the issue was raised rejected
a strict separation requirement. 314 On the other hand, ALJs have rejected the
testimony of PRO experts who participated in a sanction investigation as not
credible. 315
Manual Transmittal 15, growing out of the May 1987 compromise, provides
that a physician who "was solely or primarily responsible for making medical
judgments and developing the record and initial findings to be used at the discussion
shall not vote on the PRO's final determination about whether or not to recommend
a sanction to the OIG." 316 This provision does not apply, however, to physicians who
summarize the views of others to assemble a record and findings for the sanction
meeting. It provides a useful compromise between the need to protect the rights of a
physician or provider threatened with a sanction and the need of the sanction
committee to have available someone with knowledge of the case. My impression
from interviews with the PROs is that this provision has not yet been implemented by
all of the PROs. It should be.
Finally, the most serious charge of impropriety against the PROs is that they are
inherently biased against providers because renewal of their contracts depends on
their meeting a "quota" of sanctioned providers. 31 7 The PROs operate pursuant to
contracts with HHS, and their multimillion dollar contracts depend on meeting
contract objectives. Provider attorneys have frequently claimed that favorable
evaluations of the PROs by HHS, and thus renewal of their contracts, depend heavily
on the number of sanctions imposed by the PROs. They also claim that OIG officials
311. Lavapies v. Bowen, 687 F. Supp. 1193, 1203-04 (S.D. Ohio 1988).
312. American Cyanamid Co. v. FrC, 363 F.2d 757 (6th Cir. 1966).
313. Withrow, 421 U.S. 35.
314. Doyle v. Bowen, 660 F. Supp. 1484, 1488 (D. Me. 1987), rev'd on other grounds, 848 F.2d 296, 302 (lst
Cir. 1988).
315. In re Polka, No. HIP-000-00-0229, at 17 (June 17, 1987); In re Apakupakul, No. HIX-000-34-7009, at 32,
35 (June 1, 1987).
316. PRO MANUAL, supra note 53, § 6025(C)(5).
317. See Carlova, supra note 219, at 62.
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are rewarded for wringing sanctions out of the PROs. 31 8 Thus the PROs and OIG
must find victims to sanction, whether or not those victims actually are guilty of
sanctionable offenses.319
It is, of course, improper for an administrative tribunal to hear a case in which
it has a financial interest. 320 Courts that have addressed this allegation, however, have
found that the PROs are not improperly biased in this respect. Doyle v. Bowen
321
noted that although contract renewals depended on meeting contract objectives,
including sanctioning substandard care, it had never been suggested that the PROs
should sanction physicians who were providing adequate care. 322 Moreover, Doyle
noted that there was no evidence that individual reviewers in the case were in any way
influenced by the PRO's concern about imposing an adequate number of
sanctions. 323 Similarly the court in Lavapies v. Bowen rejected the bounty system
argument and accepted the testimony of the Ohio PRO's Vice President of Finance
that the HHS had never imposed a quota of sanctions. 324
The HHS OIG has shown great interest in PRO sanction activity, which could
be interpreted as pressure on the PROs. Some of the PROs have engaged in highly
questionable conduct in pursuing PRO sanctions, 325 which might be attributable to
overeagerness. Nevertheless, PROs that have issued no sanctions have routinely had
their contracts renewed, demonstrating that no absolute quota system is in operation.
This is, however, a subject to which the PROs and HHS must be sensitive in the
future.
E. Two Alternatives for Improving the PRO Sanction Process
1. Transfer Sanction Authority to the Inspector General and Provide
Pretermination Hearings
Many of the problems in the PRO sanction process can ultimately be traced to
the difficulty of engrafting enforcement functions onto what is basically a peer
monitoring and education program. The tension between enforcement and educative
functions in health care regulation has been noted elsewhere. 326 An effective
318. The California Medical Association in Greene obtained documents sufficiently supporting these charges to
obtain further discovery of federal officials. See Greene v. Bowen, No. CIV S-86-0625 LKK (E.D. Cal. 1988) (order of
Jan. 22, 1988, at 28); Brief for Plaintiff in Opposition to Federal Defendants' Motion to Dismiss or for Summary
Judgment at 7-I1, Greene v. Bowen, No. S-86-0625-LKK (E.D. Cal. 1988) (filed Sept. 14, 1987); McGRw-Hu.L
UTtuZArTo REVIEW REPORT 3 (Mar. 24, 1988).
319. One provider attorney with whom I spoke noted that the absence of judicial review for contract denials, 42
U.S.C. § 1320c-2(f), made the PROs even more concerned about HI-IS pressure to sanction providers.
320. Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238 (1980); Ward v. Village of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57 (1972); Tumey
v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927).
321. 660 F. Supp. 1484 (D. Me. 1987), rev'd on other grounds, 848 F.2d 296 (st Cir. 1988).
322. Doyle, 660 F. Supp. at 1488.
323. Id.
324. Lavapies v. Bowen, 687 F. Supp. 1193, 1203-04 (S.D. Ohio 1988); see also Association of Am. Physicians
& Surgeons v. Weinberger, 395 F. Supp. 125, 139-40 (N.D. Ill. 1975) (rejecting the bias charge).
325. See In re Lifshutz, No. 000-44-7020, at 23-28 (Mar. 25, 1988); Doyle, 660 F. Supp. at 1488-89.
326. See Day & Klein, The Regulation of Nursing Homes: A Comparative Perspective, 65 MILBANK MEM. FED. Q.
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education program must work with problem physicians in a close consultative
relationship based on the assumption that the physician wants to improve his practices
if he can be taught how. An effective enforcement program assumes that there are bad
as well as good physicians, and it maintains its distance from all as it attempts to
effectively ferret out and prosecute the bad ones. In combining these functions, PROs
have understandably tended to err on one side or the other. Several PROs have
become so focused on correction, and have offered so many layers of review to assure
giving problem physicians every opportunity to straighten out, that they have yet to
impose a sanction. Other PROs have been overly aggressive. The basic unfamiliarity
with legal due process of the physician managers of this latter group of PROs has
exacerbated the inquisition-like atmosphere that physicians have experienced before
them.
I believe that the public, physicians, and providers would be better protected if
the sanction authority were withdrawn from the PROs and given to the OIG. Under
this proposal PROs would retain their quality assurance functions. They would
continue to monitor medical records and investigate complaints. They would continue
to identify quality and utilization problems. When quality problems were identified,
they would continue to require corrective action. This could include the interventions
suggested by the Third Scope of Work: notification, education (including telephone
discussions, suggested literature reading, continuing medical education, meetings,
and self-education courses), intensified review, and other interventions (including
concurrent predischarge review, second opinions or preadmission review, or referral
to hospital infection control, tissue, or quality assurance committees). 327 It might also
include other interventions used by PROs with which I spoke: requirements of
limiting practice, consultation, preceptorships, attendance in a residency program,
obtaining board certification, and oversight in surgery. HHS should assist in
disseminating information among the PROs as to novel and successful approaches to
quality interventions. 328
When a PRO identified a gross and flagrant violation of physician or provider
obligations or a failure to cooperate with or satisfactorily complete a correction plan,
however, the PRO would refer the case to the OIG. It would not, as now, send a
recommended sanction to the OIG, but rather it would refer the case to the OIG for
investigation. The OIG would then, using its own medical resources (which it would
have to create as its resources are now very limited) or borrowing experts from the
PRO, conduct its own investigation and build its own case. Once it decided to
proceed against a doctor for exclusion or for a monetary penalty, the provider or
physician could appeal directly to an AL.
Appeals of exclusions or money penalties should be heard by the ALJs attached
to the Departmental Grant Appeals Board. These ALJs deal routinely with sanction
303, 307-11 (1987); Jost, Enforcement of Quality Nursing Home Care in the Legal System, 13 LAW, MED. AND HEALTh
CARE 160, 162-63 (1985).
327. TmHRD ScoPE op WoRK, supra note 3, § IV(G)(1).
328. OIG QuALITY REPORT, supra note 167, at ii.
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appeals 329 and are more experienced in presiding over adversary proceedings than are
the Social Security Office of Hearings and Appeals (OHA) judges. Appeals from the
decisions of these ALJs would be to the Departmental Grant Appeals Board. 330 The
sanction, however, would be effective immediately upon the decision of the ALJ.
This system would solve a multitude of problems. First, the PROs could focus
on what they do best-peer review. They could also greatly simplify their current
quality review procedures, which in many PROs have become impossibly labyrin-
thine. The May 1987 compromise has effectively given providers and physicians a
full due process hearing before the PRO prior to their being sanctioned. Providers and
physicians charged with committing a substantial number of substantial violations are
now entitled to two hearings before the PRO. Sanctioned providers and physicians are
entitled to a further de novo hearing before an ALJ after the sanction is imposed.
Under the OBRA '87 amendments, rural practitioners, who have been the subject of
two-thirds of PRO sanctions to date, are also entitled to an additional preliminary
hearing before an ALJ before their sanctions can go into effect. Many of the PROs
interpose additional levels of review, involving up to thirty-five reviewers, before a
case even enters the sanction process. 331 It is difficult to believe that a system this
cumbersome and time-consuming is truly protecting the public when dangerously
incompetent doctors are involved.
Because a referral for investigation implicates no property or liberty interest,332
no PRO hearing would be necessary prior to the initiation of such an investigation.
Procedures imposed by the Third Scope of Work-an initial review by a physician
advisor, a further review by a matched specialist or quality committee before a letter
is sent to an attending physician or provider requesting an explanation, and a final
review of the response received before a quality problem is confirmed (presumably
by a specialist or committee)-would still be appropriate. These procedures assure
that the PRO is fairly certain that there is a quality problem before even raising the
issue with a physician or provider, and they give the physician or provider a chance
to explain before a problem is confirmed. Once a problem is confirmed, however, the
PRO should, without further delay or waste of resources, decide to (1) continue to
profile the physician or provider, perhaps intensifying review, if the problem were
minor; (2) initiate a corrective action plan if the problem were more serious but
correctable; or (3) refer the problem to the OIG if it seemed serious.
The OIG, with its law enforcement experience and resources, could investigate
all referrals. When the investigation substantiated problems, the OIG would seek
exclusion or a fine. The OIG could deputize PRO physicians to serve as experts in
investigating and presenting the case, but for this purpose they would serve as OIG,
not PRO, experts. As the OIG's experts would be responsible for presenting evidence
329. See 53 Fed. Reg. 25,543 (1988) (assigning ALJs responsibility for hearing civil money penalty and exclusion
appeals under most other HHS sanction statutes).
330. See CIVIL MONEY PENALTIES REP., Summer 1988, at 6-7 (describing the Board's ALJs).
331. AMA PRO ExEcurnvE SuRVEy, supra note 136, Table 11.
332. Cf. Setliff v. Memorial Hosp. of Sheridan County, 850 F.2d 1384 (10th Cir. 1988) (hospital investigation of
physician does not affect property or liberty interest).
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in any hearings and the sanction decision would be solely based on this evidence,
there would be no problem with maintaining the confidentiality of PRO reviewers
who had earlier identified the problem. If a problem were substantiated by the OIG
investigation, the provider or physician would be sent a notice, and a hearing would
be scheduled on an expedited basis, perhaps within sixty days. The case would be
handled by attorneys from the OIG's office, who could avoid the problems that have
occurred when PROs have held hearings without counsel or with less experienced
counsel. As the PRO would be merely responsible for referring the case for an
investigation, and not for deciding the case, the charges of bias recounted above
would no longer be relevant. Hearings would be held at the regional offices to make
them accessible to physicians and their attorneys.
From the perspective of providers and physicians, this system should be superior
because it would assure a hearing before an impartial ALJ before exclusion. Providers
and physicians would no longer have to put up with the quasi-club meeting or the
quasi-inquisition atmosphere that has prevailed in some PRO sanction proceedings.
They would be dealing with hearing officers experienced in legal process and free
from bias. Beneficiaries should welcome the proposal because it would assure that
dangerous physicians would be dealt with swiftly and effectively and leave the PROs
to focus on education and correction. HHS should welcome this proposal because it
would give HHS more direct control over the sanction process. The OIG is already
familiar with this kind of process through its experience under its section 1128(b)
authority, reaffirmed by the Medicare and Medicaid Patient and Program Protection
Act,333 and should be comfortable with it. Most of all, the PROs should welcome this
proposal because it would free them from their greatest headache. They would still
have the ability to threaten a recalcitrant provider with a referral to the OIG, but
would themselves be less the brunt of provider and physician hostility and distrust.
It is essential to this proposal that these cases be assigned to ALJs assigned to
the Departmental Grant Appeals Board and not to the OHA judges who currently hear
sanction cases. The primary reason for this is that OHA ALJs are not used to the
expedited time frames necessary if problem providers are to be given pre-exclusion
hearings. 334 Further, OHA ALJs are not used to dealing with adversarial proceedings
and have approached sanction cases as though they were Social Security cases, in
which they are responsible for protecting the claimant as well as for deciding the case.
One example of the incorporation of Title II social security disability concepts into
sanction proceedings is the Polka case, in which the judge gave extra weight to the
testimony of the treating physician (as is normally done in disability cases), even
though the treating physician was on trial. 335 HHS attempted at one point to develop
a trained cadre of judges within the OHA to handle sanction cases, but turnover
333. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1320a-7 (West 1983 & Supp. 1988). See supra note 298.
334. As was related earlier, ALJs have not met the 45-day time limit set by HHS for decisions on the pre-exclusion
hearings required by the Hall Amendment of OBRA '87. A recent OIG report notes that final decisions in exclusion cases
take even longer. It is currently taking about 15 months from the date of a PRO sanction recommendation and 10 months
from an OIG sanction recommendation to the conclusion of an AL hearing. OIG SAScrtoN REPoRT, supra note 6, at 16,
18.
335. In re Polka, No. HIP-000-00-0229, at 17 (June 17, 1987).
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dispersed the group, which no longer exists. Departmental Grant Appeals Board
ALJs have experience in handling sanction cases and should take over these cases as
well.
Two final proposals should be considered as ancillary to this larger proposal.
First, the OIG should be given summary suspension power for egregious cases, as is
possessed by many state medical boards. 336 This would operate much like a
temporary restraining order to remove a clearly dangerous doctor from practice for a
short period of time (fifteen to thirty days) until an expedited hearing could be held.
Second, if the proposal suggested above were adopted, the OIG would
effectively become a national medical board to protect Medicare beneficiaries. It may
be advisable for the OIG to have such authority, as there is ample evidence that the
medical boards of many states have not been effective in disciplining the
profession. 337 When medical boards are effective, however, it might make sense to
have a procedure, such as appears in some civil rights and environmental laws, to
permit the OIG to certify the state procedures as equivalent in effectiveness to the
federal procedures and have the PROs refer cases to the state medical board for
investigation rather than to the PRO.
2. Retain Current System, but Streamline and Assure Due Process
While there is much to commend the idea of shifting the sanction authority to the
OIG, it is also likely to face opposition. The PROs may worry that they will lose their
most important lever for securing cooperation from recalcitrant providers and
physicians. Providers and physicians may be concerned with the fairness of the
proposed process, given their suspicions regarding the current Inspector General.
Beneficiaries may be anxious about the added delay that the proposal could add to the
process, which already takes too long. The OIG can be expected to object that unless
substantial additional resources were offered to it, it could not adequately handle the
additional responsibility. While these objections are not insurmountable, they do
counsel consideration of a more cautious approach.
Such an approach should be adequate to address, on the one hand, the concern
of providers and physicians that the current system does not guarantee them access to
an undisputably impartial presanction decisionmaker and is excessively uneven in its
results and, on the other hand, the concern of beneficiaries that the current process
has been too much consumed with bureaucratic delay.
First, the twenty-day notice and opportunity to submit additional information or
discuss the problem with the PRO, provided by 42 C.F.R. section 1004.40 for cases
involving a substantial number of substantial violations, should be abolished. It no
336. See OHIO RE v. CODE ANN. § 4731.22(D) (Anderson 1987); FEDERATION OF STATi MEDICAL BoARDs, A GUIDE
TO THE ESSUnALS OF A MODERN MEDICAL PRACTICE ACT 18 (1977), reprinted in H.R. 5110, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 409
(1986).
337. See OmncE OF THE INsPEcroR GENERAL, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HuMAN SEvs., MEDICAL LICENSURE AND
DDtpuNE: AN Ovrvi-w 12-15 (1986), reprinted in H.R. 5110, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 256-59 (1986) [hereinafter OIG
LicENsuE & DIscIPLINE REPORT]; Rayack, Medical Licensure: Social Costs and Social Benefits, 7 LAw & Hum. BEHAV.
147, 154-57 (1983).
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doubt made sense at one time, when many PROs still had abbreviated procedures and
the thirty-day notice meeting provided by section 1004.50 was quite perfunctory, to
give physicians and providers with a pattern of problems an early opportunity to
explain or correct their behavior. The current Scope of Work provides thirty days
notice and an opportunity to discuss problems as part of the presanction quality
assurance process. 338 It also focuses PROs on corrective interventions rather than
sanctions for remediable problems. 339 The May 7, 1987, compromise procedures
substantially enhance the protections available to providers and physicians in the
thirty-day notice hearing. Under these circumstances, the additional twenty-day
opportunity for discussion under section 1004.40 seems redundant and an unneces-
sary cause of delay.
Second, the Third Scope of Work should be clarified to assure that the sanction
process is initiated immediately upon the confirmation of a quality problem, if it is
a problem for which a sanction is the appropriate intervention. Section V(B) of the
Third Scope of Work requires PROs to issue a final notification to an attending
physician or provider within a maximum of seventy-five days of the identification of
a problem by a physician advisor.340 During this period the problem must be reviewed
by the initial physician advisor and a separate specialist or quality committee, and the
physician or provider must be notified of the problem and given an opportunity to
discuss it. The confirmed problem will usually not be sufficiently serious to warrant
a sanction, in which case some other intervention, such as education or intensifica-
tion, will be appropriate. 341 If the problem is sufficiently severe to warrant a sanction,
however, the PRO should move immediately into the section 1004.50 process, with
the thirty-day notice serving to begin the process. Further delays for further
committee reviews or discussions cannot be justified.
Third, the OIG and HCFA could do more to assure greater reliability and
uniformity in the sanction process. Training sessions should be offered, for example,
by the OIG to lawyers representing PROs to make certain that they understand the
procedures the PROs must follow in the sanction process and to educate them as to
errors that commonly result in OIG rejection or ALJ reversal. Model forms could be
developed by HCFA to help assure that the PROs address the factors enumerated in
sections 1004.80 and 1004.90, which must be considered by the PRO and by the OIG
in imposing sanctions.
Under this alternative proposal, once the PRO initiated a Medicare exclusion
and the OIG confirmed it and gave notice to the physician or provider, an exclusion
would go into effect within fifteen days, as provided under the current regulations.342
The physician or provider could, however, within ten days request a stay of the
exclusion, as is currently possible for rural physicians and providers under the Hall
338. TtiRD ScoPE OF WoRK, supra note 3, § V(B), at 6.
339. See generally id. § V, at 5-15.
340. Id. § V(B), at 6.
341. Id. §§ V(G)(3)-(4), at 12-13 (which gives guidance to PROs as to the circumstances in which a sanction is
appropriate).
342. 42 C.F.R. § 1004.100(b) (1987).
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Amendment, 343 if the stay would pose no serious threat to the patients of the
physician or provider. The proposal would, however, establish uniform procedures
for all, recognizing that there is no defensible reason for distinguishing between rural
and urban physicians or providers. It would place the burden of proof on physicians
or providers to show that their continued participation in the Medicare program would
not pose a serious risk to their patients. By the time the sanction proceeding reaches
this point, the physician or provider has already had at least three opportunities to
explain the problem on which the sanction is based-once in the quality assurance
process, again at the formal meeting with the PRO (to which lawyers and witnesses
can be brought), and again when the case is referred to the OIG. Both the PRO and
OIG, considering all of the information presented by the physician or provider
through this process, have concurred that exclusion is appropriate because either a
gross and flagrant violation or a substantial number of substantial violations has been
confirmed. At this point it is proper that the provider or physician establish why, in
spite of this, the exclusion should be stayed. If the provider or physician asks for such
a stay, the effective date of the exclusion should be delayed for thirty days, during
which the ALJ should consider the record and any additional information supplied by
the physician, provider, OIG, or PRO. The ALJ should render its decision on the stay
within thirty days. Regardless of the decision reached by the ALJ on the stay issue,
the ALJ should reach a final decision on the merits within one year to assure that, on
the one hand, the stay does not continue indefinitely or, on the other hand, that the
exclusion is not stayed for an excessive period of time.
VI. DENIALS OF PAYMENT FOR SUBSTANDARD CARE
COBRA '85 amended the PRO legislation to require that PROs deny payment
for services provided Medicare beneficiaries when the quality of those services does
not meet professionally recognized standards of health care. 344 The amendment
further required that such denials should be made only "on the basis of criteria which
are consistent with guidelines established by the Secretary. ' ' 345 This provision has
proved intensely controversial, and two-and-one-half years after its enactment it has
still not been implemented by HHS, although proposed regulations have been
published very recently. 346
The judgment of Congress that the Medicare program ought not to pay for poor
quality care provided to Medicare beneficiaries makes a great deal of sense. It also
343. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1320c-5(b)(5) (vest 1983 & Supp. 1988).
344. COBRA '85, Pub. L. No. 99-272, 1986 U.S. CODE CONO. & ADMIN. NEws (100 Stat.) 83, 200 (to be codified
at 42 U.S.C. § 1320c-3(a)(2)).
345. OBRA '87 further provides that the PRO shall not disapprove payment until 20 days after the PRO has notified
the affected provider or practitioner and afforded an opportunity for discussion and review, Pub. L. No. 100-203, 1987
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. uN. NEWs (101 Stat.) 1330, 1330-135 to -136 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1320c-3(a)(3)), and
prohibits physicians from charging beneficiaries for services for which payment is denied because of substandard quality,
id. at 1330-139 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1395u).
346. See PRoPosED SUmSrAeNAmo CARE REouLxrONs, supra note 61. For discussions of the reasons for the
long-delayed issuance of the proposed regulations, see Hospitals Anxious Over Payment Denials, HosprrALS, June 20,
1987, at 48, 53; Payment Denials Spark Questions, HosprrAs.S, June 20, 1987, at 32; Payment will be Denied for
Substandard Care. MEDICAL WoRLD NEWS. Jan. 12. 1987. at 25. 26.
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makes sense to notify beneficiaries if the PRO peer review process concludes that the
beneficiary has been provided substandard care. Hospitals and doctors fear that the
PRO notification of substandard care denials may lead to increased malpractice
litigation. But if a patient has been injured by poor quality medical care, he or she has
a legal right to sue for redress for the injury. It is difficult to understand why the PRO
should assist in covering up the fact that such a patient has received substandard care.
It is, of course, important for the PRO to be very sure that care provided a
beneficiary was in fact substandard before the beneficiary is notified of this fact. The
statute, however, assures physicians and providers that the PRO can only deny
payment pursuant to articulated quality criteria and after notice and an opportunity for
discussion. 347 Proposed regulations further protect providers by only allowing
payment denials when substandard quality care has resulted in "[a]n actual,
significant, adverse effect" or "[a]n imminent danger to the health, safety, and
well-being of the beneficiary, or places the beneficiary unnecessarily in a high-risk
situation" 348 and, in most cases, after the case has been reviewed by a specialist in
the area of care at issue. 349 The proposed regulations would define "actual,
significant, adverse effects" restrictively to include patient management that results
in "(i) [u]nnecessarily prolonged treatment; (ii) [m]edical complications; (iii)
[r]eadmission; (iv) [p]hysiological or anatomical impairment; (v) [d]isability; or (vi)
[d]eath."350
The delay of HHS in implementing the substandard care provision reached the
level of unconscionability and, perhaps, illegality. In other contexts, excessive
administrative delay has been challenged by the courts. 35' If the proposal made earlier
in this Article to transfer sanction authority to the OiG were adopted, it would
become even more important that PROs have the power to deny payment for
substandard care in order to assure them some ability to respond directly to poor
quality providers and practitioners. HHS's proposed regulations, therefore, should be
implemented expeditiously.
Though the problems addressed by the NPRM as to how to evaluate the quality
of medical care are largely beyond the scope of this Article, one comment will be
made here. HHS should reconsider its proposal to notify beneficiaries only that
payment is being denied because care was substandard and not to reveal the specific
reason for the decision. 352 The draft rule of HHS mandates that payment only be
denied when care is significantly deficient and results in actual significant adverse
effects or an imminent threat to the patient. In these circumstances, the beneficiary
deserves to be told the nature of the substandard care, both to allow the beneficiary
347. 42 U.S.C. § 1320c-3(a)(2)-(3) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
348. PROPOSED SUBSTANDARD CARE REGULATIONS, supra note 61, at 1963 (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 462,
§ 466.100(b)(4)(i), (ii)).
349. Id. (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 462, § 466.98(a)(4)).
350. Id. (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 462, § 466.100(b)(4)(i)).
351. See Nader v. FCC, 520 F.2d 182, 206 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Hardin, 428
F.2d 1093, 1099 (D.D.C. 1970) (holding that agency inaction over a prolonged period of time can warrant judicial
intervention).
352. PROPOSED SUBSTANDARD CARE PEGULAONS,supra note 61, at 1960.
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to take necessary remedial action to deal with the threatened or actual adverse effects
and to relieve, or at least to focus, anxiety that the beneficiary may suffer from
receiving a general notice that he or she has received dangerously deficient care. A
more specific notice may result in marginally more negligence litigation, but after all,
the PRO program exists-to protect the beneficiary, not the physician.
VII. PRO INVESTIGATIONS OF BENEFICIARY COMPLAINTS
From the beginning, PROs have based their quality review activities primarily
on the hospital records they assemble through the sampling protocols described in
Part I.353 OBRA '86 required PROs to consider a new source of data for identifying
health care quality problems: beneficiary complaints.
Section 9353(c) of OBRA '86 requires that PROs:
Conduct an appropriate review of all written complaints about the quality of services (for
which payment may otherwise be made under title XVIII) not meeting professionally
recognized standards of health care, if the complaint is filed with the organization by an
individual entitled to benefits for such services under such title (or a person acting on the
individual's behalf). The organization shall inform the individual (or representative) of the
organization's final disposition of the complaint. Before the organization concludes that the
quality of services does not meet professionally recognized standards of health care, the
organization must provide the practitioner or person concerned with reasonable notice and
opportunity for discussion. 35
HHS has implemented this provision through a modification in the contract and
the Third Scope of Work and only very recently has proposed an implementing
regulation. Under the Third Scope of Work, PROs are to investigate complaints about
hospital inpatient or outpatient care, skilled nursing services, home health agencies,
and ambulatory surgical centers. 35 PROs may only investigate written complaints.
Once a complaint is received, the PRO must determine whether the complainant is a
beneficiary or beneficiary representative, whether the services were provided in a
Medicare-certified facility or part of a facility, and whether the services complained
of are covered by Medicare (whether or not they were covered for this particular
beneficiary).356
Once the PRO determines it has jurisdiction over the complaint, it initially
assesses the complaint to determine if investigation is warranted. If the PRO
determines that the cbmplaint has merit, it must request the beneficiary's medical
records within fifteen calendar days. 35 7 The facility has thirty calendar days to
provide the record.358 The PRO review must be completed within fifteen calendar
days thereafter if no quality problem is identified.3 59 If a quality problem is found,
353. See supra text accompanying notes 38-40.
354. OBRA'86, Pub. L. No. 99-509, 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws (100 Stat.) 1874,2047 (to be codified
at 42 U.S.C. § 1320c-3(a)).
355. Ttmw SCOPE OF WORK, supra note 3, § XVll(A), at 36-38.
356. Id. § XVI(A)(1), at 36.
357. Id. § XVl(A)(4)(a), at 37.
358. Id. § XVII(A)(4)(b), at 37.
359. Id. § XVIl(A)(4)(c), at 37.
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however, the PRO must contact the physician or provider and afford another thirty
days for discussion. 360 Within five days after the review is completed, the PRO must
respond to the beneficiary. Finally, if the PRO identifies a quality problem, it may
initiate sanctions or otherwise proceed through its quality assurance process, and it
must notify the regional office. 361
The Third Scope of Work places two restrictions on the PRO's duty to respond
to the complaining beneficiary. First, it requires that under certain circumstances the
response should be to someone other than the beneficiary. The Third Scope of Work
provides that within the review time frames set out above the PRO must contact the
attending physician of the patient whose care is the subject of the complaint fifteen
days before disclosing information to the patient, as provided by 42 C.F.R. section
476.132. Section 476.132 addresses disclosure to patients of information concerning
themselves. It requires the PRO to seek the advice of attending practitioners regarding
the appropriateness of releasing information to a patient. More particularly, it
requires that, when an attending physician believes that disclosure may harm the
patient, the PRO must disclose the information to the patient's designated represen-
tative rather than to the patient or, when the patient is mentally, physically, or legally
unable to designate a representative, to a person the PRO determines to be
"responsible for the patient.' 362
Second, the Third Scope of Work differentiates between physicians and
providers as to the appropriate PRO response to a beneficiary complaint. If the
complaint involves a facility, the PRO must inform the beneficiary as to quality
deficiencies it has discovered and corrective action it requires. 363 It must include
within this notice any comments the facility made during the thirty-day discussion
period. If the quality problem involves a physician, however, the PRO may only
provide "[a] general response that assures the beneficiary that a thorough investiga-
tion of his/her complaint is being conducted and that corrective action will be taken
when a problem is found. ' 364
The PROs have received few complaints through this process. How few is not
known, as HCFA does not collect data on complaints. Thirty-eight PROs that
responded to a survey conducted by PRONET, an organization of PRO beneficiary
representatives, reported receiving a total of 651 quality complaints between October
1, 1987, and the fall of 1988, with a range of 0 to 97 complaints and an average of
18 complaints. 365 Knowledgeable persons with whom I spoke, moreover, confirmed
360. Id. § XVI(A)(5), at 37.
361. Id. § XVII(A)(7), at 38.
362. 42 C.F.R. § 476.132(c) (1987). The incorporation of 42 C.F.R. § 476.132(c) is maintained by the proposed
regulations. See PROPOSED SUBSTANDARD CARE REGULATIONS, supra note 61, at 1964 (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 462,
§ 466.106(b)).
363. Ttnso SCOPE OF WORK, supra note 3, § XVII(A)(6)(a), at 37.
364. Id. § XVII(A)(6)(b), at 38. This will apparently be changed if the proposed regulations for review of
beneficiary complaints are implemented, as they permit disclosure of physician-specific information to beneficiaries. See
PROPOSED SUsrNDARD CARE REaot.AroNs, supra note 61, at 1960, 1964 (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 476, subpt. B,
§ 476.133(b)(4)).
365. PRONET, BEImxciARY WrnrEN QUAIY COMPLAiNr SURVEY 2-3 (1988).
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the results of my own less formal survey: most PROs receive from five to forty
complaints a month.
The paucity of complaints is not surprising. First, few beneficiaries are aware
that the PROs are available to receive complaints. Community outreach is a growing
emphasis of the PROs. Under the Third Scope of Work, PROs must submit a detailed
community outreach plan, which includes such components as a toll-free number
(which several of the PROs already have), educational programs and seminars, and
publication of informational materials. 366 The PROs, however, still have far to go.
Several representatives of beneficiary groups complained to me of the difficulties
consumers have encountered in locating anyone at their PRO who is willing or able
to take a complaint. One said that if a person from their organization calls a PRO to
make a complaint, the PRO does not know what they are talking about.
Second, the statutory requirement that the complaint be in writing undoubtedly
deters many complaints. PROs responding to the PRONET survey reported receiving
3036 total complaints by telephone, but only 944 in writing. 367 Medicare beneficia-
ries with current or recent experiences of unsatisfactory medical care are often feeble
and debilitated. Making a phone call to a PRO to present a coherent complaint
requires a major effort. If the PRO tells the caller that the complaint can only be
investigated if it is received in writing, the complainant must make a substantial
additional effort, which probably will not be forthcoming. Many beneficiaries also
interpret such a response to mean that the PRO is an uncaring bureaucracy, which is
not interested in the complaint and will not take it seriously.
One PRO with which I spoke attempts to deal with this problem by assisting the
complainant in drafting the complaint while on the phone. HCFA or the PROs could
also develop a form that could be immediately sent to complainants to fill out, with
a stamped return envelope, or that could be completed by the PRO with information
gained from the phone call. 368 Only two PROs reported to PRONET that they assisted
complainants by filling out a complaint form based on the verbal complaint and
sending it to the complainant for verification and signature. 369 A more sensible move
would be to remove the requirement of a writing altogether. It serves no obvious
function other than perhaps to deter some frivolous complaints. Though screening is
undoubtedly necessary to eliminate vague or unsubstantiated complaints, PROs
should be willing to investigate specific oral complaints. 370
Third, HCFA should amend its instructions to the PROs to assure protection of
the confidentiality of complainants. 371 Under complaint investigation procedures
366. Tiniw ScoPE oF WoRK, supra note 3, § XVI(C), at 34.
367. PRONET, supra note 365, at Al. This total includes both the quality-related and nonquality-related
complaints.
368. See Letter, supra note 172, at 2-3. One HCFA representative with whom I spoke affirmed this idea but
suggested the PROs do it as they, unlike HCFA, are not subject to the Paperwork Reduction Act and thus can develop
new forms more quickly.
369. PRONET, supra note 365, at Al.
370. Cf. CAL. HEALTH & SAFTY ConE § 1419 (West 1979 & Supp. 1988) (complaints involving nursing homes may
be submitted in writing, by telephone, or by personal visit; oral complaints shall be reduced to writing by the Department
of Health); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 111 1/2, 4153-702(a) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1988).
371. The Senate version of the complaint investigation provision included a requirement for protecting the
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required by the Third Scope of Work, a provider or practitioner being investigated will
be able to discover immediately the identity of the complainant because the PRO will
request specifically the record of the complainant and a response to the complaint.
But the PRO is required even to go beyond this and to request specifically the
attending physician's opinion as to whether the complainant is sufficiently stable to
receive information resulting from the complaint investigation.
The exposure of the complainant's identity throughout the process not only
serves to discourage complaints, but it may also actually put some complainants at
risk for their health and safety. Two representatives of beneficiaries with whom I
spoke noted that the PRO's practice of informing skilled nursing facilities (SNFs) of
the identity of residents who had complained about conditions in the SNF could be
dangerous to the complainant. The vulnerability of nursing home residents to physical
and mental abuse is widely acknowledged372 and has been recognized in state nursing
home laws protecting the confidentiality of complainants. 373 Yet even when care in
the hospital is involved, and abusive retaliation is less likely, the elderly, debilitated
patient or her family may fear that care will suffer further if the provider or physician
becomes aware that the patient has complained to the PRO. One interviewee noted
the tenuous nature of contemporary physician/patient relationships and expressed the
opinion that few beneficiaries would risk this relationship to complain of problems
without strict protection of confidentiality.
Given the broad powers the PROs have to monitor care in institutions under their
jurisdiction, they could easily investigate complaints while protecting the identity of
complainants. A PRO, for example, could request a facility that was the subject of
a complaint to provide the records of ten patients, including the complainant and nine
others chosen at random. Indeed, a PRO could intensify review of a particular
provider or physician, reviewing all cases or all cases in a particular area. If a
problem were identified, the PRO could then approach the provider with a pattern of
cases, no one of which would be identifiably linked to a complainant. If it became
absolutely necessary at some point in a proceeding to identify a complainant, the
complainant could be offered the opportunity (afforded by a number of state nursing
home laws) to withdraw the complaint rather than be put at risk.374
The Third Scope of Work provision that allows a physician target of a complaint
to decide whether a complainant is capable of receiving information about the
confidentiality of the complainant. This requirement was deleted without comment by the Conference Committee. See
CONF. REP. 1012, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 360-61. This does not necessarily preclude HCFA from establishing
confidentiality requirements, as they have elsewhere in the PRO program, see 42 C.F.R. § 473, but may argue in favor
of the need for a statutory, and not just a regulatory, change.
372. See Stannard, Old Folks and Dirty Work: The Social Conditions for Patient Abuse in a Nursing Home, 20 Soc.
PRoBS. 329 (1973).
373. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1419 (West 1979 & Supp. 1988); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 111 1/2, 4153-702(c)
(Smith-Hurd 1988); IOWA CODE ANN. § 135C.37 (West Supp. 1988); Micnt. Comp. LAws ANN. § 333.21799a(3) (Vest
1980); A.B.A. MODEL REcoMMENDATONSs: INI ERMEDIATE SANcrIONS FOR ENFORCMiENT OF QuAt.rrv OF CARE IN NURStNG
HOMES 33, 37, 40 (1981).
374. See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 111 1/2, 14153-702 (Smith-Hurd 1988); MIcm. Comsp. LAws ANN. § 333.21799a(3)
(West 1980).
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investigation is particularly offensive, indeed bizarre, and it should be deleted as soon
as possible.
It is ironic that although the PRO Third Scope of Work offers no protection for
the confidentiality of complainants, it goes so far in protecting the privacy of problem
physicians that it actually violates the statute. This is a fourth problem with
implementation of the beneficiary complaint investigation requirement. OBRA '86
requires that the PRO "shall inform the individual (or representative) of the
organization's final disposition of the complaint.' '375 The Third Scope of Work,
however, ever solicitous to protect the reputation of physicians, only allows the PRO
to give the beneficiary an evasive report that an investigation is being conducted and
corrective action, if necessary, will be taken. This response is contrary to the
requirements of the statute that the PRO explain its "final disposition." 376 Moreover,
it is likely to discourage complainants, who may be reluctant to pursue a complaint
without any possibility of discovering its disposition. It is hoped that this problem
will be cleared up by the proposed regulations, which seem to permit disclosure of
physician-specific information. 377
Fifth, representatives of beneficiary organizations with whom I spoke also
believe that beneficiaries are discouraged from complaining by the cumbersomeness
of the process. For example, most PROs define "quality" issues quite narrowly and
refuse a significant proportion of complaints lodged with them as inappropriate. 378 By
contrast, two of the PROs with which I spoke pursued nearly all complaints lodged
with them and were quite successful, for example, in straightening out billing and
coverage disputes for their beneficiaries. This should be the norm, not the exception.
Next is the problem of delay. Under the process outlined above, it can take the
PRO nearly three months to investigate a complaint. Contrast this with state nursing
home complaint investigation statutes requiring investigation of abuse and neglect
complaints to be completed within seven days, or within twenty-four hours if a
resident's life or safety is imminently threatened, and all other investigations within
thirty days. 37 9 While the statute requires that practitioners and providers must be
given "reasonable notice and opportunity for discussion" before the PRO concludes
that their services were of poor quality, the length of time that is reasonable in any
particular case should be determined considering the seriousness of the complaint.380
375. OBRA '86, Pub. L. No. 99-509, 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMiN. NEws (100 Stat.) 1874, 2047 (to be codified
at 42 U.S.C. § 1320c-3(a)).
376. 42 U.S.C. § 1320c-3(a)(9) requires confidentiality of PRO data generally and permits disclosure to the extent
necessary "to carry out the purposes of this part." Here disclosure is clearly necessary.
377. See supra note 364. Again, it is instructive to consider nursing home statutes that not only require the
investigative agency to give the complainant a full accounting of its investigation, but also allow the complainant an
opportunity to appeal if dissatisfied with the result. See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 111 1/2, 4153-702(g) (Smith-Hurd 1988);
A.B.A. MoDEL RECO.MENDATIONS, supra note 373, at 37.
378. The PRONET survey discovered that some PROs consider nearly all complaints to be quality complaints,
others only a very small percentage. Two PROs classified only 3% of the complaints they received as quality complaints.
PRONET, supra note 365, at 3.
379. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 111 1/2, 4153-702 (Smith-Hurd 1988).
380. HCFA's recent proposed regulations require PROs to allow practitioners or institutions 30 days to respond to
complaints prior to notification to beneficiaries, further slowing the process. See PROPOsED SUSTAtARD CAMR
REGULATONS, supra note 61, at 1964 (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 462, § 466.106(a)). That PROs are capable of greatly
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Several beneficiary representatives complained more generally that the PROs
will not communicate with complainants once the complaint is lodged and that they
tend to dismiss complainants and complaints too readily. One stated that an individual
beneficiary would seldom be able to pursue a complaint to a successful conclusion
without strong support from a determined family or beneficiary organization. Others
complained of the limited scope of PRO complaint investigations-they are generally
restricted to the facility record and ignore care received in doctors' offices or
following hospitalization. Finally, once PROs identify problems, there is often little
they can do to solve them. With nursing homes or home health agencies, for example,
the PRO may well end up referring a confirmed problem to the state licensing and
certification agency, which could have handled the initial complaint more rapidly and
with less danger to the complainant if the complaint had simply been forwarded to it
in the first place.
This final observation highlights a basic problem with the PRO complaint
investigation procedure: recent federal and state consumer protection initiatives are
building a reticulate, and sometimes redundant, system for beneficiary protection.
OBRA '87, for example, requires investigation of complaints involving nursing
homes and home health agencies at the state level. 381 All states have physician
licensure agencies, most license hospitals, all license nursing homes, all have nursing
home ombudsmen programs. Until recently, the PRO role in this network of survey
and enforcement agencies has been to monitor hospital data on an ongoing basis and
to study and correct problems identified through that monitoring process. The
complaint investigation requirements of OBRA '86 require PROs to take on an
additional new identity, much more closely akin to traditional law enforcement. This
may be appropriate in some settings, such as hospitals, in which PROs have extensive
experience and in which there are few alternatives to which the beneficiaries can turn.
It is less appropriate in the nursing home setting, in which other modes of state and
federal regulation are more established and PROs have little experience. 382 PROs will
not easily become comfortable in this new role, and if they are to take it on
effectively, HCFA will have to give more leadership than it is currently offering. 383
VIII. HoSPrrAL NonicEs OF NONCOVERAGE
With the DRG PPS Medicare reimbursement system came a fear that the new
system would create incentives for hospitals to discharge patients "sicker and
quicker."384 Because hospitals are paid on a per admission basis, it was thought they
expedited review is demonstrated by the notice of noncoverage procedures, discussed in Part VIII below, under which
decisions are rendered in three days or less.
381. OBRA '87, Pub. L. No. 100-203, §§ 4025, 4202(a)(2), 1987 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMm. NEws (101 Stat.)
1330, 1330-74, 1330-174 to -179 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1395x(v)(1)(L), 1395aa(d)).
382. See INsTrrum ov MEDICINE, supra note 304, at 146-70.
383. A draft manual transmittal addressing the PRO complaint investigation authority attempts to describe the kinds
of problems PROs should address and those they should refer to others to investigate. This is a step in the right direction.
In fact, only 59 of the 517 classified quality complaints received by the PROs identified in the PRONET survey pertain
to nursing homes. PRONET, supra note 365, at Al.
384. See Examination of Quality of Care Under Medicare's Prospective Payment System: Hearings Before the
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would attempt to discharge patients as quickly as feasible to reduce their costs and
increase their profits. The PROs, as Medicare's primary bulwark against erosion of
the quality of medical care, were quickly brought in to assist in assuring that
Medicare beneficiaries were not discharged until discharge was medically appropri-
ate. Resulting legislation, regulations, and manual provisions have created a terribly
complex process that has left beneficiaries confused and their representatives
frustrated.
OBRA '86 created the basic framework under which PROs review hospital
notices of noncoverage. If a hospital determines that a Medicare beneficiary no longer
needs inpatient care, and the patient's attending physician agrees, the hospital may
give the patient a notice of this determination.385 This notice is called a notice of
noncoverage, because it is effectively a notice that hospitalization is no longer
necessary and, therefore, no longer covered by Medicare. 386 If a hospital gives this
notice, and the patient refuses to leave, the hospital may begin charging the patient
directly for his or her care after the second day following the date of the notice (after
two "grace days"). 387
The patient may, however, request the PRO to review the hospital's determi-
nation. If the patient requests the review no later than noon of the first working day
after the date he or she receives the hospital notice, the hospital must provide the PRO
with the patient's records by the close of that day. 38 8 The PRO must then review these
records and discuss the discharge with the patient and the patient's attending
physician.3 89 The PRO must complete its review by the close of the next full working
day after it has received the records390 and then send a notice to the patient and
hospital of the results of its review. If the patient makes a timely request for review,
the hospital may not charge the patient for inpatient hospital services received prior
to noon of the day after the patient receives notice of the PRO decision. 391 Of course,
if the PRO decides that discharge is medically inappropriate, the hospital cannot
charge the patient until discharge is appropriate.3 92
If the hospital determines that inpatient care is no longer needed, but the
attending physician disagrees, the hospital may ask the PRO to review its
determination. 393 The hospital may not charge the patient until the PRO rules in its
favor. If the PRO rules in favor of the hospital, and against the attending physician,
the hospital may issue a notice of noncoverage. The patient may then request the PRO
to reconsider its earlier decision. The PRO must complete this reconsideration within
Senate Comm. on Fin., 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 114, 142, 276, 290 (1986); Quality of Care Under Medicare's Prospective
Payment System: Hearings Before the Senate Special Comm. on Aging, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 363-65 (1986) (Vol. 1).
385. 42 U.S.C. § 1320c-3(e)(1) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
386. Id.
387. 42 C.F.R. § 412.42(c)(3)(ii) (1987).
388. 42 U.S.C. § 1320c-3(e)(3)(B) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
389. Id. § 1320c-3(e)(5); PRO MANuA, supra note 53, §§ IM4120. IM4130.
390. 42 U.S.C. § 1320c-3(e)(3)(B) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
391. Id. § 1320c-3(e)(4).
392. 42 C.F.R. § 412.42(c)(4) (1987).
393. 42 U.S.C. § 1320c-3(e)(2) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). Under a provision of OBRA '87, it must notify the patient
that it has done so.
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three days. 3 94 As the hospital may begin charging the patient after the two grace days
elapse, however, the patient may have to pay for the final day of the reconsideration.
The Medicare statute also requires that hospitals give beneficiaries a description
of these appeal rights at the time they are admitted. 395 The Medicare Hospital Manual
requires that this statement be a copy of a document entitled "An Important Message
from Medicare." The PROs are to monitor hospitals to be sure that they, in fact, give
beneficiaries this notice.396 Under a rule proposed in June 1988, the hospital would
have to "obtain a separate signed acknowledgement from the beneficiary attesting to
the receipt of the statement, and maintain a copy of the acknowledgement. - 397
Finally, the PRO is responsible for reviewing all cases in which the hospital charges
a patient for care after a notice of noncoverage is sent.398 If the PRO determines that
the notice of noncoverage was inappropriate, the hospital must refund inappropriately
collected charges. 399 The PRO regulations and Medicare Hospital Manual also
provide for an expedited three-day appeal process when a hospital or PRO denies a
patient admission to a hospital on the grounds that the admission is not covered by
Medicare because it is not for necessary care. 4o°
If the procedures described in the preceding paragraphs seem confusing to the
reader, imagine how they must seem to an elderly Medicare beneficiary who has just
been admitted to a hospital or is just about to be prematurely discharged. Beneficiary
representatives with whom I spoke uniformly complained that HCFA's "An
Important Message from Medicare" was unintelligible to many beneficiaries and,
until recently, in error. Moreover, most beneficiaries are unaware of the "Important
Message," which is generally handed to them with a sheaf of other admission papers
at a time when they are obviously distracted by other concerns. One recent survey
revealed that 82% of beneficiaries claimed that they had not received the notice at
admission. 4 1 An AARP study of persons over sixty-five who had been hospitalized
in 1987 found that more than half of the respondents (56%) either believed that they
had not received the notice or did not know whether they had received it or not.402
Several beneficiary representatives with whom I spoke claimed that hospitals seldom
give patients notice of noncoverage, preferring to work with the doctor to convince
the patient to leave without threatening to make the beneficiary pay for the care. 40 3
394. 42 C.F.R. § 473.32(a)(1) (1987).
395. 42 U.S.C. § 1395cc(a)(l)(M) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). These provisions are implemented by 42 C.F.R.
§ 466.78(b)(3).
396. MEDicARE HosP. MANUAL, supra note 56, § 312.1; PRO MANuAL, supra note 53, § 2005.
397. 53 Fed. Reg. 22,523 (1988) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. § 498.27) (proposed June 16, 1988).
398. PRO MANUAL, supra note 53, § IM2080.
399. 42 C.F.R. § 412.42(c)(3)(v) (1987).
400. See id. § 473.32(a)(1); Wilson, How to Appeal Medicare Hospital Coverage Denials Under the DRG System,
20 CL.EARHOusE Rev. 434 (Summer 1986).
401. Conversation with Laura Schoenberg, Pennsylvania Public Interest Coalition.
402. AARP, DRAFT OF SuRvEY nY MARKETFAcs 5 (1988).
403. In fact, PRO data reveal that the extent of issuance of hospital notices varies significantly from PRO to PRO.
New York hospitals had issued 39,726 notices as of June 1988, Washington hospitals only 10. The extent of PRO
disagreement with the hospital also varied significantly, from a disagreement rate of 41% in Michigan and 44% in
Delaware, to 3% in Minnesota, Montana, and Maine. HEALT CAE FN. ADms., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & Hosoes SERvs.,
MONTHLY PEER REvw ORGANILzATON (PRO) DATA SuamrmARY D3 (Sept. 8, 1988) [hereinafter PRO DATA SutiARY].
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Though hospitals must all disseminate the "Important Message" at admission, they
can draft their own notices of noncoverage to give at discharge, and these vary
significantly, some not explaining the patient's rights at all.
The most important issues in this area concern whether the beneficiary should
always be entitled to a liability-free appeal to the PRO, when the beneficiary should
be given a notice of his or her rights, and what the notice should say. As described
above, if the hospital notifies the beneficiary that it and the beneficiary's physician
concur that the beneficiary should be discharged, and the beneficiary appeals by noon
of the next day, the beneficiary cannot be charged for care until the PRO rules on the
appropriateness of the discharge. If, however, the hospital and the physician
disagree, the hospital requests PRO review, the PRO rules in favor of the hospital,
the hospital issues a notice of noncoverage, and the beneficiary requests PRO
reconsideration, the beneficiary may end up paying for a day of care while awaiting
the PRO decision.
This two-track process is responsible for much of the complexity of the
"Important Message" and the confusion of the current process. Surely the cost to the
hospitals of the extra day of care in the latter situation, which cannot be too common,
does not justify this added confusion and complexity. Alternatively, PROs reviewing
beneficiary appeals, when they have already ruled on the disagreement between the
doctor and hospital, should be able to reconsider their decision within the two grace
days, because they already have the records and have talked to the parties during the
prior review. In any event, it should be possible to provide the beneficiary with a
liability-free review by the PRO. OBRA '86 only provided a liability-free appeal
from notices of noncoverage when the hospital and physician concurred. OBRA '87
appeared to assure a liability-free appeal for all beneficiaries, regardless of physician
concurrence or nonconcurrence in the original decision, but a technical correction to
OBRA '87, found in the Catastrophic Coverage Act, restored the two-track
system. 4o4 The statute should be amended to assure that every beneficiary who
receives a notice of noncoverage, and who appeals by noon of the next day to the
PRO, is entitled to remain in the hospital without additional charge until the PRO
decides the appeal.
If it is the intent of HHS to make beneficiaries aware of their rights, it is
troubling to rely on information concerning these rights given beneficiaries at the
time of admission, when most beneficiaries (and their representatives) are over-
whelmed with the anxiety of a hospital admission and other paperwork connected
with the hospital stay. Even having the beneficiary or representative sign the notice
will help little, as the notice will remain only one more paper to be signed as part of
the admission process. Notice of beneficiary rights should, therefore, also be given
as part of the discharge planning process. 4°5
404. Medicare Catastrophic Coverage Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-360, § 4096, 1988 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEws (102 Stat.) 683, 791 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1320c-3(e)(3)(A)(i), 1320c-3(e)(2)(B)) (to be amended by a
subsequent technical correction striking "before 'paragraph (2)'" in Family Support Act, Pub. L. No. 100-485, § 608,
1988 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADmn. NEws (102 Stat.) 2343, 2421 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1320c-3)).
405. Section 9305(c) of OBRA '86, Pub. L. No. 99-509, 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws (100 Stat.) 1874,
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At the time a hospital or attending physician determines that a Medicare patient
no longer needs hospital care, the patient ought to be given notice of this decision and
of his or her rights under the law. This information should be given the patient as soon
as possible after it is determined that the patient is ready for discharge and at an early
enough point to allow the patient to exercise his or her rights. The notice should be
provided to the beneficiary by his or her own physician or by an employee of the
hospital responsible for discharge planning. Alternatively, the notice could be posted
on the wall near the bed in all patient rooms that are used for Medicare beneficiaries,
so that the beneficiary could read it at his or her leisure. While providers may object
that this procedure may lead to more appeals, it is hard to sympathize with an
argument that beneficiaries should be kept ignorant of their rights to keep them from
burdening the system through the exercise of those rights.
The notice given the patient should be as simple as possible. 40 6 It need only tell
the patient that, even though the hospital has decided that discharge is appropriate,
the patient can stay and not be charged for the stay until after the second day
following the date of the notice. If the recommendation to merge the two-track system
into a single system is adopted, the notice would further state that, should the patient
decide to appeal and promptly calls (by noon of the next day) the PRO (whose
toll-free number would appear prominently in the notice), the patient could not be
discharged or charged for care until the day following the PRO's decision on the case.
If a two-track system is retained, the notice just described could be given when the
doctor and hospital agree, and a separate, differently worded notice could be given
if the hospital has already received review from the PRO. This notice would state that
a prompt appeal to the PRO would secure review within three days, with the patient
liable for only, at most, one day of care. This is all the beneficiary really needs to
know, and further information may be more confusing than helpful. This notice (or
notices) should be on forms provided the hospital by HCFA to assure uniformity and
accuracy. It should be drafted with ample input from beneficiary organizations to
assure that it is comprehensible to beneficiaries.
IX. UTILIZATION REVIEW DENIALS, RECONSIDERATIONS, AND APPEALS
While PROs do not yet have regulatory authority to deny payment for
substandard care, they regularly exercise their authority to deny payment for care they
determine to have been rendered unnecessarily, or in an inappropriate setting, or to
partially deny requested payment by modifying the DRG assigned by a hospital. 407
When PROs determine that payment should be denied on the basis of lack of
necessity, they are required further to determine whether beneficiaries, practitioners,
or providers should be excused from liability for the cost of this care because they did
1989, requires hospitals to assist Medicare patients with discharge planning. 42 U.S.C. § 1395x(ee) (1982 & Supp. IV
1986) (implemented by regulations proposed at 53 Fed. Reg. 22,506 (1988)).
406. See Letter, supra note 172, at 4.
407. 42 U.S.C. § 1320c-3(a) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986); 42 C.F.R. § 412.60(d) (1987); id. pt. 466.
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not know, and could not reasonably have known, that Medicare would not pay for the
care. 4o8
The PRO utilization review denial process is normally initiated when a nurse
reviewer, applying screening criteria, kicks out an aberrant medical record. This
record is then reviewed by a physician (usually not of the specialty of the physician
whose work is being reviewed) who then sends a notice to the attending physician and
to the provider requesting an explanation. 40 9 The PRO must allow the physician and
provider twenty days to respond to the query and must also allow an opportunity to
discuss the problem by telephone. 410 The provider and physician response is then
reviewed again, and a final initial determination is made by the PRO. In several of
the PROs I interviewed, this determination is made by the initial reviewer; in others
it is performed by a second reviewer. In only one of the PROs I interviewed was there
an attempt to use a matched specialist for this review. 411 Notice of this initial
determination is sent to the beneficiary, physician, provider, and the fiscal interme-
diary (which denies payment to the provider). 4 12
A beneficiary, provider, or physician affected by an initial denial, unfavorable
waiver of liability determination, or DRG change may request a reconsideration by
the PRO within sixty days of receipt of notice of the denial.4 13 The case is then
reconsidered by a matched board-certified or board-eligible specialist, who cannot be
the person who made the initial determination. 414 If a beneficiary requests a
reconsideration, the PRO must complete its review within three working days if the
beneficiary is an inpatient in a hospital (and the claim relates to the hospitalization)
or if the initial determination was a preadmission review and denied admission, or if
the patient is an inpatient in a skilled nursing facility, the PRO must complete its
review within ten working days.4 15 All other PRO reviews must be completed within
thirty working days.416 Some PROs offer an evidentiary hearing at the reconsidera-
tion level; others conduct a review on the written record (considering any additional
information offered by the requester) or by telephone.4 17
If the PRO reconsideration decision is unfavorable, and the amount in
controversy involves more than $200, the beneficiary may appeal the decision to an
ALJ.418 If more than $2000 is involved, the beneficiary may seek judicial review.41 9
408. 42 U.S.C. § 139 5pp (1982 & Supp. IV 1986); 42 C.F.R. § 466.86(a)(4) (1987).
409. 42 C.F.R. § 466.93 (1987).
410. TiRD Scom OF WoRK, supra note 3, § 111(B), at 2-3.
411. The regulations only require that the determination be made by a physician, 42 C.F.R. § 466.98, though the
PRO Manual also requires that it be done by a physician who practices in a setting similar to that of the physician whose
care is being reviewed. PRO MANUAL, supra note 53, § IM2002. The AMA PRO ExEcUrivE SURVEY, supra note 136,
Table 7, found that 28% of the PROs use specialists for initial medical reviews. More information on this is contained
in a recent GAO study. See generally GAO MEDIcARE PROs, supra note 175.
412. 42 C.F.R. § 466.94(a) (1987).
413. 42 U.S.C. § 1320c-4 (1982); 42 C.F.R. §§ 473.15,.16, .20 (1987); PRO MAruAL, supra note 53, § 4082. See
generally Wilson, supra note 400 (on PRO appeals).
414. 42 C.F.R. § 473.28 (1987); PRO MANUAL, supra note 53, § 4084(A).
415. 42 C.F.R. § 473.32 (1987).
416. Id.
417. PRO MANUAL, supra note 53, § 4086(B).
418. 42 U.S.C. § 1320c-4 (1982).
419. Id.
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A provider or physician denied payment, however, has no recourse beyond the
reconsideration, except the right to appeal unfavorable waiver of liability
determinations. 420 The provider or practitioner may also request an ALJ hearing if the
PRO found it to have inappropriately discharged or transferred a patient in
circumvention of the PPS system. 42 1 The physician or provider cannot collect from
the patient if payment is denied.
As a practical matter, PRO determinations seldom involve large enough sums of
money to justify the cost of an appeal to an ALJ or judicial review. 422 Moreover,
since only the beneficiary can directly appeal a PRO necessity or appropriateness
decision, and since the beneficiary is usually excused from payment for denied care
under the waiver of liability provisions, there is seldom sufficient incentive for the
beneficiary to appeal.
PRO officials with whom I spoke generally felt the utilization review system was
working rather well. Beneficiary and provider representatives were less sanguine,
though few put revising the utilization review process at the top of their PRO agenda.
Several concerns, however, were raised by these representatives.
First, providers and practitioners are concerned that they have no means of
directly appealing an adverse PRO utilization review decision to an ALJ. 42 U.S.C.
section 1320c-4 only allows beneficiaries the right to appeal PRO decisions to an
AL. As noted above, providers may directly appeal adverse waiver of liability
decisions, but not the underlying decision on necessity or appropriateness (except
when the provider has been found to have taken an action to circumvent PPS). 423
Even if a provider wins a waiver of liability appeal and the underlying decision is
wrong, the provider will be bound by that decision in future cases, for it will not again
be able to argue that it did not have notice of the lack of necessity of the service, a
necessary element of a waiver of liability determination. 424 Section 9313(a) of OBRA
'86 permitted providers and practitioners to represent beneficiaries in Medicare
appeals (if they did so without charge and waived any right to payment for the
services that were the subject of the appeal), 425 thus effectively allowing providers
and practitioners direct appeal rights when the beneficiary agreed to allow such
representation. This provision, however, expressly does not apply to PRO
decisions. 426 The Senate version of OBRA '87 extended it to the PRO program, but
420. Id. § 1395pp(d) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). This appeal is only available if the beneficiary does not appeal and
if the amount in controversy exceeds $100 for Part A determinations or $500 for Part B determinations. Judicial review
is available for waiver of liability determinations involving more than $1000.
421. PRO MANUAL, supra note 53, § 4088(A); 53 Fed. Reg. 8,665 (1988) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. § 466.83)
(proposed Mar. 16, 1988). This distinction is often not clear. A PRO could find an inappropriate readmission, for
example, to be not medically necessary or to be the result of a premature discharge.
422. Some of course will, such as an admission denial involving a costly medical procedure.
423. PRO MANUAL, supra note 53, § 4088(A).
424. 42 U.S.C. § 1395pp(a)(2) (1982).
425. OBRA '86, Pub. L. No. 99-509, 1986 U.S. CoD CoNG. & ADMiN. NEws (100 Stat.) 1874,2002 (to be codified
at 42 U.S.C. § 1395ff(b)(1)).
426. 42 U.S.C. § 1395ff(b)(1)(D) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
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this amendment was dropped from the conference bill,4 2 7 and thus providers and
practitioners remain without any means of appealing PRO decisions.
Because few PRO utilization review denials involve large enough sums to justify
the cost of an appeal (or even to reach jurisdictional amounts for an appeal), providers
and practitioners are much more concerned that utilization review decisions be made
correctly in the first place. The data are not encouraging. Nationally as of June 1988
during the second contract cycle, 3.862% of reviewed cases were denied. 428 In over
30% of these cases, a reconsideration was requested. 429 In nearly 44% of these cases,
the initial decision was reversed on reconsideration. Reversal rates of individual
PROs ranged from 10% to 71%.430 The SuperPRO has also disagreed with PRO
utilization review decisions in a significant proportion of cases. 431 It is difficult to
avoid the impression that PROs are often sending out initial denials without adequate
consideration, trusting that if the decision is wrong it can always be changed at the
reconsideration level. This is not a defensible approach under any circumstance.
Considering that denial notices go to beneficiaries as well as to providers and
practitioners, and often leave beneficiaries confused, anxious, and uncertain of their
own liability for the denied care, this practice is inexcusable.
Two approaches to improving the quality of utilization review decisions are
apparent. First, more contact can be required between the PROs and the providers and
practitioners whose records they are reviewing. This approach is taken by OBRA '87,
which affords a practitioner or provider an opportunity of discussion and review of a
proposed denial before the decision is implemented. 432 Although this approach is
sensible and is already the practice of many PROs, going further in the direction of
requiring the reviewer to justify his or her decision to the practitioner or provider is
not without costs. One PRO executive, for example, noted that it is difficult enough
to get qualified reviewers, and it will be even more difficult if reviewers are expected
to argue face-to-face with other doctors over every review decision.
Second, specialist review can be required at the initial determination level.
Currently, final initial decisions are made in most PROs by doctors who are not
specialists in the type of medical care under review. 433 Only at the reconsideration
level is specialty-matched review required. 434 Given the highly specialized nature of
modem medicine, this practice is unacceptable and goes far towards explaining the
high level of reconsideration reversals.435 It may not be practical to assign initial
427. H.R. CoNy. REP. No. 495, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 666, reprinted in 1988 U.S. CODE CoNG. & ADMI.N. NEws
2313-1245, 2313-1412.
428. PRO DATA SusnARy, supra note 403, Table Dl.
429. Id.
430. Id. See Whalen, Schmitt, & Rossetti, Early Experience with Peer Review Organizations, 3 J. GENt. INTERNAL
MED. 59 (Jan.-Feb. 1988) (describing the PRO reconsideration process from a reviewer's perspective).
431. OIG EFmcnvENEss REPORT, supra note 9, at 12, 61.
432. OBRA '87, Pub. L. No. 100-203, § 4093, 1987 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.mm. NEws (101 Stat.) 1330, 1330-136.
See 53 Fed. Reg. 8,865 (1988) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. § 466.93) (proposed Mar. 16, 1988).
433. See 42 C.F.R. § 466.98 (1987).
434. See id. § 473.28; 53 Fed. Reg. 8,666 (1988) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. § 473.28) (proposed Mar. 16, 1988);
PRO M, aumA, supra note 53, § 4084.
435. See Whalen, Schmitt, & Rossetti, supra note 430, at 61.
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reviews and the drafting of proposed decisions to matched specialists. Indeed, if the
review is done on-site, it is probably not possible. But the final initial decision, made
after the provider or practitioner has had an opportunity to review and respond to the
proposed decision, should be made by a specialist.
A final issue that is beyond the scope of this Article should be noted because it
was mentioned so often by the provider representatives that I interviewed. The direct
consequence of a PRO utilization review denial is that the fiscal intermediary is
notified, which then denies reimbursement to the hospital under Part A for the
unnecessary or inappropriate care. The intermediary should notify the carrier, which
should deny payment to the physician who ordered the inappropriate care. 436
Hospitals firmly believe, however, that this A-B link has not been made, and carriers
are not denying payment to doctors. Hospitals are exceedingly annoyed that they are
routinely denied payment for unnecessary care, but the doctors who ordered the care
are not penalized by Medicare in any way. Their annoyance seems justified, and
taxpayers, who are financing the unnecessary care, should be equally upset.
X. PRO DATA CONFIDENTIALrrY AND DIscLosuRE
One of the primary functions of the PROs is to assemble data. Not surprisingly,
therefore, they possess vast quantities of data on Medicare providers, practitioners,
and beneficiaries. PROs are not subject to the requirements of the Freedom of
Information Act. 437 Rather, disclosure and maintenance of confidentiality of PRO
data are governed by the PRO statute438 and regulations. 439 The general effect of
these provisions is to protect data that identifies patients, providers, and practitioners
against disclosure, except insofar as this information is required by federal or state
regulatory and law enforcement agencies to carry out their responsibilities.
The PRO confidentiality and disclosure provisions are generally consistent with
recommendations made by the Institute of Medicine after a thorough study in
1981. 440 This study thoughtfully weighed the considerations in favor of disclosure
and of confidentiality and reached conclusions that continue to be on the whole
acceptable. I would favor greater disclosure of health care quality data to assist in
creating a smoother functioning market for health care services, 44 1 but this preference
is grounded on health care policy rather than administrative law considerations. 442
Several confidentiality and disclosure issues have been discussed earlier in this
436. Part B Carrier's Manual, § 4169; Gosfield, Utilization Management and Quality Assurance, 2 MED. STAFF
Couus. 15, 16 (Spring 1988).
437. 42 U.S.C. § 1320c-9(a) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
438. Id. § 1320c-9.
439. 42 C.F.R. pt. 476 (1987); see also 53 Fed. Reg. 8,654, 8,666-67 (1988) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 476)
(proposed Mar. 16, 1988).
440. See INSMUrrE OF MEDICINE, AccEss TO MEDICAL RsviEw DATA: DiscLosuRE POLICY FOR PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS
REviEw ORGANIZATIONS (1981), summarized in Searches for A Balance in Medical Data Disclosure: Report of a Study,
1 HEALTH AFw. 62, 62 (Spring 1982).
441. See Jost, The Necessary and Proper Role of Regulation to Assure the Quality of Health Care, 25 Hous. L. REV.
525, 594-97 (1988).
442. Greaterdisclosureis favored also by beneficiary groups. See Letter, supra note 172, at 5-6; Letterfrom Sidney
Wolfe to HCFA (July 5, 1984) (commenting on proposed PRO confidentiality and disclosure regulations).
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Article.443 There are two additional areas, however, in which PRO policy should be
clarified to assist in effectuating the PRO mission. First, PRO sharing of data with
state medical boards should be improved. The OIG study on PRO quality assurance
activities found that 67% of the PRO CEOs interviewed believed that the relationship
between their PRO and state medical board was relatively poor, and 27% felt that
greater clarification was needed as to federal restrictions on sharing information with
the medical board. 444 This is consistent with my own discussions with the twelve
PROs I interviewed, most of whom exchanged little data with the state medical
boards.
Section 9353(d) of OBRA '86 requires PROs to share data with state regulatory
authorities. Regulations implementing this provision have been proposed by HHS.445
HHS should promptly promulgate regulations, issue Manual provisions implement-
ing these regulations, and amend its Scope of Work to require the PROs to formulate
a plan for sharing data with state medical boards.446
The second issue involves PRO notification of hospitals of problems involving
physicians on the staff of those hospitals. The PRO confidentiality regulations require
PROs to disclose to an institution, on request, information regarding the practice and
performance of practitioners in that institution. 447 Some PROs with which I spoke
have interpreted this provision liberally, notifying hospitals immediately whenever
they identify quality problems involving physicians on their staffs and fully involving
the hospital in the corrective action plan.448 Others have refused to release any
information to hospitals about a practitioner without the consent of that practitioner,
which is seldom given. The California Medical Association, recognizing the valuable
role that hospital medical staffs can play in assisting physicians with practice
problems, has urged HCFA to clarify the responsibilities of PROs to involve hospital
medical staffs in resolving physician quality problems. 449 The AMA has debated
taking a position favoring disclosure of physician problems to hospital medical staffs,
but it stopped short of doing so. 450 The AHA has also asked that hospitals be notified
443. See supra text at notes 278-81, 371-77.
444. OIG QuArv REPORT, supra note 167, at 18; see also OIG LicEusu & DiscipuNE REPoRT, supra note 337,
at 15, 17 (faulting the state medical boards for their poor relationship with the PROs). See also GAO MEuriC.AR PROs,
supra note 175, at 30 (57% of PROs reported no contact with state medical boards in the fourth year of the program; only
27% reported more than one contact).
445. 53 Fed. Reg. 8,654, 8,666-67 (1988) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 476) (proposed Mar. 16, 1988). HCFA
should also alter its proposed regulations to conform to the law. 42 U.S.C. § 1320c-9(b)(2), as amended by OBRA '86,
requires disclosure on request to state licensure bodies of data or information "relating to a specific case or to a possible
pattern of substandard care." The proposed regulation requires disclosure on request of information "relating to a specific
case of a possible pattern of substandard care." 53 Fed. Reg. 8,654, 8,667 (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. § 476.138(a)(1))
(proposed Mar. 16, 1988) (emphasis added). As the rule would seem to require a pattern of substandard care before
information regarding a specific case could be disclosed, it would permit sharing of much less information than the statute.
I am informed that this is a misprint, which will be corrected by HHS in the final rule.
446. See OIG QuAi.rry REPoRT, supra note 167, at iii; current requirements in the Scope of Work require this only
obliquely (see Ttnat ScoPE oF WoRK, supra note 3, §§ XVIII(G), XX, at 41-42).
447. 42 C.F.R. § 476.133(a)(2) (1987).
448. See AMA PRO ExTmvE Suvsy, supra note 136, Table 15 (85% of the PROs report meeting with medical
staff to share corrective action plans).
449. See Letter from Laurens White, CMA, to Thomas Morford, HSQB, at 3 (Mar. 30, 1988).
450. PROs Draw Fire from AMA House, MEo. WoRLD NEws, Jan. 12, 1987, at 26.
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whenever a quality problem is identified by the PRO involving a physician on their
medical staffs.4 51
Several HCFA memos issued in 1988 have further muddied the waters as to the
PROs' responsibilities in this respect. A Regional Medical Review Letter issued in
January 1988 informed the PROs that absent permission from a physician they could
not disclose information concerning quality problems to a hospital medical staff
unless the PRO identified a "pattern" of poor practice (involving more than one
confirmed problem) and then only if the hospital requested the information. A
subsequent Regional Medical Review Letter, dated June 1988, informed PROs that
HCFA had reconsidered and that they could inform hospitals of any confirmed quality
problems involving physicians on that hospital's staff, with or without a request. This
reconsideration was based on the realization that any quality problem involving a
physician potentially involved the provider as well. The June 1988 letter, however,
prohibited PROs from divulging to hospitals corrective action plans they were
considering. This left the PROs in a quandary, as most physician corrective action
plans involve hospital oversight. A memo from HSQB, dated July 22, 1988,
addresses this situation by permitting PROs to notify hospitals of corrective action
plans when the hospital's participation is necessary to implement the plan or if the
plan will affect the hospital. Otherwise, notification to the hospital is still
prohibited. 452
HHS should amend its confidentiality regulations to allow PROs to disclose to
hospital medical staffs information regarding any confirmed quality problems
involving practitioners on the staffs of those hospitals and any corrective action plans
involving those practitioners. Hospitals already have a pretty good idea of who on
their staff is in trouble with the PROs because they know whose records the PROs are
requesting. Explicit sharing of PRO information with the hospitals would help them
to better focus their efforts in assisting these problem doctors to improve their
practices. Such sharing is certainly consistent with the PRO statute, which permits
disclosure of confidential information "to the extent that may be necessary to carry
out the purposes of this part" and when the Secretary permits disclosure by
regulation. 453 This change would assist PROs in carrying out their quality assurance
role, assist hospitals in dealing with problem doctors, and, ultimately, assist doctors
in addressing quality problems before beneficiaries are harmed and sanctions become
necessary.
451. See Letter from Jack Owen to William Roper (May 16, 1988) (commenting on proposed PRO regulations). See
also Remarks of Buetel, Dedic, and Weit on the role of a hospital PRO committee in assisting physicians, Transcript,
Conference on Understanding the Federal P.R.O., 95-107 (Feb. 28, 1987) (sponsored by Loyola University Health Law
Institute, Chicago Academy of Medicine, and Resurrection Hospital, Chicago).
452. Memo from Richard Husk, Director Office of Peer Review, to John L. Setman, Associate Regional
Administrator, HSQB, Region VII.
453. 42 U.S.C. § 1320c-9(a)(1)-(2) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
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XI. CONCLUSION
The PRO program is still very young-a person its age would still be in
kindergarten. During its short life it has undergone frequent and dramatic change. Not
surprisingly, the beneficiaries, providers, and practitioners affected by the program
have frequently found it frustrating and almost always confusing. Among those I
interviewed, however, there seemed to be an emerging consensus that the program is
worth keeping and that it is maturing. The recommendations delineated in this Article
are offered to assist in that maturing process, to fine-tune rather than to radically
change the program. They will undoubtedly not be accepted by consensus. The
parties affected by the program too often have already staked out positions too sharply
at odds to make consensus possible. These suggestions are offered, however, with
good will towards the program and to all those affected by it. It is hoped that those
with the power to implement these recommendations will consider them carefully as
a means towards improving the PRO program to better serve the Medicare program
and its beneficiaries.

